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Abstract 
The seven publications comprising this PhD by publication employ neo-
Durkheimian institutional theory (NDIT) to examine the relationship between the 
concept of culture and accounting practice. The primary focus of all the publications 
is on the dynamics of cultural dialogues (as defined in NDIT) and cultural change, 
and the publications contribute to accounting research in the areas of: audit failure, 
the financial crisis, developments in management accounting post-1980, 
financialization, risk disclosure, and accounting regulation.  
The contributions of three of the publications contributions derive from identifying 
the impact that a shift to a dominant individualistic solidarity has upon the 
(in)effectiveness of Arthur Andersen as the Enron auditor, the behaviours of key 
actors in the 2007-8 financial crisis, and the development of strategic management 
accounting post-1980. The fourth publication contributes by employing NDIT to 
explain cross-country variations in experiences of financialization. The fifth 
publication contributes to a new understanding of risk disclosures by demonstrating 
it is possible to trace through from patterns of social relations to risk management 
strategies and risk disclosures. The final two publications contribute to debates 
regarding the development of regulation by evidencing that accounting regulation is 
not subject to regulatory capture but rather to regulatory self-capture.         
Prior accounting-culture studies have depended heavily upon Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions as the theory base and this is problematic as his work has been subject to 
important criticisms. NDIT, unlike Hofstede, does not assume nations are culturally 
homogenous and static.  
There has been little use made of NDIT in prior accounting research and, in addition 
to the aforementioned contributions, the publications also demonstrate the efficacy 
of the theory for undertaking nuanced analyses of the four solidarities by reference to 
patterns of social relations and for explaining the dynamics of cultural change via the 
notion of cultural dialogues. 
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1. Introduction 
My research employs neo-Durkheimian institutional theory (NDIT) to address the 
complex problem of understanding the relationship between the concept of culture 
and accounting practice. Academics initially recognised accounting needed to be 
studied as a social and institutional practice at the end of the 1970s; however, a 
primary concern in respect of accounting-culture studies undertaken to date is the 
enormous dependence upon Hofstede’s cultural dimensions1 as the theory base. The 
domination of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions in accounting research is highly 
problematic as his work has been subject to important criticisms. Hofstede assumes 
nations are culturally homogenous which is restrictive and oversimplifies the idea of 
culture. As a consequence accounting research dependent upon Hofstede’s 
dimensions is prone to disregard the intricacies of culture (Harrison and McKinnon, 
1999). Further, Hofstede assumes culture is static and this presents an additional 
issue for accounting research utilising his cultural dimensions as it ignores the 
possibility of cultural change.
My motivation for employing neo-Durkheimian institutional theory (NDIT) in 
culturally-related accounting research is it can provide nuanced culturally-based 
analyses and the criticisms of Hofstede do not apply to the theory. NDIT asserts that 
in any group four solidarities (the individualistic, hierarchical, isolate and enclaved 
solidarities) will be present and in constant opposition, and this gives rise to cultural 
dialogues as the ‘supporters’ of each solidarity articulate their worldviews in a bid to 
convince others of the rightness of their claims (see for example, Douglas, 1997, 
2004). The dynamics and complexities of cultural change are explained in NDIT via 
the notion of cultural dialogues and it neither assumes a direct relationship between 
nations and cultures or that cultures are static. My decision to adopt NDIT is based 
upon my recognising I could significantly contribute to the development of 
culturally-based accounting research by undertaking studies that have a primary 
focus on the dynamics of cultural dialogues.   
The seven publications comprising the thesis examine a broad range of topics in 
accounting and finance within different institutional and societal settings; for 
1 These are the (now) six dimensions: power distance, individualism (versus collectivism), 
masculinity (versus femininity), uncertainty avoidance, long term orientation (versus short term 
orientation), and indulgence (versus restraint). See, for example, Hofstede (2011).   
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example, the publications study, inter alia, the financial crisis of 2007-8, the Burmah 
Oil Company tanker fleet crisis of 1974 and comparative experiences of 
financialization in the UK and Germany2. An overarching contribution of the 
publications is they corroborate the existence of cultural dialogues and extend 
understanding of the significant impacts these cultural dialogues have for accounting 
and finance practice. In doing so they substantiate NDIT can provide nuanced and 
dynamic analyses of culturally-related aspects of accounting and finance. The 
specific contributions of the publications are that they add to knowledge of: causes 
of audit failure and financial failure, reasons for the development of Strategic 
Management Accounting and strategy as craft, how the different aspects of 
financialization can be brought together, the connection between thought styles, risk 
strategies and risk disclosures, and the development of accounting regulation as a 
function of regulatory self-capture.      
The next section of this integrative chapter discusses the problem my research 
addresses and sets out why this problem is important. Section three critiques extant 
culturally-related accounting research and discusses the issues arising from 
Hofstede’s hegemony in accounting-culture research. This section also explains why 
Hofstede has been adopted to such an extent in prior accounting research. Section 
four summarises the fundamentals of NDIT, explains how NDIT is a dynamic theory 
not susceptible to the same criticisms as Hofstede and addresses criticisms 
commonly directed at NDIT. This section also explains my motivations for adopting 
NDIT in culturally-related accounting research. The fifth section of the chapter 
evaluates the original contribution to knowledge that has been made by the submitted 
work. Finally, the conclusion reviews the discussions presented in the chapter and 
discusses the multiplicity of future directions for NDIT-based research in the field of 
accounting and finance.  
2. The problem addressed by my research 
The research comprising this thesis employs NDIT to address the significant 
problem of how to understand the relationship between culture and accounting 
2 Details of the seven publications are provided in Table 3 in appendix 1 and the full publications are 
provided in appendix 3.  
9 
practice. Accounting researchers began to fully recognise the importance and 
significance of examining accounting as a social and institutional practice only 
relatively recently at the end of the 1970’s (Miller, 1994; Hopwood, 1985; 
Hopwood, 2005). Walker (2016) discusses how, at this time, ‘pioneering’ accounting 
academics “embarked on difficult journeys in search of the interconnections between 
accounting and the social” (p. 41). These accounting academics include, for 
example, Burchell et al. (1980) who discuss accounting as an institution and note 
how the field is undergoing a reappraisal with “(f)inancial accounting and reporting 
… coming to be seen as outgrowths of institutional processes of enormous and still 
uncharted complexity” (p. 12).  
This important adjustment in the focus from accounting being perceived as a 
‘neutral’ activity reporting economic truths to it being understood as a collection of 
practices “(t)he emergence, distribution, location and intensity of which … are thus 
research issues that promise to tell us something about the type of social relations 
that obtain in different … settings, and at different points in time” (Miller, 1994, p. 
2) led to researchers such as Violet (1983) identifying culture and accounting as 
inextricably connected: 
Accounting is a social institution established … to report and explain certain social 
phenomena occurring in economic transactions … As a social institution … (a)cccounting 
cannot be isolated and analyzed as an independent component of culture. It is … a product 
of culture. (Violet, 1983, p. 8)  
The importance of studying the complex effects culture has on accounting praxis is 
now fully acknowledged by accounting academics and extant accounting research 
has examined these effects across a wide array of areas within accounting. These 
include, inter alia, studies of culture and: the development of national accounting 
systems (see, for example, Salter and Niswander, 1995), the application of 
accounting standards (see, for example, Tsakumis, 2007; Cieslewicz, 2014), 
accounting classifications (see, for example, d’Arcy, 2004), accountability styles 
(Ahrens, 1996), tax ethics and tax reform programmes (Shafer and Simmons, 2011; 
Xu and Xu, 2016), the design of management accounting control systems (see, for 
example, Williams and Seaman, 2001), modes of budgetary participation (see, for 
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example, O’Conner, 1995), how performance measurement systems are employed 
(Henri, 2006), annual report disclosures (see, for example, Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002), audit firms and auditors’ judgements of materiality (see, for example, 
Carpenter et al., 1994; Sikka, 2008), approaches to risk management (see, for 
example, Mikes, 2011), accounting fraud (see, for example, Cooper et al., 2013), 
accountability systems and ethnicity (see, for example, Greer and Patel, 2000), and 
gender and the accounting profession (see, for example, Kamla, 2012; Davie, 2017). 
However, as explained in the next section there is a major problem with this prior 
research. 
3. Extant culturally-related accounting research 
3.1 The hegemony of Hofstede 
Although a significant number of culturally-related accounting studies have been 
published, a primary concern is there has been an overwhelming dependence upon 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions as the theory base. Baskerville (2003) identifies this 
prior dependence and raises significant issues regarding the employment of Hofstede 
for studying culture (Baskerville 2003). Other accounting researchers who have also 
recognised this reliance upon Hofstede include Greer and Patel (2000) who argue 
that the “majority of cross-cultural accounting studies have applied only one 
conception of culture … originat(ing) from the research by Hofstede” (p. 309) and 
Harrison and McKinnon (1999) who identify prior culturally-focused management 
control systems studies as “restricted and narrowed in focus through an almost total 
adoption of the … work of Geert Hofstede” (p. 484).
The enormous influence of Hofstede following the original publication of Culture’s 
Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values in 1980 has also 
been noted more widely across the field of management (see, for example, 
McSweeney, 2002; Ailon, 2008; Patel, 2016). In the accounting domain it is 
important to recognise that the employment of Hofstede has been particularly 
marked as it is common for researchers looking to compare accounting across 
countries to either employ Hofstede’s dimensions directly or to employ Gray's 
(1988) accounting values framework which is directly derived from Hofstede’s 
dimensions. In this respect, Heidhues and Patel (2011) evidence an “unquestioning 
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acceptance and application of (Gray’s) methodology” (p. 273) in international 
accounting literature and in accounting textbooks and, further, assert that the 
“narrowly focused dimensional approaches (of Hofstede and Gray) have … 
dominated cross-cultural accounting research” (p. 274).  
3.2 Why Hofstede’s hegemony is problematic 
The adoption of Hofstede in accounting research is most likely to have arisen 
because it allows culture to be quantified via the numerical cultural dimensions. This 
ability to ‘score’ culture permits researchers to develop and test hypotheses for 
statistically significant relationships which can potentially “lend … scientific 
legitimacy and respectability within accounting research” (Baskerville, 2003, p. 11). 
The potential for legitimating accounting research in the way described by 
Baskerville (2003) is also raised by Heidhues and Patel (2011) who contend 
positivistic research has had a favoured status in accounting and might be a primary 
cause of an over-reliance on Hofstede’s - and Gray’s - numeric values.  
This form of positivistic-quantitative research approach is, of course, valid if the 
theory on which the hypotheses rest is robust; however, it is common for researchers 
to justify adopting Hofstede (or Gray) on the grounds it has been previously 
employed in similar studies. Consequently, researchers have not questioned whether 
the theory underlying Hofstede’s dimensions and Gray’s accounting values is 
satisfactory.  
The uncritical acceptance, and hegemony, of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions in 
accounting research, whether employed directly or indirectly via Gray’s accounting 
values framework, presents significant difficulties as his work has been subject to 
significant criticisms. McSweeney (2002) judges “Hofstede’s model of national 
culture … profoundly problematic” (p. 113) and Baskerville (2003) argues that four 
fundamental criticisms can be raised against Hofstede and relate to: the advancement 
of a direct relationship between countries and cultures, Hofstede not studying 
cultures ‘from within’, the numerical orientation of the Hofstedian dimensions, and 
an assumption cultures are constant.  
The Hofstedian view that countries and cultures are directly related is highly 
problematic. McSweeney (2002) critiques Hofstede’s analysis of the IBM 
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questionnaire responses and concludes that the “depiction of the reported response 
differences as caused by national cultures is merely the product of his supposition 
that such causality exists” (p. 102) and Ailon-Souday and Kunda (2003) discuss how 
Hofstede is conceiving of “national identity as merely the passive embodiment of a 
predetermined cultural template, and thus fails to take into account the freedom that 
members have in defining what national belonging means, in shaping this identity”
(p. 1074).  
The uncritical employment of Hofstede’s theory has fundamental implications for 
prior accounting research. The presumption of cultural homogeneity and cultural 
stability within national boundaries is constraining and leads to a simplification of 
the notion of culture (Gould and Grein, 2009). The result is accounting research 
which “neglect(s) the greater depth, richness and complexity of culture and cultural 
diversity” (Harrison and McKinnon, 1999, p. 492). For example, the array of 
different behaviours of ethnic groups within nations is ignored (Baskerville, 2003) 
and this leads, inter alia, to accounting research disenfranchising indigenous peoples 
and failing to understand cultural dynamics with regards to accounting, 
accountability and societal values (Greer and Patel, 2000). Hence, there is a lack of 
recognition that “cultural borders are porous, so cultures may be shared by people 
from different geographical regions, and contested by people from the same region”
(Patel, 2017, p. 91).  
The use of numerical indices is an issue as it results in an ‘averaging’ of cultural 
differences and, hence, the nuances of culture are lost. A simplistic approach to 
culture in accounting research has also lead to the neglect of the “importance of 
political, legal, historical, social and economic factors and their interdependencies in 
evaluating national accounting models” (Heidhues and Patel, 2011, p. 274). 
Accounting research employing Hofstede’s cultural dimensions does not just neglect 
these nuances at the level of nations; nuances are also lost when organisations and 
their accounting systems are examined by reference to Hofstede’s framework. In this 
regard, organisationally-based accounting research overlooks that organisations 
operating across national boundaries (and who employ staff from different countries 
across different functions) do not simply take on the characteristics of the national 
cultures where the different parts of the business operate. Furthermore, culturally-
related accounting research focusing on organisations that operate solely within the 
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boundary of one nation are ignoring that the organisation might comprise more than 
one culture and that the disagreements or conflicts between these cultures can be 
significant in determining how accounting practices are operationalised.    
Harrison and McKinnon (1999) note that for many of the prior cultural-accounting 
studies that form the basis of their review the researchers omit to select all of 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions in their hypothesis testing and these omissions are 
neither explained nor justified. Thus, these prior studies do not provide  a “theory-
driven evaluation of the irrelevance of the dimension to the dependent variable or 
relation at issue” (Harrison and McKinnon, 1999, p.488). In essence, this implies 
they are not examining culture in its ‘totality’. Central to Harrison and McKinnon's 
(1999) critique of the use of these indices is they are too simplistic for measuring 
culture, and that there is a need for research that engages with the complexities of 
culture and:  
… breaks off the shackles of its hitherto reliance on … (a Hofstede-based) perspective … 
to move beyond its existing static nature, which constrain it to establishing (or not 
establishing) point-in-time statistical associations between values as independent variables 
and affective and/or behavioural responses as dependent ones. (Harrison and McKinnon, 
1999, p. 499) 
It is also important to emphasise that the presumption that culture is static is another 
significant issue for accounting research utilising Hofstede. When researchers ignore 
studying changes in culture they are unable to explain, for example, the causes of 
changes in accounting practices whether at the national level or the organisational 
level. Consequently, omitting examining the dynamics and mechanics of cultural 
modifications is to fail to understand that “culture constitutes an ongoing 
interpretation process rather than a stable structure of values that can be measured at 
a point in time” (Patel, 2017, p.91). 
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4. Motivations for employing neo-Durkheimian institutional theory  
4.1 The requirements for an alternative theory base 
My motivation for employing NDIT in culturally-related accounting research is that 
it is not subject to the same criticisms as Hofstede and can, in addition, “capture the 
complexity and dynamics of cultures” (Heidhues and Patel 2011, p. 283). NDIT was 
developed by the anthropologist Mary Douglas over a considerable period (see, for 
example, Douglas, 1970, 1978, 1986, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1994, 1995, 2003, 2004) 
and with significant contributions to its development being made by Michael 
Thompson. It is noteworthy that Harrison and McKinnon (1999) and Baskerville 
(2003) both advocate accounting researchers look to draw on ideas of culture from 
anthropology and sociology. They suggest accounting academics should look 
towards these disciplines as they may provide a means for overcoming the criticisms 
directed at Hofstede and can address the concern regarding  the “dissonance between 
anthropological research and Hofstede’s cultural dimensions” (Baskerville, 2003, pp. 
8-9).  
NDIT originates out of Douglas’s ethnographic studies of the Lele people in the 
Kasai region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (see, for example, Douglas, 
1963) which resulted in Douglas publishing Purity and Danger in 1966. Hence, the 
theory is ultimately rooted in studies of social organisation ‘from within’ rather than 
‘from without’ (see, for example, Linsley and Shrives, 2014). NDIT presumes we are 
social beings who form our notions of selfhood by reference to other people and the 
theory specifies how social relations connect through to preferences and ways of life. 
Central to the theory is the proposition that patterns of social relations are of 
fundamental importance, determining how we frame problems and choose solutions. 
Thus, as Thompson et al. (1990) note, “adherence to a certain pattern of social 
relationships generates a distinctive way of looking at the world” (Thompson et al., 
1990, p. 2) and in NDIT this generation of distinctive ways of observing the world is 
often explained by referring to social relations as influencing thought styles. 
4.2 The fundamentals of neo-Durkheimian institutional theory  
NDIT contends the number of basic patterns of social relations is systematic and 
limited in its diversity to four elementary forms that are the only sustainable forms of 
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institution, with any group or organisation being predisposed to revert to one of the 
four forms (see, for example, Douglas, 2003; Thompson and Ellis, 1997). The 
framework describing these four forms (or solidarities) is constructed by reference to 
two dimensions of grid (social regulation) and group (social integration).  
Social regulation concerns the extent to which an individual is free to self-select their 
social roles. In a low grid setting there is, relatively, greater freedom to select social 
roles by comparison to a high grid setting where there is strong social regulation 
which circumscribes the social roles an individual can choose. Therefore, the grid 
dimension is concerned with issues of autonomy in respect of roles (Douglas, 1989, 
p.173).  
Social integration describes the degree to which an individual has a commitment to 
other individuals within the organisation or group. If there is high social integration 
(high group) this denotes the individual is strongly committed to others within the 
group. In respect of low (or weak) social integration an individual feels little loyalty 
or commitment to others within the community. Thus, in a low group setting an 
individual places their own aims above those of the group and the reverse is the case 
in a high group setting (Douglas, 1978). Consequently, social integration concerns 
whether “practices, positions, and relations are specified by strong or weak 
accountability to bonds and memberships” and social regulation concerns whether 
there is “strong or weak accountability to constraint, imperative, prescription, (and) 
roles” (6, 2014a, p. 89).
The grid-group matrix (figure 1) that results from combining the two dimensions in 
weak (or low) and strong (or high) states displays four forms of social relationships: 
enclaved (or egalitarian), hierarchical, isolate (or fatalist) and individualistic.  
Douglas divides the two dimensions into weak and strong (or high and low) states as 
these four solidarities have been observed as the four sustainable forms of institution. 
Douglas fully acknowledges she is “reducing social variation to a few grand types” 
(Douglas, 1982, p. 2) when, in fact, there is enormous variety; however, “an explicit 
and parsimonious typology is necessary for meaningful analyses of cultural 
dialogues” (Linsley and Shrives, 2014, p. 760).  
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Figure 1: Grid-group framework
Source: adapted from Douglas (1986, 2004) 
The enclaved ordering comprises strong social integration and weak social 
regulation. Thus, this solidarity is defined by the strong group boundary. 
Commitment to the group is of the utmost importance and penalties for disloyalty 
will be severe. To reinforce the group boundary enclaved solidarities will commonly 
define themselves in opposition to the ‘world’ outside the group. This can be 
achieved by conceiving the outside world as wicked or unjust or immoral. The 
hierarchical ordering also has a strong group boundary but this is combined with 
strong social regulation. Thus, this solidarity seeks to ensure that both inner and 
outer boundaries are not breached. Consequently, respect for those in authority is 
expected with roles being clearly delineated and expressing status. This runs in 
tandem with a lack of tolerance for deviant behaviour that threatens the boundaries. 
The individualistic solidarity is diagonally opposite the hierarchical solidarity and, 
hence, both social regulation and social integration are weak. The outcome is that 
individuals have considerable freedom to co-operate with any other individual. 
Douglas judges this form of ordering as challenging in that it “sanctions individual 
competition” (Douglas, 2004, p. 291) and if failure occurs then there is little purpose 
in approaching others for help. Consequently, what determines status is the ability to 
marshal resources (6, 2011). The isolate ordering combines strong social regulation 
with weak social integration. This has led to this solidarity being described as prone 
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to fatalism on the grounds that individuals in this setting feel they are not part of any 
group but are subject to strong prescriptions in respect of social roles. 
4.3 Cultural dialogues and the dynamics of the theory 
In her later work Douglas emphasises that any group or organisation or society will 
comprise all four solidarities and that the four will interact with one another by 
engaging in cultural dialogues. One of the four solidarities may be dominant, but it is 
not expected that any group will solely display the characteristics associated with 
one solidarity. The solidarities co-exist, although it is not necessarily a passive co-
existence, and will ‘debate’ which way of life is most appropriate as they look to win
over individuals to their solidarity. These cultural dialogues serve an important 
function acting as a means by which each solidarity can affirm their pattern of social 
relationships. In addition, the cultural dialogues can assist the solidarities from 
becoming parodies of themselves.  
This idea of cultural dialogues is, fundamentally, concerned with recognising that the 
four solidarities must necessarily be in continual conflict with one another. This is 
because each of the four solidarities has “developed its own ‘cosmological values’, 
its own claims of justice, its own conception of how to think about the past and the 
future, and the duties that each … places upon people” (6 and Richards, 2017, p. 93). 
Hence, Douglas comments that there will inevitably be never-ending clashes 
between the four solidarities as “(i)ntercultural dialogue is inherently agonistic . . . 
the contest is about the form of life to be held in common” (Douglas, 1997, pp. 128–
129). 
Thus, in later versions, NDIT is developed as a dynamic theory3 and, unlike 
Hofstede, neither assumes a direct relationship between nations and cultures or that 
cultures remain static4. The dynamic version of the theory recognises individuals will 
move across the solidarities either because their current solidarity fails to fulfil on its 
intrinsic promises or because they are ejected from the solidarity. Thompson et al. 
(1990) describe how an individual may elect to transfer allegiance when “successive 
3 This is particularly due to the incorporation of Michael Thompson’s ideas (see, for example, 
Thompson and Ellis, 1997). 
4 For more extensive discussions explaining why NDIT is not subject to the same criticisms as 
Hofstede see Linsley and Shrives (2009) and Linsley et al. (2016). 
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events intervene in such a way as to prevent a solidarity from delivering on the 
expectations5 it has generated, thereby prompting (that) individual to seek more 
promising alternatives” (p. 4). For example, an inherent expectation of members of 
the enclaved solidarity is that loyalty to the group will be reciprocated should they 
fall on hard times. Such transfers of allegiance across the solidarities provide the 
explanation for how in any group or organisation or society the dominant solidarity 
may be replaced, over time, by another solidarity.  
Therefore, cultural dialogues are a fundamental feature of the theory and essential 
for explaining how, and why, one solidarity may dominate for a period and then be 
usurped as another solidarity rises to dominance. That is, cultural dialogues represent 
the causal mechanism that enable us to understand why changes in solidarity 
dominance occur. In addition to explaining ‘cultural’ change, cultural dialogues also 
provide the means for understanding why a particular set of impacts are brought 
about by a change in solidarity dominance within any group, community, 
organisation or society. 
NDIT has been used extensively in political science, public policy and public 
administration6; however, notwithstanding the extent to which the theory has been 
previously employed it is still being developed and refined. For this reason there 
have been calls for further NDIT-based research to be undertaken to extend the 
existing literature (see, for example, 6, 2014b). The calls for further research are 
understandable given it is such an ‘ambitious’ theory and one aspect of these calls is 
in respect of addressing the need to assess whether neo-Durkheimian institutional 
theory can be successfully extended into new domains as this provides additional 
tests of the universal applicability of the theory (see, for example, 6 and Mars, 2008). 
Excluding the publications in this thesis, the theory has not been employed to any 
extent in accounting and finance with only one previous NDIT-based paper having 
been published by Moerman and van der Laan (2012) in Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting journal. Unlike the publications in this thesis, there is no reference by 
Moerman and van der Laan (2012) to the underlying patterns of social relations 
5 Thompson uses the term ‘surprises’ to describe when this “discrepancy between the expected and 
the actual” becomes so significant that people are “tip(ped) … out of one form of social solidarity and 
into another” (Thompson, 2008, p. 98).
6 For example, Grendstad (2003) uses the theory to analyse political preferences across Nordic 
countries whilst Song et al. (2014) examine child vaccination programmes. 
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(which are the foundation of the theory) or to cultural dialogues or the dynamics of 
the theory. The particular focus of Moerman and van der Laan (2012) is a function of 
their article only drawing on two of Douglas’s earlier works (Douglas and
Wildavsky, 1982; Douglas, 1986) and this has the significant drawback that 
Douglas’s ideas progress over time with the dynamic aspects of the theory being 
developed in her later work.  
4.4 Motivations for adopting neo-Durkheimian institutional theory  
The seven publications comprising the thesis utilise NDIT to examine a broad range 
of aspects of accounting and finance within very different institutional and societal 
settings as summarised in table 1.  
Table 1: Aspects of accounting and finance investigated within the publications 
comprising the thesis 
Publication
Aspect 
investigated Setting (location) Context
Linsley and Shrives 
(2009)
Auditing Individual company 
and professional 
services firm
Enron audit failure
Linsley and Linsley 
(2010) 
Financial crisis Banks, underwriters 
and ratings agencies
Credit crisis of 2007
Linsley and Linsley 
(2014) 
Management 
accounting
UK and USA 
corporates
Strategic management 
accounting and 
strategy thinking
Linsley and Shrives 
(2014)
Accounting 
regulation
Regulatory body FRC regulatory 
consultation on 
complexity project
Linsley, Linsley, 
Beck and Mollan 
(2016)
Financialization UK and German 
society
Experiences of 
financialization post-
war to present
Linsley, McMurray 
and Shrives 
(2016)
Accounting 
regulation
Regulatory body FRC regulatory 
consultations on 
complexity, auditor 
scepticism and 
company stewardship 
projects
Abdelrehim, 
Linsley and Verma 
(2017)
Financial reporting Individual company BOC risk management 
strategies pre- and 
post- 1974 crisis
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An outcome of employing NDIT in accounting and finance research is that I address 
the calls of 6 (2014b) to extend NDIT into new domains; however, this was not 
central to my motivation when electing to adopt the theory. My initial interest in 
NDIT was prompted through engaging with Douglas’s risk-focused NDIT writings 
(see, for example, Douglas, 1966, 1986, 1994; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). NDIT 
asserts that groups, organisations and societies have “selective attention to risk, and 
preferences among different types of risk taking (or avoiding)” (Wildavsky and 
Dake, 1990, p. 43) with each solidarity emphasising different risks as they seek to 
defend their different patterns of social relations.  
In the first of the publications in the thesis (Linsley and Shrives, 2009) the original 
conception was the paper would principally focus on analysing the risk perceptions 
of the Enron auditor, Arthur Andersen, to explain how these caused a major audit 
failure. As the paper progressed it became evident NDIT can do far more than 
provide an understanding of risk perceptions of the four solidarities in the context of 
accounting and audit failure.  
Thus, central to my motivation for employing NDIT was the recognition, through 
researching and writing the Enron-based paper, that NDIT is not prone to the 
difficulties associated with Hofstede and, very importantly, can: 
i. Provide nuanced analyses of the preferences and biases of the four 
solidarities by reference to the underlying patterns of social relations. 
These include, but also go significantly beyond, risk-related 
preferences of the solidarities7.  
ii. Be used for studying groups and communities and of all forms. Thus, 
for example, it can be employed in societal level or organisational 
level studies.  
iii. Contribute to understanding the strategies and actions solidarities 
decide upon when under threat and the subsequent reactions of the 
other solidarities.   
iv. Explain the dynamics and complexities of cultural change as the 
different solidarities interact with one another via cultural dialogues.  
7 For example, NDIT can, inter alia, explain why the solidarities: frame and solve problems in such 
distinct ways, adopt different views of resilience, and plan ahead over different time horizons.   
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Hence, my decision to adopt NDIT was rooted in my recognising I could 
significantly contribute to the development of cultural-accounting research by 
undertaking studies that have a primary focus on the dynamics of cultural dialogues.  
4.5 Addressing criticisms of neo-Durkheimian institutional theory 
The three principal criticisms commonly directed at NDIT are with regards to 
whether the theory: is merely a typology, can account for the complexities and 
varieties of groups, organisations and other institutions that exist, and is 
deterministic.       
The criticism that NDIT is merely a typology is incorrect but it is possible to see 
why this charge has arisen. As 6 and Mars (2008) indicate there are many NDIT-
based publications that go no further than drawing on the fourfold typology to allot 
the data under examination to one of the four possible positions in the grid-group 
matrix. Such research ignores the underlying theory regarding social relations, 
conflictual cultural dialogues and the possibility of change. However, there is an 
underlying theory as outlined earlier in the chapter, and this theory should be utilised 
by researchers employing NDIT not least because the theory provides an 
understanding of the causal mechanisms whereby patterns of social relations lead 
through to thought styles which lead through to particular actions.   
In addition, simply using the typology without reference to understanding the 
underlying theory can be a factor in making NDIT appear too simplistic and unable 
to account for complexities. It has already been stated in discussing cultural 
dialogues that the theory does not assume any group or organisation or other form of 
institution will correspond with a single solidarity. The theory assumes all four 
solidarities will be present to different extents in different settings and that hybrids 
might be evident too.  
The criticism that the theory does not permit individuals free will can be refuted as 
follows. It is individuals who consent to the formation of institutions. These 
institutions may be constraining and are able to lay claims against us, but we consent 
to the formation of institutions because we are, innately, social beings and because 
they provide benefits in return. These claims and benefits will differ dependent upon 
the form of the institution. For example, an advantage of a hierarchically-dominated 
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institution is that it will provide an individual with a safety net of some type should 
they run into difficulties and this might be one reason we would be willing to accept 
the boundaries this form of solidarity places upon us. Further, it is important to 
recognise that no individual is bound by any specific worldview and we can never 
fully predict how any person will behave. Thus, in a hierarchically-dominated 
institution any individual is free to elect to behave as they wish and, hence, they may 
decide not to show respect for authority. It is also important to re-emphasise that 
NDIT is a dynamic theory that can account for a change in the dominant solidarity 
by reference to cultural dialogues. As Douglas (2004) states:  
(c)ulture is not a mechanical control on the individual members of a community. If enough 
individuals want to be free to compete, they will abolish the rules that check competition 
… If the consensus prefers a society that will honour the old, and care for the infirm … or
maintain a monarchy, they will set up regulations to restrain free enterprise. (p. 290)  
Thus, individual agency is underpinning changes in solidarity dominance with 
individuals free to change allegiance from one solidarity to another with “(t)he way 
of life …that is dominant at any particular time … (being) the product of all the 
separate cultural dialogues that have been taking place and … an outcome of 
individuals’ verdicts on what form of life they would prefer” (Linsley and Shrives, 
2014, p. 761). 
5. My contribution to culturally-related accounting research 
5.1 How NDIT has been employed in the publications 
The seven publications all have a principal focus on the dynamics of cultural 
dialogues in accounting and finance as summarised in table 2. Five of the 
publications investigate sites where cultural dialogues have resulted in a change in 
the dominant solidarity; these studies analyse how the cultural dialogues lead to the 
observed change alongside analysing the impacts the change in the dominant 
solidarity has upon the worldviews and behaviours of the different groups or 
organisations or countries under investigation. The five publications are: Linsley and 
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Shrives (2009), Linsley and Linsley (2010), Linsley and Shrives (2014), Linsley, 
Linsley, Beck and Mollan (2016), and Abdelrehim, Linsley and Verma (2017).  
The other two publications (Linsley and Shrives, 2014; Linsley, McMurray and 
Shrives, 2016) also investigate cultural dialogues, albeit from a different perspective. 
A shared aspect of the behaviour of the four solidarities is that, although they engage 
in continually ongoing cultural dialogues, they have an innate inability to listen to 
the worldviews of the other solidarities. These two publications investigate the 
significant implications this has for the development of accounting regulation.  
Table 2: Foci of cultural dialogue analyses for the publications comprising the thesis 
Publication Cultural dialogues investigated
Solidarity interactions 
analysed 
Linsley and Shrives 
(2009)
Cultural dialogues within Arthur 
Andersen and the impact on audit 
effectiveness.
Wider societal responses in the wake of 
Enron failure.
Hierarchical and 
individualistic 
Hierarchical, individualistic 
and enclaved 
Linsley and Linsley 
(2010) 
Cultural dialogues in UK and USA 
during the 1970s and the impact on 
banks, underwriters and ratings 
agencies.
Hierarchical and 
individualistic
Linsley and Linsley 
(2014) 
Cultural dialogues in UK and USA 
during the 1970s and the impact on 
companies’ strategy making and 
management accounting.
Hierarchical and 
individualistic
Linsley and Shrives 
(2014)
Cultural dialogues between respondents 
to regulatory consultation and the impact 
on policy making.
Hierarchical, individualistic,
and enclaved 
Linsley, Linsley, Beck 
and Mollan (2016)
Cultural dialogues in UK and Germany 
from WW2 to present and the impacts 
on companies and finance.
Hierarchical, individualistic
and enclaved
Linsley, McMurray 
and Shrives 
(2016)
Cultural dialogues between respondents 
to regulatory consultations and the 
impact on regulatory reform.
Hierarchical, individualistic,
enclaved and isolate
Abdelrehim, Linsley 
and Verma 
(2017)
Cultural dialogues within Burmah Oil 
Company and the impact on risk and 
risk management strategies.
Hierarchical and isolate
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5.2 Contributions  
The thesis publications, in totality, provide strong support for employing NDIT to 
examine culturally-related aspects of accounting. The evidence for this statement is 
that the publications demonstrate NDIT can (as per the motivations set out in section 
4.4 above): (i) provide nuanced analyses of the preferences of the four solidarities, 
(ii) be used to study groups of all forms, (iii) provide understandings of the strategies 
and counter-strategies of solidarities when under threat, and (iv) explain the 
dynamics and complexities of cultural change. This verification of the utility of the 
theory for undertaking accounting research is an over-arching contribution that has 
been made by the publications.  
More importantly, the publications have made specific contributions in respect of the 
different culturally-related aspects of accounting they examine. These specific 
contributions are the focus of the discussions in this section; in addition, the 
discussions set out the ways in which the publications connect with, and build on, 
one another.  
The first two publications are both concerned with analysing cases of failure in 
different accounting and finance contexts. The objective of Linsley and Shrives 
(2009) is to explain the failure of audit practices in the context of the 2001 Enron 
debacle by reference to a change in the dominant solidarity of Enron’s auditor, 
Arthur Andersen. Therefore, this paper studies dominant solidarity change at the 
organisational level, whereas Linsley and Linsley (2010) examine solidarity changes 
at a societal level to explain failures relating to the financial system that lead to the 
2007-8 financial crisis.  
In the first of the two publications, the implications of the individualistically-
oriented nature of Enron is initially discussed, and this is followed by the core 
argument that Arthur Andersen’s modification from a hierarchically-oriented 
solidarity to an individualistically-oriented solidarity adversely affected its ability to 
audit Enron’s financial statements. Previously, partners in the firm had been 
prepared to contest a client’s accounting treatments; however, the ability to remain 
independent of the client diminished and the change in the dominant solidarity 
negatively impacted on the disposition of Arthur Andersen to act as a gatekeeper. 
Relatedly, when this form of solidarity is dominant less attention is paid to following 
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audit processes as “the auditor adopts the role of strategist rather than steward” 
(Linsley and Shrives, 2009, p. 503) and the inherent myopia of the individualistic 
solidarity results in it being difficult for a firm to conceive of future risks to 
reputation should an audit not be performed to an appropriate professional standard. 
Linsley and Shrives (2009) trace this change in dominant solidarity to the expansion 
of the consulting division of Arthur Andersen commencing in the 1960s. Essentially, 
the contest between the hierarchically-oriented audit division and individualistically-
oriented consulting division is won by the latter with the outcome that demonstrating 
the ability to meet financial targets becomes the prime measure of an individual’s 
success in the firm as opposed to technical accounting ability. By comparison, 
Linsley and Linsley (2010) assert the change from a dominant hierarchical solidarity 
to a dominant individualistic solidarity in UK and USA society is a consequence of 
an intensification of cultural dialogues associated with the significant economic and 
political upheavals of the 1970s. These upheavals resulted in vigorous debates 
including those which focused on the extent to which governments should intervene 
in, and regulate, markets.  
The prime objective in the 2010 paper is to demonstrate society’s vulnerability to the 
financial crisis is a direct result of the post-1970 dominance of the individualistic 
solidarity. As noted in the first publication, the individualistic solidarity has an 
innate short sightedness and a central argument in the second paper is this 
characteristic encourages short-term risk taking which, alongside an 
individualistically-oriented optimism that the financial system will naturally achieve 
a state of equilibrium, created the conditions for the 2007-2008 credit crisis. Two 
other characteristics associated with the individualistic solidarity are also analysed to 
explain their respective roles in creating the conditions for the financial crisis; 
namely, a preoccupation with wealth acquisition as a prime determinant of success 
and that this solidarity alludes, ostensibly, to a vision of opportunity for all.  
Enron and the 2007-8 financial crisis have been key events in the accounting and 
finance sphere during the last twenty years with the consequence that they have been 
the subject of numerous academic studies. These two papers contribute an alternative 
understanding of how failure in these important and complex cases is associated with 
the characteristics pertaining to the patterns of social relations of the NDIT-rooted 
solidarities. The papers also contribute to an understanding of the societal reactions 
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to the failures by reference to the debates (cultural dialogues) between the 
solidarities. The papers reveal a prime linkage between the two cases is both failures 
arise from the change to a dominant individualistic solidarity with its faith in the 
ability of markets to self-regulate, innate myopia, short-term planning horizons, and 
focus on individual entrepreneurialism.   
Linsley and Linsley (2014) build on Linsley and Linsley’s (2010) examination of the 
repercussions of the shift from a dominant hierarchical solidarity to a dominant 
individualistic solidarity as caused by the vigorous cultural dialogues of the 1970s. 
However, whereas Linsley and Linsley (2010) are concerned with the actions of 
banks, ratings agencies and individual mortgage holders, the 2014 publication is 
focused on how this impacts on management accounting practices and the role of 
management accountants working in companies. Specifically, Linsley and Linsley 
(2014) examine the notion of Strategic Management Accounting (SMA) which arises 
at the outset of the 1980s and describes the proposition that management accountants 
must move away from being technically expert accountants and move towards 
becoming proactive, strategic decision-makers.  
The publication maintains the rise to dominance of the individualistic solidarity 
brings about the emergence of the notion of SMA in the early 1980s as well as 
changes in strategy thinking. Strategy as ‘craft’ replaces the rationalistic strategy 
approach as the market for corporate control impacts and a focus upon shareholder 
value develops. Staff across the different business functions are now expected to 
engage in strategic decision-making, including management accountants. There is 
greater fluidity in roles as internal boundaries weaken and management accounting 
expertise counts less than the ability to assist the company in adding shareholder 
value.  
This contrasts with when the dominant solidarity is hierarchical. Management 
accounting is conceived of as a functional discipline and supports a stewardship 
approach to the management of finance. A procedural and rationalistic approach to 
strategy prevails, and a top-down methodology is the norm with senior managers 
expecting junior managers comply with their strategic edicts.  
Linsley and Linsley (2014) not only contribute to understanding why SMA arose and 
how it connects to changes in strategy thinking. Through employing NDIT they are 
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also able to propose reasons why, contrary to what one would expect, innovative 
SMA techniques have not been embedded within companies to a greater extent.  
Whilst Linsley and Linsley (2014) is focused upon UK-USA societal change and its 
impact on the corporate sector, Linsley, Linsley, Beck and Mollan (2016) examine 
comparative experiences of financialization in the UK and Germany. This 2016 
publication extends the examination of societal level cultural dialogues in Linsley 
and Linsley (2010) and Linsley and Linsley (2014) in two respects. First, there is a 
geographical extension as it examines Germany in addition to the UK. Second, the 
examination of the UK (and Germany) is much more detailed and the paper provides 
a comprehensive examination of the cultural dialogues in the two countries from the 
end of the Second World War to the present.  
Financialization debates are concerned with the observation that in the last two to 
three decades there have been such dramatic changes in finance (see, for example, 
Epstein, 2005) that financialization is a phenomenon that demands explanation. 
Accordingly, alternative definitions of financialization have developed principally 
allied to ideas of shareholder value or the growing span of finance, and the three 
most important financialization schools relate to critical social accounting, regulation 
theory, and socio-cultural approaches. The array of financialization definitions and 
schools highlight how wide a spectrum of effects financialization is judged to have 
had across the economic (macro), corporate (meso) and social (micro) spheres.  
Financialization has been lacking an underlying theory that might draw together the 
different elements. This publication contributes to the financialization literature by 
explaining, and drawing together, the very disparate facets of financialization by 
reference to the four solidarities of NDIT and cultural dialogues.  
Different countries have experienced financialization to different degrees and their 
experiences of financialization have not been simultaneous. Through employing 
NDIT the paper explains variations in financialization across the UK and Germany. 
The publication establishes that the differences in the form and timings of the 
modifications away from the dominant hierarchical solidarity in the two countries 
explain why the UK experienced financialization to a greater degree than Germany 
and at an earlier point in time.  
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Core to the publication is the argument that, whereas for the UK there is a shift from 
a dominant hierarchical solidarity to a dominant individualistic solidarity post-the 
1970s, in Germany the shift is from a dominant hierarchical solidarity to a hybrid 
hierarchical-enclaved-individualistic arrangement and this hybrid evolves in a later 
period during the mid-1990s. An important aspect of the cultural dialogues in 
Germany is that the debates are very much influenced by the strong desire of the 
German nation to avoid any repetition of past mistakes given its experience of 
Nazism and this provides the scope for enclaved groups to have influence. 
Whilst Linsley, Linsley, Beck and Mollan (2016) provide a novel understanding of 
financialization, Abdelrehim, Linsley and Verma (2017) make a significant 
contribution to accounting research through providing a wholly new way of 
understanding risk disclosures. Disclosure studies are of great importance in 
accounting as researchers wish to understand what motivates managers when writing 
the narrative sections of the company’s annual report. Prior risk disclosure research 
has been very restricted. Content analysis has been the principal research 
methodology and the focus of the prior research has either been to identify the main 
characteristics of the risk disclosures or to test for statistically significant 
associations between the volume of risk disclosures (typically measured by the 
number of risk sentences) and corporate governance attributes.  
Abdelrehim, Linsley and Verma (2017) examine a single case company, the Burmah 
Oil Company (BOC), during a period of crisis, 1971-76. Archival research is 
undertaken to analyse BOC’s patterns of social organisation over the period by 
drawing on a wide range of company documents (for example, internal minutes of 
company meetings, statements of HR policy, and management memorandums). This 
is wholly unlike prior risk disclosure research which examines only the risk 
disclosures in the annual report based on content analysis of risk sentences.  
The analysis identifies the dominant hierarchical solidarity is replaced by a dominant 
isolate solidarity in the wake of the BOC tanker fleet crisis in 1974. Pre-crisis the 
risk management strategy of the BOC board is to carefully balance risk and reward 
via risk diversification and to believe it is possible to manage future risk over the 
long-term, and this corresponds with the hierarchical thought style regarding risk 
management. The publication explains how, during the 1974 crisis, group bonds 
became weakened as the hierarchical solidarity ceased to deliver on its inherent 
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promises; however, whilst social integration diminished, social regulation remained 
high with the consequence that an isolate form of social organisation came to 
dominate. The post-crisis risk management strategy of the BOC board, which 
accords with the thought style of the isolate solidarity, is to absorb losses and to hope 
to survive with short-term management approaches becoming the norm.  
The analysis of the risk disclosures in the BOC annual reports for the period 1971-76 
finds they are consistent with the dominant forms of solidarity in the pre-crisis and 
post-crisis periods. Thus, the publication can trace through from social organisation 
(patterns of social relations) to thought styles (of the dominant solidarity) to risk 
management strategies to risk disclosures. An important omission in prior risk 
disclosure research is that it does not seek to understand the worldviews of the 
people in the organisation responsible for managing risk and for preparing the risk 
disclosures8. Therefore, a fundamental limitation in the prior research is overcome 
and the publication contributes by providing a completely new understanding of risk 
disclosures by demonstrating a causal connection between the different forms of 
solidarity, risk strategies and risk disclosure narratives.      
The two remaining publications (Linsley and Shrives, 2014; Linsley, McMurray and 
Shrives, 2016) are concerned with examining the implications of the four solidarities 
not being able to hear one another in the context of accounting regulation 
consultations. Linsley and Shrives (2014) identify the different voices of each 
solidarity located within the comment letters sent in response to a discussion paper 
issued by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC)9. They then analyse the arguments 
supplied by each respondent in their comments letter and evidence how each 
respondent’s arguments are, in effect, attempts to persuade others of the validity of 
the way of life associated with the respondent’s dominant solidarity. Thus, Linsley 
and Shrives (2014) confirm the arguments match with the thought style of the 
dominant solidarity identified for that respondent.  
Linsley, McMurray and Shrives (2016) explain that the wider regulation-based 
literature has observed that regulatory reform across different policy domains - not 
8 Nor indeed have any other non-risk focused disclosure studies (for example, corporate social 
responsibility disclosure studies) sought to identify a causal link of this type.  
9 The FRC is the independent regulator responsible for regulating accounting, auditing and corporate 
governance in the UK.
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just accounting - has failed in recent times to result in any significant policy or 
regulatory changes. Thus, the principal objective of the paper is to examine why 
consultation processes intended to bring about change are failing to do so. Linsley, 
McMurray and Shrives (2016) do this by examining two further FRC consultations 
and testing a number of NDIT-derived propositions.  
The 2016 study confirms the 2014 findings and, by examining three consultations, 
also verifies there is consistency in respect of the themes of the arguments presented 
by each of the four solidarities across all three consultations. Further, through 
examining hybrid responses (where two or more solidarities share dominance) the 
2016 study explores the possibility that respondents are being strategic and seek to 
win at least some arguments by being willing to compromise.  
Most importantly, Linsley, McMurray and Shrives (2016) identify the three pre-
consultation proposals remain largely unchanged after the consultation has taken 
place. This confirms the regulator is focused on perpetuating their own worldview 
and has difficulty ‘hearing’ responses that do not accord with their worldview. 
Therefore, the result supports the NDIT-derived proposition: “(t)he worldview of the 
regulator will influence the outcome of the three consultations” (Linsley, McMurray 
and Shrives, 2016, p. 993).  
Linsley and Shrives (2014) and Linsley, McMurray and Shrives (2016) contribute to 
debates in the field of regulatory studies in the following manner. The dominant 
concept pertaining to how regulation is developed is that of regulatory capture, 
which describes the situation whereby powerful interest groups can influence the 
regulator sufficiently to ensure new regulation fits their agenda. However, recently it 
has been argued that this account of regulatory capture by interest group is 
ineffective in explaining policy-making in the domain of financial regulation and 
alternative understandings of policy-making are needed (Young, 2012; Kwak 2014). 
Linsley, McMurray and Shrives’ (2016) finding that “consultation processes emerge 
as a mechanism for the maintenance of prevailing policies rather than the starting 
point for their substantive re-negotiation” (p. 989) leads to the important insight that 
regulatory self-capture is occurring as opposed to regulatory capture. The notion of 
regulatory self-capture is constructed in the paper to designate that the innate 
response of the regulator is to act to maintain its existing pattern of social relations 
and to, unavoidably, perpetuate their own worldview.  
31 
Linsley and Shrives (2014) conclude by arguing there is a need for the FRC to listen 
to the voices of all four solidarities when consulting on regulation. One reason this is 
necessary is it is sub-optimal to enact solutions that only accord with one’s own 
worldview, for as each solidarity frames problems and selects solutions dependent 
upon its social organisation the result is that no one solidarity can offer a flawless 
answer to any problem. Further, if the solutions of one solidarity are enacted they 
will, inevitably, be opposed by the other solidarities. Consequently, Linsley and 
Shrives (2014) advocate a clumsy solutions approach. This requires accepting there 
is no one best solution and displaying an ability to listen to all four solidarities to 
fashion a solution that has at least some appeal for each solidarity. This clumsy 
solutions approach has not been advocated either in prior accounting research or 
prior financial regulation research.   
6. Conclusion 
My work has contributed to accounting research in respect of adding to 
understanding in the following areas: causes of audit failure and financial failure, 
post-1980 developments in strategy and management accounting, the phenomenon of 
financialization, the study of risk disclosures, and the development of accounting 
regulation.  
The contributions of the first three publications arise from identifying the impact the 
shift to a dominant individualistic solidarity has upon the effectiveness of Arthur 
Andersen as an auditor, the behaviour of key actors in the financial system, and the 
development of the notion of strategic management accounting. The fourth 
publication contributes by setting out how NDIT connects disparate aspects of 
financialization and explaining cross-country variations in financialization. The fifth 
publication contributes to a new understanding of risk disclosures as a function of 
patterns of social relations. The sixth and seventh publications contribute to 
understanding by identifying that the development of accounting regulation is being 
hampered because of regulatory self-capture.         
The thesis publications all adopt NDIT as an alternative theory base for culturally-
related accounting research across a wide array of topics. This demonstrates the 
efficacy of NDIT for undertaking nuanced culturally-based accounting research 
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which can explain the dynamics of cultural change via the notion of cultural 
dialogues.  
It is also of significance that NDIT does not rely upon the assumptions of Hofstede 
and can be employed for studying groups of all kinds. This is important as there 
appears to be a growing dissatisfaction with the reliance upon Hofstede in 
accounting and finance research. For example, a Special Issue of Accounting, 
Auditing and Accountability journal was published in 2016 following a call for 
alternative theories to Hofstede to be adopted for investigating ethnicity and culture 
in accounting research10.  
A key challenge for NDIT is that it is still being developed. Linsley and Shrives 
(2009) note in the conclusion to the first thesis publication that “(g)rand theories 
need re¿ning and developing if they are to fully account for the complexities 
inherent in organisational and institutional life” (p. 506). This remains the case and, 
consequently, there is enormous scope for further research in accounting that 
employs NDIT as the theory base. Three broad categories of future research that 
could be especially valuable are: (i) studies that critique and build upon the 
publications in the thesis, (ii) studies that employ NDIT to investigate aspects of 
accounting beyond those areas investigated in the thesis publications and (iii) studies 
that investigate particular aspects of NDIT in the context of accounting. 
In respect of the first category, future studies that evaluate the robustness of the 
findings of the thesis publications would be valuable. For example, further research 
tracing through from thought styles to annual report disclosures can establish 
whether the findings of the BOC study also hold in other cases. Such studies need 
not be confined to solely examining risk disclosures and could usefully be extended 
to examine other types of disclosures provided by management in the annual report. 
Another example of an extension study would be an NDIT-based investigation of 
financialization in a country, or countries, other than the UK and Germany.  
10 Linsley, Linsley, Beck and Mollan (2016) was one of the papers published in this Special Issue. 
The editors of the Special Issue state: “The contribution by Linsley et al. (2016) is a powerful 
demonstration of the ability of the Grid and Group model to theoretically frame cross-cultural and 
cross-country research. Unlike the approach of Hofstede, which directly and statically links culture to 
nation, Linsley et al. (2016) highlight dynamic relations between four solidarities (i.e. hierarchy, 
enclave, individualist and isolate) within nations” (Baskerville et al., 2016, p. 1263).
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The second category of future studies that would be beneficial are those that employ 
NDIT to investigate aspects of accounting beyond the thesis publications. The 
second section of this chapter noted that prior culturally-based accounting research 
has examined a wide array of topics within accounting including, for example: 
national accounting systems, accounting standards, and performance measurement 
systems. Employing NDIT to re-examine these disparate areas would be potentially 
valuable for appraising what new insights the theory can add to our understanding in 
the different areas. Such studies would also begin to redress the imbalance in respect 
of the dominance of the employment of Hofstede in cultural-accounting research. 
This second category of study need not be confined solely to those accounting areas 
noted in section two. For example, two additional aspects of accounting that would 
particularly benefit from investigation using NDIT concern the notions of risk 
culture and calculative culture. There has been limited exploration in accounting as 
to how either of these concepts should be understood and NDIT could be a means for 
analysing both concepts.
The third category of future research is with regards to studies that examine specific 
aspects of NDIT in an accounting context with the primary objective of aiding in the 
further development of the theory. The thesis publications examine cultural 
dialogues and associated change processes, and this has been an aspect of NDIT 
where there have been recent prior calls by NIDT researchers for further study (see, 
for example, 6 and Swedlow, 2016). Two other aspects of NDIT that would benefit 
from further research are hybrids and clumsy solutions. Hybrids occur when two or 
more solidarities form some type of coalition and there is a need for further research 
to better understand why and when hybrids occur. Clumsy solutions concern the idea 
that to resolve the debates between the four solidarities and to address wicked 
problems requires enacting solutions that all four solidarities will deem legitimate. 
These two aspects of NDIT are examined within the thesis publications but only to a 
limited extent.         
In conclusion, there is still further work needed to overcome the hegemony of 
Hofstede and to introduce alternative perspectives into accounting-culture research. 
NDIT provides an approach that can offer nuanced understandings of the connect 
between culture and accounting, and can cope with change and complexity through 
from the micro-level of the individual to the macro-level of nations. There is scope 
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for significant further research not only in respect of studies that corroborate or 
contradict the findings of the thesis publications, but also with regards to studies in 
other areas of accounting. Finally, there are still challenges as to how NDIT is 
verified and theorized and, therefore, future studies can also enhance and develop 
understanding of NDIT.  
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a b s t r a c t
Sociology and anthropology are especially valuable in providing a
critical understanding of the risk-related implications ofmodernity.
There has, however, been relatively little discussion of the work of
Mary Douglas within accounting although her pioneering writings
in the area of risk have been highly influential. This paper uses Dou-
glas’ cultural theory of risk to provide an alternative perspective on
the demise of Enron and Andersen. The failure at Enron is inter-
preted through the grid-group model and analysed as a series of
events that threaten to destabilize established cultures. Account-
ing is thus construed as an activity that exists on the margins
of boundaries. There are two important conclusions drawn from
the analysis. First, as the worldviews of both the individualist and
hierarchical cultures became threatened by the ensuing crisis they
collaborated to ensure their perpetuation. This also averted indi-
viduals from becoming susceptible to recruitment by subversive
egalitarian groups. Second, the individualistic culture of Andersen
shaped practices within the firm weakening its ability to act as a
gatekeeper and therefore public accounting firms need to modify
their cultures if they are to police the margins effectively.
© 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Accounting researchers have found it beneficial to draw on other disciplines to analyse and
evaluate accounting issues. For example, Macintosh and Baker (2002), McGoun et al. (2003) and
Lewis and Unerman (1999) utilize perspectives derived from linguistics, theatre and philosophy in
accounting-related papers. The two related fields of sociology and anthropology havemade significant
contributions to the study of risk (Freudenburg and Pastor, 1992) and provide valuable perspectives
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on a topic that has received much attention lately (Power, 2004). Consequently accounting academics
have been influenced by “the work of people such as Beck and Giddens” (Hanlon et al., 2006, p. 270)
and have used their ideas within different accounting contexts. For example, Green (1999), Jones and
Dugdale (2002), and Froud (2003) employ the ideas of Beck and Giddens to examine audit practices,
activity-based costing and health accounting, respectively.
It is unsurprising that outside the field of sociology formulations of risk by Beck and Giddens have
dominated risk discussions. Beck’s Risk Society (1986) is regarded as a seminal work and there is a
strong commonality with Giddens’ writings on risk in, inter alia, The Consequences of Modernity (1990)
and ReflexiveModernization (Beck et al., 1994). There are, however, other risk theoristswhosework is of
equal importance. In particular, Mary Douglas is considered to have produced “path-breaking analyses
of risk . . . (that are) . . . highly relevant to the critique of contemporary ideologies of risk” (Elliott, 2002,
p. 301). Further, the writings of both Douglas and Beck are considered the two key reference points for
sociologists and anthropologists studying risk (see for example Zinn, 2004).
This paper seeks to bring Douglas’s risk thinking into the accounting domain and re-dress the
imbalance brought about by accounting researchers having too great a focus on the risk ideas of Beck
and Giddens. The authors draw on Douglas’s work to explore current accounting and auditing failures;
a subject that was studied in a recent paper by Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004) and central to which
are Giddens’ theories on risk and trust that stem from his reflections upon the nature of modernity.
Through re-examining the same topic the authors are able to provide an alternative analysis of the
Enron accounting failure.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Initially Giddens’ account of modernity, risk and trust
in expert systems is critiqued and problems inherent in the risk society perspective are discussed.
In their paper Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004) explicitly state that the “purpose . . . is not to critique
Giddens’ theoretical propositions” (p. 972). However, it is important to examine these criticisms as
they provide a foundation for justifying using Douglas’s ideas to examine accounting and audit issues.
Douglas’s cultural approach to risk is then reviewed and criticisms of her conception of cultural theory
are addressed. The accounting and auditing failures at Enron are then re-analysed using Douglas’s
theoretical grid-group framework. Finally, the implications of the analysis of the case using Douglas’
cultural theory of risk are discussed within the conclusion.
1. Criticisms of Giddens
Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004) base their analysis of the implications of Enron and Andersen
accounting and audit failures upon Giddens’ (1990) proposal that the reorganization of social relations
on a global, rather than a local, basis is progressed through two types of disembedding mechanisms;
symbolic tokens and expert systems of technical and professional expertise. Whilst non-experts trust
that experts have created systems incorporating tolerable risk levels, they begin to contest expert
knowledge when events occur that undermine those systems. This re-evaluation of expert status and
knowledge is a product of reflexivity. Reflexivity in modern society is concerned with our propensity
for analysing knowledge and modifying our perceptions of social systems and social activities as new
information arises.
Unerman andO’Dwyer (2004) contend that the events that unfolded at Enron and Andersen caused
employees, and other external lay persons, to question the reliability of accounting and audit systems
withnon-expert actors reflexivelymodifying their opinions about the trustworthiness of these abstract
expert systems. Consequently, through the process of reflexivity, non-experts developed increased
sensitivity to levels of risk in stock market investment and stocks, which are symbolic tokens, also
became vulnerable to a withdrawal of trust. They conclude by positing that this loss of confidence and
trust in the two disembedding mechanisms may have potential ramifications not just for the status
of experts and the capital markets but also for the continuation of the capitalist system on which
modernity is based.
In his conception of reflexivity and risk Giddens assumes that scientific knowledge consists solely
of propositional truths with the outcome that his distinction between expert and lay knowledge is
unconditional (Wynne, 1996). That is, in the context of reflexivity, there is the implication that the
risk meanings created by experts have primacy and lay individuals merely react reflexively to the
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experts’ view of risk rather than creating their own risk meanings (Lupton, 1999; Taylor-Gooby and
Zinn, 2006). Thus if there is disagreement amongst those possessing expert knowledge then lay actors
need to decide which expert to trust; but if the experts concur upon an issue then the lay actors can
accept this expert view without needing to make any decision (Wynne, 1996).
Consequently, Giddens idea of reflexivity implies not only that expert knowledgehas pre-eminence,
but also that lay individuals adopt a rationalist and calculative stance in their interactions with expert
systems (Alexander, 1996; Elliott, 2002; Lupton and Tulloch, 2002). Wynne (1996) explains how this
simplistic approach can be seen to be deficient “once one introduces the idea that scientific expert
knowledge itself embodies a particular culture” and consequently embodies “hermeneutic (and for-
mulaic) and not only propositional truths” (Wynne, 1996, p. 75).Wynne demonstrates that individuals
create their own risk knowledges through localised experiences and observations (and by means of
individual or collective risk encounters) and therefore lay actors are continually making assessments
concerning the credibility of experts’ risk knowledges (Lupton, 1999). This is not to argue that the
lay person’s risk knowledge should necessarily be deemed superior to the expert’s risk knowledge;
rather that individuals do not simply compare the risk assessments of experts when determining their
reaction to a risk (Wynne, 1996). The relationship between the lay public and experts (who will have
a more generalised and idealised risk view) is therefore more complicated than Giddens suggests.
Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004) do not explore this lay-expert issue in the context of expert account-
ing and audit systems. Therefore no account is taken of the possibility of lay actors having created
their own localised risk knowledges prior to Enron’s bankruptcy and, therefore, having different con-
ceptions of trust in expert accounting and audit systems. For example, Enron employees were able to
observe the company firsthand and therefore their evaluation of the credibility of the accounting and
audit systems might have differed substantially from investors; or within the community of investors
it is possible that assessments of the reliability of accounting and audit systems differed dependent
upon factors such as prior experiences in investing in stocks or prior levels of accounting and audit
knowledge.
It is also asserted byWynne (1996) that individuals have always constructed their own risk knowl-
edges. Giddens may therefore be mistaken in assuming that ‘reflexive’ modernity (under which
conditions lay actors rationally decide whether to invest trust in any particular expert system) was
preceded by a period of ‘simple’ modernity where unconditional acceptance of, and trust in, experts
existed. One consequence of Wynne’s assertion is that even if there appears to be no visible distrust
in an expert system it cannot be assumed that trust is present. Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004) do not
consider the possibility that distrust in expert accounting and audit systems may have already been
present, and that actors in the Enron drama may have been accepting of their distrust of the system
during the 1990s as it provided opportunities to accrue gains (financial or otherwise).
A further difficulty concerning Giddens’ notion of reflexivity is that the notion that modern actors
have been liberated from “traditional deference to . . . the authority of experts” and “self-confident . . .
citizens seek to interpret the views of different risk experts with varying claims to authority” (Taylor-
Gooby and Zinn, 2006, pp. 404–5) cannot be applied to all individuals. For example, membership of
a particular social class or a lack of economic wealth may exclude some individuals from the process
of reflexivity (Lupton, 1999). As different actors have varying degrees of agency then it is an omission
on the part of Giddens not to consider the significance of social contexts and power dynamics (Elliott,
2002; Lupton, 1999; Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006). For example, many USA citizens do not have the
financial wherewithal to invest in stocks and thismay have excluded them from engaging in a reflexive
re-consideration of trust in expert accounting and audit systems following Enron’s demise.
Giddens’ perspectives on risk are closely allied to the risk society themes developed by Beck (1986,
1999). The theories propoundedbyBeck andGiddens have undoubtedly become central to risk debates
both inside and outside sociology (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006) but neither Beck nor Giddens have
endeavoured to test their theories (LuptonandTulloch, 2002). Additionally, theyneglect to engagewith
the culturallybasedand “more sophisticatedandsymbolicallymediateddiscussionof risksundertaken
by thinkers like Mary Douglas” (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006, p. 404). Therefore Douglas’s cultural-
symbolic approach has been adopted in this paper as it can offer an alternative, more subtle, account
of Enron’s accounting and audit failures. The next section of the paper sets out Douglas’ cultural theory
of risk and addresses criticisms of cultural theory.
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2. Douglas and risk
2.1. Douglas and the social construction of risk
Douglas’s ideas concerning risk anddanger (Douglas, 1966, 1970, 1982, 1986, 1994) form thebasis of
her cultural theory of risk with its central proposition that “selective attention to risk, and preferences
among different types of risk taking (or avoiding), correspond to cultural biases—that is, to worldviews
or ideologies entailing deeply held values and beliefs defending different patterns of social relations”
(Wildavsky and Dake, 1990, p. 43). Therefore Douglas’s position is that danger and risk are social
constructions with different social structures causing different risk perceptions (Dake, 1992).
To explain how different types of social structure impact on risk perceptions Douglas (1970, 1982,
1986, 1994) and Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) develop a grid-group model. The grid element of the
model relates to the degree of autonomy an individual has over the selection of their role(s) in society.
For example, gender, race or age may confine an individual to undertaking a restricted set of social
roles (Rayner, 1992). A high-grid state indicates that there are significant social constraints on the
members of a society and interactions are regulated; a low-grid state designates a society where all
actors are free to choose social roles without prejudice. The group dimension is associated with an
individual’s commitment to their community. Thus there may be solidarity between actors in the
society and the existence of shared aims (high-group state) or there may be little cohesion between
the actors and a limited sense of inter-dependence (low-group state). Overall, therefore, the grid-
group model differentiates four cultural groups; individualists, egalitarians, hierarchists and fatalists
(see Fig. 1).
If the social structure of the group towhich a person belongs is categorized as individualist then this
denotes a low grid-low group culture. In this type of society individuals are free to transact with any
other individual, but therewill be a propensity to collaboratewith other individualswhen gains can be
made from such alliances. Individualists are pro-competition and consider a free market environment
the most appropriate configuration (Douglas, 1982). Self-regulation is espoused (Lupton, 1999) and
American entrepreneurs would be a typical example of this cultural type (Rayner, 1992). This society
demands people perform to a high level and, consequently, is a stressful society. It would be unrealistic
to expect support from another individual if failure occurs and ill-health, for example, would be seen
as aweakness. Consequently,Wilkinson (2001) perceives this culture as supporting “social institutions
which enshrine the goal of personal acquisition as their supreme value” (Wilkinson, 2001, p. 5). The
individualist worldview of risk is that it is not to be regarded as exclusively negative as there is also an
Fig. 1. Grid-group model.
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upside to risk that resides in the market opportunities it can present. This entrepreneurial acceptance
of risk-taking is alsopresent in the individualist view that self-regulationof risk is preferable to external
regulation.
In the egalitarian (low grid-high group) culture the external boundary of the group is very clearly
demarcated, with a strong division existing between group members and outsiders (Douglas, 1982).
The wellbeing of the group is of greater importance than the interests of the individual resulting
in individual behaviour being constrained. Disloyalty to the group is viewed as a perfidious act with
expulsion from the group being themost probable outcome. The low-grid nature of this type of society
implies that, alongside this group commonality, individual social roles are unrestricted. The egalitarian
society is therefore pre-disposed towards idealism, and equality and justice are seen as central con-
cepts. Inequality and injustice within wider society are thus seen as significant ills. Risks are therefore
perceived as emanating from untrustworthy outsiders. Furthermore the egalitarian culture questions
the expert status of the professions.
The third cultural type is the hierarchical organization or institution (high grid-high group) that
combines clearly defined group boundaries with limitations upon the social roles that a group mem-
ber may opt for (Douglas, 1982). Outsiders are viewed as potential transgressors of boundaries and
are therefore a threat, and because social roles are well-defined there are also strict internal bound-
aries that must be respected. Consequently authority is respected, and traditions and customs an
important part of organizational or institutional life (Wilkinson, 2001). Delinquency and unconven-
tional behaviour are, however, unacceptable and systems of justice will have established clear rules
for responding firmly to any such cases. There will also be greater regulation imposed upon group
members. Within the hierarchical society trust is placed in professional experts who can advise how
best to manage risk. This may necessitate the implementation of even tighter controls to protect the
boundaries (Douglas, 1994).
The final cultural classification is the fatalist society (high grid-low group). In this type of society
the individual actor is highly constrained in respect of the social roles they are permitted to undertake
and there is little scope for self-determination. Additionally, the group boundary is very weak and no
sense of community exists. This results in the individual having no sense of belonging to their own
group and yet also being an outsider in respect of other social groups (Douglas, 1982). The individual is
alienated and isolated, events occur arbitrarily, and it is impossible to influence the outcomes of these
events (Wilkinson, 2001). The response to risk and danger is, therefore, submissive resignation as a
victim of fate (Douglas, 1994).
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) suggest that at the level of public policy four principal risks can be
identified: (i) foreign disputes and conflicts, (ii) crime and civil disorder, (iii) concerns for the envi-
ronment and the misuse of technology, and (iv) economic problems affecting levels of affluence. The
hierarchical culture, with its emphasis on the maintenance of internal and external boundaries, is
focused upon dangers associated with foreign conflicts and crime. Examples of institutions and orga-
nizations whose social patterns form this type of culture include “churches, industrial corporations,
and political hierarchies” (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982, p. 90). An individualist culture has a greater
focus on economic risks, stemming from the entrepreneurial free market perspective that character-
izes this type of society. Douglas and Wildavsky consider these two cultures as being at the ‘Center’
because of the power and influence they hold with regard to wider society. This power is especially
strong when the interests of the two cultures intersect (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982).
By contrast egalitarian groups are considered to be on the ‘Border’. They are not close to the centres
of power or influence and, to maintain stability within the group, they identify the outside world as
a threat. An egalitarian culture perceives nature as vulnerable, and therefore deems environmental
and technological risks most important. Groups that have been identified as culturally egalitarian in
modern society include environmental organizations and some religious groups (Rayner, 1992).
Because Douglas’ cultural theory seeks to explain why certain risks become politicised there is a
moral aspect to the theory. As Ericson and Doyle (2003, p. 5) explain, “(Risk) is used . . . to mobilize
moral communities for dealingwith danger in particular ways, and to force accountability.” In the past
the moral dimension of risk would be invoked through the language of religion with potential wrong-
doers being reminded that transgressing society’s boundaries was ‘sinful’ or ‘taboo’. Douglas perceives
theword ‘risk’ a secular substitute for ‘sin’ inmodernWestern society but performing the same funda-
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mental function of imbuing individual actors with the sense that they have a moral responsibility not
to disturb the societal order. As a consequence risk is also interlinkedwith notions of blame inDouglas’
cultural theory. For example, in hierarchical societies blame will be ascribed to those who transgress
internal or external boundaries and appropriately harsh penalties will be applied as punishment for
endangering the group.
2.2. Criticisms of Douglas’ cultural theory of risk
The use of grid-group as a framework for analysing the behaviour of social groups or organizations
has been subject to a number of criticisms. It is claimed that Douglas’ cultural theory is deterministic
and does not account for individual free will (Tansey and O’Riordan, 1999). Rayner (1992) clarifies
that although Douglas’ cultural theory does presuppose that cultural bias exists this does not bind an
individual to a specific cosmology and whilst there will be behavioural dispositions arising from the
social structures that characterize a society this does not imply that it will be possible to anticipate
how every individual will behave in respect of a particular issue. Consequently, nor is it the case that
Douglas’ cultural theory is attempting to stereotype individuals (Rayner, 1992).
Boholm (1996) emphasizes the problem thatDouglas’ cultural theory has in explaining the dynamic
dimension of an individual’s life. As Hendry (1999) observes modern society requires individuals to
function within a variety of group or organizational settings that may not share the same cultural
typology. For example, we may work for a company that has an individualist culture, whilst in our
social life we are a member of a religious or political group that has a hierarchical culture. There are
different stances adopted by cultural theorists in this respect. An individual could attempt to manage
this dichotomous existence by changing personality according to the cultural setting that they are
operating within. For example, an individual may assume the persona of an individualist in the work-
place and take on the cultural norms of a traditionalist when engaging in religion or politics, but this is
unlikely because of “the psychological need of the individual for cognitive consistency” (Hendry, 1999,
p. 566). Douglas asserts that individuals will therefore endeavour to confine their group membership
to a single cultural typology compatible with their world view. Hendry’s (1999) alternative suggestion
is that it is likely that an individual who has to maintain membership of a group where the worldview
of the individual and the group do not coincide is able to resolve this difficulty by withholding full
commitment. Hendry’s view therefore has an affinity with Rayner’s (1992) mobility hypothesis which
acknowledges that individuals do move across differing contexts, and appears a more realistic and
flexible position to adopt than Douglas’s stability hypothesis (Tansey and O’Riordan, 1999).
A further criticism of Douglas’ cultural theory is that “a typology of a limited number of stereotypes
will run into difficulties should it attempt to account for complex social reality that is inhabited not
by artificial constructs but by real people” (Boholm, 1996, p. 73). This assumes, erroneously, that an
organization or society must fully conform to one of the four typologies. The grid-group dimensions
are not meant to be interpreted simply as possessing either a low or high state; rather they allow for
gradations as both dimensions are scalar. The use of four principal typologies is a device for under-
standing why within a particular social group certain risks become prominent and others are ignored.
Consequently cultural theory is helpful “because it is a neutral tool (that) does not seek to classify the
actions of different groups in terms of rationality and irrationality as the expert-lay distinction often
implies” (Tansey and O’Riordan, 1999, p. 77).
Boholm’s (1996) criticism that Douglas’ cultural theory cannot account for the complexities of
modern society can also be contested. Hendry (1999) is able to use cultural theory to explain changes
in social structures that have occurred within the business and management arena in the USA and
UK since the 1980s, and his discussions are significant in the context of this paper. Fundamental to
Hendry’s paper is his commentary upon the relationship between the hierarchical and individualist
cultures. He discusses how, particularly in the US, the traditional hierarchical society is being usurped
by an individualistic culture, although the hierarchical culture continues to persist. For example, polit-
ical structures still retain hierarchical features and hierarchically related notions such as “authority,
fairness, duty (and) care are still . . . important” (Hendry, 1999, p. 567).
Interconnections that have developed between these two cultures are particularly conspicuous in
the business andmanagement field. Business owners andmanagers traditionally ordered firms hierar-
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chically as a means of managing and controlling employees. Concurrently these firms were, however,
supporting amarket-based culture as they pursued profits and hence the potential for the hierarchical
and individualist belief systems to conflict arose. Hendry contends that this issue remained relatively
suppressedwhilst employees lived in a predominantly hierarchical environment and believed that the
firm would look after them via, for example, long-term employment agreements. However since the
1980s themarket for corporate control has causedmanagers to implement practices such as downsiz-
ing, short-term employment contracts and flatter organizational structures and this has brought the
two cultures into direct conflict. Concurrently, senior managers’ employment packages have become
more obviously market-based and they are no longer perceived as ‘servant-stewards’ of firms.
Hendry’s assertion that modern companies exhibit a synthesis of the hierarchical and individualist
cultures then leads him to query whether this position is sustainable. His principal conclusion is that
in the short-termmanagersmaymake use of hierarchical structures to co-ordinate activities in pursuit
of opportunities that the market culture presents. However, as the managers of ‘hybrid’ hierarchical-
individualistfirmsseek to takeadvantageof a residual groupallegianceassociatedwith thehierarchical
culture they find this difficult to sustain as employees nowperceive their loyalty as beingmanipulated.
Therefore firms reach a stagewhere employee co-operation has to be obtained via an alternative route.
As US society has moved towards an individualistic culture then a vision which appeals sufficiently to
the self-interest of employees needs to be promoted and extolled by firms.
Thenext sectionexamines accounting andaudit failures at EnronusingDouglas’ cultural theory. The
analysis uses Douglas’s grid-group framework to consider how cultural typologies affected the world-
view of the actors involved in key events and utilises Hendry’s ideas concerning the inter-relationships
between the hierarchical and individualist cultures.
3. Analysis of accounting and audit failures
3.1. Enron as an individualist concern
If the grid-group model is applied to Enron then there is strong evidence that the company should
be classified as an individualist culture. The whole emphasis of the organization was to seek to grow
earnings and the stock price (Healy and Palepu, 2003). This occurred via Enron’s operations in the
USA’s energymarkets (Reinstein andMcMillan, 2004)with the company later expanding into overseas
energy-related transactions and other ventures such as broadband, pulp and paper (see for example,
Chabrak and Daidj, 2007; Chatterjee, 2003). Thus the company was focused upon making money
(Clarke, 2005) and had an underlying philosophy that those who generated profits for the firm should
be compensated generously. McLean and Elkind (2004) detail how internally this led to conflicts,
manipulation, dysfunctional behaviour and bitter rivalries. For example, trading operations would
deliberatelymis-quote gas prices to appropriate profits for themselves (and away from the originators
of the deals) thus turning Enron into a “free-for-all culture that infected the entire company” (McLean
and Elkind, 2004, p. 56).
The appraisal system was brutal such that whilst high performing employees received gener-
ous bonuses, under performing employees would be dismissed or worked under threat of dismissal
(Benston and Hartgraves, 2002; Tonge et al., 2003). Consequently, this was a highly demanding envi-
ronment (Chatterjee, 2003) and thosewho remainedat the company “were themost ruthless in cutting
deals and looking out for themselves” (McLean and Elkind, 2004, p. 121).
Human resource strategies were deliberately conceived to recruit individuals whowere supportive
of Enron’s individualist culture. The selection process involved sifting through the pool of poten-
tial employees looking for arrogant and forceful individuals who would buy into Enron’s vision. The
recruiters pursued these ‘loyals’ and screened out individuals likely to be subversive (Trinkaus and
Giacalone, 2005). If the screening process had inadvertently let through an individual whose commit-
ment was doubtful, then the six monthly appraisal system was available to expel that ‘incompatible’
employee.
These descriptions of Enron accord with Douglas’s depiction of the worldview of the individualist
society as “an accommodation to the harsh experience of competitive society. The individual . . .. (is)
under continual threat of withdrawal of support . . . Society is an unremitting source of worry as well
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as rich prizes. . . . continual selectivity in the social environment . . . demand(s) the highest standards”
(Douglas, 1982, pp. 211–212).
Prior analyses of the Enron debacle have also highlighted the importance of the notion of the ‘mar-
ket’ within the firm. For example, Craig and Amernic (2004) discuss how the company revered the idea
of the ‘market’ and senior managers persistently reiterated their belief in free market ideas (Chabrak
and Daidj, 2007). This seeming espousal of the sanctity of the free market was actually, however, a
championing of the belief that it was appropriate to act in self-interest and to transact deals on the
best terms possible both as an individual within the company and in respect of external transactions.
Thus, externally for example, Enronmanagers cultivated political relationships to influence govern-
ment decision-making and (de)regulation (Bakan, 2004; Froud et al., 2004; Hardin, 2007), and there
was gaming of the system (market manipulation) by Enron to profit from the California energy crisis
in 2000–2001 (Bakan, 2004; Krugman, 2004). As governments in developing nations became more
disposed to consider privatisation as an option for fulfilling energy needs Enron saw opportunities
for building power stations. For example, in India Enron was awarded the Dabhol power contracts
without any competitive bidding process in a deal that lead to accusations of dishonesty in addition
to considerable anger at the inequity of the contract structure (McLean and Elkind, 2004).
Internally,managers andemployeesalso consideredEnrona ‘market’ tobegamedwith, for example,
manipulation of the appraisal system occurring and staff manoeuvring to be awarded greater bonuses
and incentives. The scale of stock options awarded to directors as part of their compensation packages
has also beenwell documented (see for example Gordon, 2004) as has the Chief Financial Officer’s use
of special purpose entities to amass private profits (see for example Froud et al., 2004). These all serve
as examples of Enron managers and employees following self-interest to accrue personal wealth.
Therefore the manner in which Enron’s executives and employees interacted with external and
internal ‘markets’ further signifies the individualist culturewithin the company. For, as Douglas (1982)
observes, the individualist culture may have the appearance of a free market but, inexorably, advan-
tageswill be pursued throughmonopolies, cartels, lobbying or other practices thatmight be personally
beneficial when transacting with other participants in the market.
3.2. Marketing a vision
It has already been discussed how Hendry (1999) contends that a move towards an individualistic
culture in US firms has necessitated marketing a vision to employees predicated upon self-interest.
Enron offered substantial salary packages to employees (Tonge et al., 2003) supporting the notion that
employeeswere strongly drawn to the company because of thematerialistically based rewards system.
Promoting a vision founded upon the acquisition of material wealth at Enron, and at other companies
such as WorldCom (see for example Breeden, 2003), was facilitated by the bull market of the 1990s
that created prosperity for a growing investor class and who adopted a positive view of the market
economy (BusinessWeek, 2002).
The visionmarketed to Enron recruits had another, more subtle, element too. Douglas (1970, 1982)
explains how, in the individualist environment, to become a ‘Big Man’ (that is, to become one of the
individuals who leads that society or group) then there is a need to muster support. At Enron Skilling
andLayappear tohaveacquired support throughanostensible linkagebetween individualistic cultures
and democracy.
The low grid-low group culture of an individualistic society suggests, although it does not actually
create, a democratic arrangement that has an inherent appeal because of themessage it communicates.
Moriceau (2005) notes this equivalence between democracy and markets in the context of Enron, and
the significance of this is that the individualistic society implies an equality of opportunity exists for
anyonewanting to pursue success in an individualistic society or organization. For in an individualistic
society the opportunity to acquire wealth and ‘get on’ is seemingly available to anyone willing to
commit themselves to pursuing success.2
2 There is, of course, not a true equality of opportunity that can be attached to the individualist culture. For example, at Enron
the majority of new recruits were drawn from the highest ranked universities only (Trinkaus and Giacalone, 2005) and once
hired these recruits then had to deal with all the behaviours created by the extreme competitiveness inherent in the firm.
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The coupling of Enron to notions of democracy occurred, for example, through the newspaper and
magazine reports of the very modest family upbringings of senior managers such as Lay, Skilling,
Wing and Mark (Froud et al., 2004; McLean and Elkind, 2004). Similar stories provided further ver-
ification that prior background was not a barrier to becoming successful at Enron (for example, see
the account of the high school dropout who became head of paper trading at Enron published in For-
tunemagazine; O’Reilly, 2000). Skilling’s belief that prior business experiencewas less important than
resourcefulness and intellect added to this representation of a democratic organization. The image of
democracy was also enhanced through the “co-branding of Enron and Houston through good works
in the community” (Froud et al., 2004, p. 901) with generous donations being made to a wide range of
charitable causes suchas theUniversityof TexasM.D.AndersonCancerCenter (BenstonandHartgraves,
2002).
Chabrak and Daidj (2007) have suggested that a supplementary strategy developed by Enron’s
managers to influence opinion and market a vision was to construct a rhetoric infused with religious
language. Theyfind support for a connection between economic life and religious conviction in theUSA
within the writings of, for example, de Tocqueville and argue that this legitimises the use of religious
language inaUScorporate context. Formeremployees alsouse language infusedwith religious imagery
to describe their experiences at the company although Chabrak and Daidj (2007) do not discuss this.
For example, quotations from former employees cited byMcLean and Elkind (2004) include, inter alia:
“There is one meeting in particular that everyone remembers . . . In the Enron mythology, it came
to be known as the Come to Jesus meeting.” (p. 25)
“. . . we were proselytizing. We were the apostles.” (p. 38)
“We (were) brought together with a certain amount of missionary zeal.” (p. 71)
“.. practically like a revival meeting.” (p. 242)
The significance of these quotations is that the intensity of emotion apparent in the former employ-
ees’ use of religious phraseology implies that a highly compelling vision had been created with Lay
attaining a “GreatManpersona” (McLean andElkind, 2004, p. 96) and Skilling “sound(ing) like a vision-
ary” (McLean and Elkind, 2004, p. 233). Jobs at Enron became highly coveted (Watkins, 2006) and it
successfully differentiated itself from other firms in a number of respects including: the nature of its
business model, the manner in which human capital was employed and the many business accolades
it had received such as six times winner of the Fortune ‘Most Innovative Company in America’ award
from 1996 to 2001 (Kaminski andMartin, 2001). Thus Enron’smanagers were successful in convincing
employees, potential employees, and others external to the organization, that it provided a unparal-
leled opportunity for self-advancement thatwas not available to the same extent elsewhere and hence
Enron was identified by recruits as a “once in a lifetime opportunity . . . to be part of a mighty mission
(. . . an intoxicating “in” group)” (Trinkaus and Giacalone, 2005, p. 239).
3.3. Enron, risk and Douglas’cultural theory
Within an individualist culture economic threats are a central concern. There is a heightened sense
of the significance of personal possessions and the risk focus is upon issues such as sustainability
of economic growth, albeit with an acceptance that it is not possible to have a completely risk-free
society (Dake, 1992). Therefore Enron’s senior executives would have been attentive to the size and
historical pattern of the earnings figures disclosed in the financial statements. This is because the
earningsfiguresprovide fundamentally important informationabout the company’s current and future
economic prospects (Coffee, 2004) and, in the context of an individualist culture, any vulnerability in
earnings would be construed as a sign of a possible risk or danger to the wealth of stockholders,
employees and other stakeholders.
Manipulation of the financial statements by senior executives resulted in the firm’s earnings being
disclosed as growing until a third quarter loss of $618m was announced in October 2001. Once it had
been announced that Enron’s earnings were negative, a risk to personal wealth was exposed and this
commenced the process of the disintegration of Enron as the severity of underlying issues became
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apparent (Gordon, 2004). Accordingly, the declaration of the third quarter loss was interpreted as a
warning sign and in due course led to Enron filing for bankruptcy on December 2, 2001.
The senior executives of Enronwould have been aware that a disclosure of negative earnings posed
a risk to their own wealth as well as to the wealth of others. Possession of insider information did,
however, provide senior executives with the opportunity to act in self-interest and safeguard personal
wealth through judicious timing of stock saleswith a total value in excess of $1 billion (Beetham, 2005).
For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission First Amended Complaint (against Skilling and
Causey) alleged that:
“Between 1998 and 2001, Skilling received approximately $200million from the sale of Enron stock
netting over $89 million in profit . . . and . . . Causey received more than $14 million from the sale
of Enron stock, netting over $5 million in profit . . . Enron’s other executives and senior managers
also sold hundreds of millions of dollars worth of Enron stock at artificially inflated prices.” (SEC
Complaint Civil Action No. H-04-0284).
In addition to the Enron executives the other members of this individualistic organisation were
the employees and they, too, would have been alert to any sign that the firm’s earnings might be
vulnerable as this could signal that their personal wealth was at risk. As levels of wealth rose in the
1990s there was an overwhelming feeling of euphoria in the financial markets and stock prices rose
dramatically (Krugman, 2004). Enron’s stock price mirrored this trend during the late 1990s and even
in the year 2000 rose by 87% (Healy and Palepu, 2003). In December 2000 Enron was still held in
esteem when Skilling was appointed Chief Executive Officer and he received praise from magazines
such as BusinessWeek and Worth (McLean and Elkind, 2004). Consequently, through to December
2000, Enron employees would have seen the value of their 401(k) pension plans (which comprised
Enron stock that could not be sold prior to being fifty; Gordon, 2004) increasing and warning signs of
earnings-related issues were not evident.
In early 2001 indicators of potential earnings problems did emerge. In March 2001 (6 months
prior to the announcement of the third quarter loss) a journalist, Beth McLean, raised questions about
Enron’s accounts, querying if the company was overpriced and discussing how the business was diffi-
cult to understand (McLean, 2001), and in early 2001 Enron Broadband Services division commenced
a programme of staff reductions as that part of the business struggled (McLean and Elkind, 2004).
Therefore with hindsight it may seem surprising that in early- and mid-2001 Enron’s employees did
not appear to be forewarned of the economic risks present in the organization.
Why these economic risks did not appear to become visible to employeesmay be attributable to the
core individualistic culture where the “market . . . (is) . . . focused on individual profits, (and) is myopic
to larger effects . . . (thus) it foresees danger only from the individual perspective . . .” (Douglas, 1994,
p. 66). That is, Enron’s employees would have paid most attention to risks that might directly impinge
upon their personal wealth. As fear of loss of personal wealth is especially strong in an individualist
culturewhere there is a lack of provision then,when Enron’s stock price fluctuated butwith a generally
downwardmovement during 2001, this caused individuals to re-direct their attention fromwishing to
amass further wealth to seeking to preserve existing wealth. Hence, during 2001 the greatest concern
of employees would have been to maintain their salaried Enron earnings and their 401(k) pension
plans. The result being that the prime danger many employees were likely to have focused on was the
possibility of dismissal.
One employee who did become aware of the earnings manipulations in 2001 was the ‘whistle
blower’ Sherron Watkins. She had some awareness of the accounting problems but was reluctant to
voice her concerns outside the company for fear of losing her job at Enron (Watkins, 2006). This is to be
expected for overt dissentwould have been unlikely because of the strength of this desire to remain an
employeeof Enron (Froudet al., 2004). Consequently, it is unsurprising that hermemoshavenot always
been perceived as truewhistle blowing, but rather have been portrayed as “opportunistic . . . (reading)
partly as her pitch for a new job as the vice-president” (Froud et al., 2004, p. 903). Further evidence of
her behaviour seeming to conform primarily to an individualistic worldview that is inherently short-
sighted, largely self-interested and has limited support for those who fail is her having sold $47,000
of stock after sending the memos. When questioned about this action during a BBC Radio Programme
she explained that, whilst in retrospect she was not terribly proud of the action, her family were
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dependent upon her income and “after 9/11 and stock market jitters I was just trying to get as much
cash as possible” (Watkins, 2006).
3.4. Accounting, auditing and the issue of margins
There is, of course, an expectation that the external auditor (Arthur Andersen in the case of Enron)
will forewarn the wider investment community of any accounting and earnings-related risks as their
principal function is to act as a gatekeeper3 verifying, and vouching for financial reports (Coffee, 2004).
This notion of ‘gatekeeping’ is also significant in the context of cultural theory having a correspon-
dence with Douglas’s ideas concerning ‘margins’. The crux of Douglas’ cultural theory is that social
structure shapes a society’s perception of risks and dangers. Douglas (1966) explains that margins are
those points in a society that are particularly vulnerable to risks and dangers. Consequently margins
“mark and straddle boundaries, . . . are . . . dangerous, (and) require high levels of policing and control”
(Lupton, 1999, p. 41).
Previous papers discussing Enron have emphasized the great significance of agency-related prob-
lems at the firm (see for example; Arnold and de Lange, 2004; Cullinan, 2004; Gavious, 2007; Reinstein
andMcMillan, 2004). In an individualistic culture, where managers have a greater propensity to act in
their own interests rather than in the best interest of investors, this agency issue is amplified. There-
fore the financial statements represent a vulnerable point in individualistic societies where there is
an increased risk of managers engaging in earnings management and, consequently, the gatekeeping
role of the external auditor assumes an especial importance. Additionally, because it is not possible to
create a classification system that can prescribe accounting treatments for all potential transactions
(McSweeney, 1997;Mouck, 2004) this ‘danger at themargin’ is further exaggerated as it providesman-
agers with the option of adopting accounting treatments that suit their purposes and yet technically
still remain within the rules. The boundary between adopting an accounting treatment that is within
the spirit of an accounting standard and adopting an accounting treatment that is technically within
the rules but has been chosen to achieve a desired outcome is ill defined as evidenced by Enron’s
manipulation of earnings using mark to market accounting and Special Purpose Entities (Baker and
Hayes, 2004). Accounting standards can be revised as new and unforeseen situations arise, but these
re-classifications will inevitably still leave anomalies that can be exploited (Evans, 2002).4 It is for this
reason that accounting requires the use of professional judgement (McMillan, 2004).
If the preparation of the financial statements is an activity located on the ‘margin’ and hence has
especial risks, why was Arthur Andersen not assiduous in patrolling the border? To answer this ques-
tion it is necessary to return to culture. The implications of themove toward an individualistic culture,
andaway fromahierarchical culture, in the corporate arena in theUSAduring the1980s and1990shave
already been discussed. If such a shift in culture had also occurred in respect of US public accounting
firms this will have had important implications for the practices they follow.
When the dominant culture is hierarchical then the strong grid-group dimensions imply an organi-
zational structure with clear internal divisions resulting in a demarcation between different branches
of the public accounting firm such as audit, tax and consultancy. The conventions of a hierarchical
society suggest that the CPA qualification will be an important symbol of status denoting profession-
alism and trust, and the expertise and specialist knowledge of a CPA will be respected. There will be
a preference for standardised audit procedures as systems will err towards the bureaucratic and in
such a society it will be deemed important that these procedures are adhered to. Auditors within such
firms will have a traditional perspective upon the role of the auditor and, because of the risk-averse
nature of hierarchical societies, will therefore perceive their primary role as safeguarding investments
3 Otherprofessionals alsoundertakegatekeeping roles includinganalysts, credit ratingagencies and investmentbanks (Coffee,
2004). The gatekeeping role of the auditor is considered central to the verification process (see for example, Lee, 2006) and
therefore this section focuses solely upon the auditing aspect. However a similar analysis is possible in respect of the other
gatekeepers.
4 For example, six years after BethMcLeanpublishedher original article discussing Enron’s accountingpractices shepublished
an article questioningwhether an Enron-type repetitionwas possible. This new article discussed accounting practices in respect
of structured investment vehicles (McLean, 2007).
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made by stockholders. This will also result in concepts such as prudence being deemed important. The
strong group boundarywill tend to result in delineation between the firmand its clients and, therefore,
firm–client relationships will tend towards the formal. To ensure that the strong group aspect is not
threatened (this form of society does not want to set groupmembers in opposition to one another) the
firm’s goals will be less clearly defined than in an individualistic organization. Consequently the goals
are likely to be more modest as this assists group members in attaining targets but without needing
to resort to undue competition between group members.
Conversely, if the culture in the public accounting firm is individualistic the boundaries between
divisions will be less obvious and overlap will be possible. Status will not be derived from having
gained a CPA qualification; status will be determined by how successful an individual has been in
achieving high levels of income. Technical accounting knowledge will be more open to question and,
consequently, the accounting profession will not be held in the same regard. The firm’s goals are
likely to be well-defined and financially based, and individuals will be judged upon how they have
performed against these pre-set targets. Incentives predicated upon self-interest will be offered to
encourage individuals to attain these goals. Auditors and consultants within the firm are likely to view
their role in a non-traditional manner. They are more likely to perceive their role as strategic and will
also be inclined to be more innovative. Consequently the approach to the audit process will be less
cautious and, unlike the hierarchical firm, will not be as inclined towards conformity and compliance.
If Arthur Andersen is considered then prior to the 1980s the firm was noted for being indepen-
dent of clients, following internal processes diligently and upholding professional standards in client
audits (Clarke and Dean, 2007; Sridharan et al., 2002). Substantial resources were devoted to instilling
a very strong group ethos through training sessions for new recruits in St. Charles (Andersen’s ded-
icated training venue) that not only embedded the importance of adhering to firm policies but also
addressed much broader issues such as how to dress and behave as an Andersen employee (Hechter,
2008). Systems existed for employees to inform management of any colleague deviating from firm
procedures (Wyatt, 2004). All employees had to pass the CPA examination and promotion to manager
was impossible without CPA status (Wyatt, 2004). Technical accounting skills were also an important
determinant of further advancement in the firm (Wyatt, 2004) and Andersen was considered a model
of a public accounting firm (Clarke and Dean, 2007). Partners were willing to disagree with a client’s
interpretation of an accounting standard and central to its ethoswas the notion of professionalism and
trust (Wyatt, 2004). Therefore, prior to the 1980s the culture at Andersen was strongly hierarchical
(Hechter, 2008).
Andersen commenced offering consulting services in the early 1960s and this part of the firm grew
rapidly. The high revenue earning capacity of the consultants, who were largely non-CPAs, gave them
power in the firm and they demanded greater levels of remuneration (Wyatt, 2004). This eventually
resulted in profitability becoming the centralmeasure of success (Wyatt, 2004)with each office having
clear financial goals and operating as independent “profit center(s) and . . . a significant portion of
partner compensation (was tied) to own-billings or office-billings” (Gordon, 2004, p. 325). Promotion
became predicated upon the ability to produce increased revenues rather than technical ability, and
self-interest became more prominent (Wyatt, 2004). Demarcations between audit and consultancy
were removed as services were cross-sold and this altered the nature of client relationships causing
a loss of independence (Coffee, 2004; Sridharan et al., 2002). The existing culture was also weakened
as consultants were not obliged to attend initial training in St. Charles (Hechter, 2008) and many
were recruited from other consulting firms rather than as new hires. Therefore, during the 1980s and
1990s Andersen was gradually changing to an individualistic culture with a more entrepreneurial
focus.
The importance of this change in culture should be re-emphasised as the form of culture will
directly affect the practices adopted at a public accounting firm and when the individualistic culture
becomes dominant then, ultimately, the ability of a firm to act as a gatekeeper is weakened. There is
an unwillingness to confront clients because of the desire to cross-sell services in pursuit of additional
revenueswhichmay in turn lead tohigherpersonal earnings. There is reducedemphasis on conforming
to procedures as the auditor adopts the role of strategist rather than steward. The pursuit of earnings
growth as the dominant firmgoal has an attendant short-sightedness thatmakes it difficult to conceive
of the possibility of reputational damage impacting future earnings.
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These issues associated with an individualistic culture can be observed in respect of Andersen’s
interactionswith Enron. For example, at Andersen’s Houston office a client services team focused upon
developing innovative products they could sell to Enron and hence enhance firm earnings (Weber et
al., 2002). There was no boundary delineating Andersen from Enron with staff assigned to the Enron
audit being providedwith permanent offices at Enron, wearing Enron branded shirts and having social
lives centred on Enron events (Sridharan et al., 2002). Andersenwas partly engaged on some of Enron’s
internal audit work and it was common for Andersen employees to become Enron employees (Weber
et al., 2002; Gordon, 2004). Procedures for internally reviewing decisions on accounting treatments
could be over-ridden (Gordon, 2004). When Carl Bass, the Houston member of Andersen’s Profes-
sional Standards Group, questioned the accounting treatment of Special Purpose Entities at Enron he
was reassigned and had no further oversight brief in respect of Enron (Fuerman, 2004; Sridharan et
al., 2002). Consequently, Andersen was ineffectual in its scrutiny of Enron’s disclosures (Chaney and
Philipich, 2002).
Critically, however, the case of Andersen and Enron is only one instance of how this individualistic
cultureat apublic accountingfirmcanaffect their gatekeepingabilities. Andersenwas involved inother
audit failuresduring the1990s (ChaneyandPhilipich, 2002) and the cultural changeatAndersenduring
the 1980s and 1990s was mirrored at other public accounting firms (O’Connell, 2004; Wyatt, 2004).
For example, when Coffee (2004) discusses the very significant increase in the number of earnings
restatements in the 1990s and notes that the “overall experiences of the Big Five accounting firms
suggests that Andersen was not significantly different from its peers and experienced the same, or
even a lesser, rate of earnings restatements” (Coffee, 2004, p. 338) this is to demonstrate that there
were gatekeeping issues in respect of all the Big Five firms and not just Andersen. Thus the rise of the
individualistic culture at the public accounting firms appears to have had the effect of diminishing
their effectiveness as auditors.
3.5. Responses to the accounting and audit failures
In an individualist culture where risk-taking is acceptable then failure is also seen as possible. Con-
sequently, had the accounting and audit failures at Enron been of a lesser magnitude it may have
been possible that the demise of Enron would not have been deemed a risk to the perpetuation of
the individualist culture. However, as Douglas notes, the individualist has a great “fear (of) any threat
to the exchange system” (Douglas, 1982, p. 96) and the scale of the accounting manipulations and
associated audit failures that led to Enron being the largest bankruptcy in US history (Benston and
Hartgraves, 2002) were sufficient to bring about a crisis of confidence in the effectiveness of the gate-
keeping mechanisms that are expected to protect investors and other stakeholders. This threat to the
individualist culture was further compounded as accounting irregularities were uncovered at other
companies.
As this threat to the ‘exchange system’ arose from, and relates to, the individualist culture then
the expectation might be that the response would also be typical of that culture. The most signif-
icant response was, however, legislative, with the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act establishing rules to
strengthen financial controls and auditor independence. This response ismore usually associatedwith
a hierarchical restoration of trust in experts.
That this hierarchical response to an individualistic risk event appears to be paradoxical can
be explained through reference to Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982) discussions relating to the
‘Center’ and the ‘Border’. The power and influence that is held by the hierarchical and individ-
ualistic cultures places them at the ‘Center’ and there is a mutual dependency between these
two cultures that is succinctly described by Douglas in the following terms: “. . . competitive
market individualism needs a political base to assure its basic security (and) . . . the hierarchi-
cal culture needs an economic base5” (Douglas, 1990, p. 12). These two cultures must collaborate
5 That is, when the economy contracts or fails this can cause potential problems for a hierarchical culture as it is more
difficult to support members of society because of higher unemployment, diminishing tax revenues and the like. This then has
undesirable consequences for the group dimension of the hierarchical culture.
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to some degree if they are to support and sustain their differing worldviews. Thus, although
the individualist culture has a preference for self-regulation and would normally consider addi-
tional regulation an impediment to the efficiency of market operations, the business interests that
comprise the individualist culture understood that following Enron self-preservation entailed co-
operating with the state if public confidence in the market was to be restored. The state also
had a vested interest in ensuring the economy did not become harmed and, being hierarchically
organized, was predisposed to implement additional legislation as the means of re-establishing con-
fidence.
A further highly significant reason for the hierarchical and individualistic culturesworking together
was the potential threat from the ‘Border’. The ‘Border’ comprises groups and organisations with an
egalitarian culture. Groups of this type tend to ‘recruit’ members most successfully when individuals
become critical of organizations at the ‘Center’. For example, Douglas andWildavsky (1982) argue that
in the USA in the 1960s and 1970s the Vietnam War and Watergate scandal were largely responsible
for a reaction against the institutions at the ‘Center’ at that time and resulted in wider acceptance
of the egalitarian culture. The result is that the ‘Center’ considers egalitarian groups as undesirable
because of the threat they pose to the hierarchical and individualistic cultures, and this creates an
enmity between the ‘Border’ and the ‘Center’.
As Enron’s employeesweremade redundant and the value of their pension plans collapsed itwas of
great concern to the ‘Center’ that citizens would become cynical and distrustful particularly through
comparing the precarious financial circumstances of Enron’s ex-employees to the immense wealth
accumulated illegally by Enron executives. As Frank (2007) notes when discussing how incomes of the
middle-class have, in real terms, fallen since the beginning of the 1970s:
“The difficulty is that working hard and abiding by the rules is no longer the reliable formula for
success it once was . . . only those near the top . . . have experienced significant income and wealth
growth” (Frank, 2007, p. 71).
The events at Enron, and other companies where accounting scandals occurred, caused many US
citizens to query the inequity of the individualist culture. Consequently, the ‘Center’ was concerned
that “a growing number of activitists . . . would . . . eschew government solutions . . . believ(ing) that
government has lost its capacity to contain corporate power (and) (p)eople should confront corpora-
tions directly” (Bakan, p. 150). For example, ex-Enron employees who had not considered themselves
activists began to campaign in support of pension law reforms to increase workers’ protection. This
included speaking at the AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Orga-
nizations) ‘Business as Usual’ campaign in Chicago in May 2002 (Roman, 2002). The AFL-CIO was
lobbying to assist ex-Enron employees in recovering severance pay andmonies lost in 401(k) accounts,
but was also able to use this as an opportunity to promote the benefits of union membership and
labor activism. The ex-Enron employees who spoke at the May meeting had initially been convinced
of the need to campaign for reform after the Reverend Jesse Jackson visited Houston in early 2002
(Sanchez, 2002). The Reverend Jackson’s Rainbow/PUSH Coalition is a pressure group for civil rights
and social change justice, and was working in partnership with the AFL-CIO to support ex-Enron
employees.
To avoid “a major populist backlash” (Nussbaum, 2002, p. 40) with individuals becoming suscepti-
ble to recruitment by ‘Border’ activist groups the ‘Center’ had to be seen to be responding vigorously
and robustly to the Enron fallout. Consequently, the hierarchical legislative response of enacting the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act was supplemented with a hierarchical form of blaming. The perpetrators of the
corporate fraudswere subjected to severe criminal sanctions, signalling that harshpunishmentswould
be meted out to future transgressors. For example, Ebbers (WorldCom) and Skilling were sentenced
to 25 years and 24 years in prison respectively (Teather, 2005; Clark, 2006). The language of news
headlines was also hierarchical when discussing blame. For example, ‘The Betrayed Investor’ and ‘Pay-
ing for the Sins of Enron’ appeared as BusinessWeek headlines on 25 February 2002 and 11 February
2002 respectively, and emphasize the deviant nature of the behaviour of Enron’s senior managers.
It is unsurprising therefore that when Ken Lay died before he could serve his prison term there was
widespread anger as it was felt he had escaped rightful punishment (see for example, McLean and
Elkind, 2006).
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4. Conclusions
This paper has interpreted the events at Enron using Douglas’ cultural theory of risk and there
are two important implications resulting from the analysis. The first relates to culture and the pub-
lic accounting firms. It has been argued that the individualistic and hierarchical cultures in the US
came under threat following the accounting and audit failures at Enron and other companies such
as WorldCom. The root of the threat was identified as a severe decline in confidence in the ability of
public accounting firms to act as gatekeepers. This gatekeeping role is of particular importance in an
individualistic culture where there is enhanced risk of earnings management. Hence, financial state-
ments can be construed as constituting a danger at the margin and careful policing of this vulnerable
point by the external auditor is necessary. However, the culture present in the public accounting firm
undertaking the external audit can have an important effect upon practices and attitudes adopted by
staff working for the firm. For example, staff within firms with a hierarchical worldview will have a
greater propensity to follow guidelines and policies more strictly, will place greater emphasis upon
concepts such as professionalism and be more willing to confront and challenge clients. By contrast,
where the cosmology is individualistic there is less independence in firm–client relationships and staff
self-interestedly strive to achieve financially based targets that ultimately determine their current and
future earnings. Post-Andersen and Enron many articles debated issues such as whether accounting
standards were deficient or if auditor rotation was needed to address some of the problems. This cul-
tural theory-based analysis would suggest that it is altering the cultural form of the public accounting
firms that could be most constructive as it would fundamentally re-shape practices within the firms
and enhance their role as gatekeepers.
The second important implication concerns the broader question of whether social structures that
exist currently are likely to change. A central premise of Douglas’ cultural theory is that societies
will identify dangers that threaten to bring about instability and act to uphold order and defend the
society from those dangers. Following the accounting and audit failures at Enron and other companies
the individualistic and hierarchical cultures in the US collaborated to fend off the resulting threat
to the exchange system. These cultures at the ‘Center’ acted to ensure their preservation and were
fearful that individuals may become susceptible to recruitment by ‘rival’ egalitarian groups’. That the
instinctive reaction of any culture is to defend the existing order creates an inherent resilience to
crises.
This does not, however, entirely guarantee that extant worldviews will be preserved. It has already
been suggested in this paper that the acute imbalances ofwealth illuminated by the crisis causedmany
to reflect upon injustices present in society and thesewealth differentials could become a critical issue.
Douglas (1982) advises that the ‘Center’ can never be complacent and has to be vigilant in monitoring
public confidence, and there are those at the ‘Center’ who have identified this topic as a concern. This
includes Bill Gross (Chief Investment Officer, PIMCO fixed income management company) who has
stated, “When the fruits of society’s labor become maldistributed, when the rich get richer and the
middle and lower classes struggle to keep their heads above water . . . then the system ultimately
breaks down. the center cannot hold” (Gross, 2007).
This paper has been very broad in scope and additional research needs to be undertaken to examine
Douglas’ cultural theory in relation to accounting and auditing. It has been argued that an individualis-
tic culture at Arthur Andersen had significant implications for its role as an external auditor. Studies of
public accounting firms that display different cultures as suggested by the grid-groupmodel may pro-
vide further insights into how culture may shape auditing practices. Similarly, it has been argued that
Enron’s status as an individualist firm had implications for, inter alia, its relationship with the external
auditor and its propensity to manage earnings. Research examining corporate culture in other firms
would help in enhancing understanding of how the worldview of a company impacts upon the use or
misuse of accounting information.
Douglas, like Beck and Giddens, has developed a “grand theory” (Irwin et al., 1999, p. 1325) and
this presents a challenge. Grand theories need refining and developing if they are to fully account for
the complexities inherent in organisational and institutional life. Further empirical research, including
comparative studies utilizing Douglas’s, Beck’s and Giddens’ conceptions, provides an opportunity for
potentially sophisticated risk-based understandings of accounting and auditing to be developed.
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 15 
 Cultural Theory of Risk and 
the Notion of “Management 
Accountants as Strategists” 
 Philip  Linsley and  Alexander  Linsley 
 Introduction 
 It has become commonplace to claim that accountants must supple-
ment their technical accounting skills with strategic capabilities and be 
“active participant(s) in the decision-making process” (Latshaw & Choi, 
2002, p. 27). Thus, it has been argued that finance departments should 
become central to the decision-making process. Further, it has been 
suggested that accountants should provide strategic advice to managers 
working in other parts of the organization and that a pre-requisite for 
progression to finance director roles is the capacity to be a proactive 
strategist (Grundy, 2007). 
 This claim that accountants should engage in strategic decision-making 
and use strategy tools to increase shareholder value can be traced back 
to the early 1980s when the term “strategic management accounting” 
first emerged (Roslender & Hart, 2003). It is also possible to identify 
an important shift in the development of strategy thinking around this 
time with Whittington (1996) observing that corporate planning ceased 
to be the primary focus of strategy researchers and practitioners towards 
the start of the 1980s and ideas such as those related to the crafting of 
emergent strategies arose (Mintzberg, 1987). 
 One way of thinking about these contemporaneous changes in the 
scope of the remit of accountants and in strategy thinking is to draw the 
two strands together through Mary Douglas’s cultural theory of risk. The 
prime assertion of cultural theory of risk is that perceptions of what risks 
are important will be dependent upon the underlying patterns of social 
relations. Consequently, patterns of social relations determine how we 
respond to uncertainties and dangers and, in addition, will impact on 
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(inter alia) perceptions of the role of the accountant and of approaches 
to strategy. 
 The chapter argues that calls for accountants to be strategists are an 
outcome of the vigorous cultural dialogues that took place during the 
1970s and, ultimately, resulted in the previously dominant hierarchical 
culture in the UK and USA being usurped by an individualist culture. 
Very broadly, in Douglas’s conception, an individualist cosmology 
represents a highly competitive, free-market form of society whereas a 
hierarchical society possesses strong boundaries and is bureaucratic in 
its nature (Douglas, 1992). 
 It is argued this cultural shift resulted in calls for the accounting func-
tion to move from largely fulfilling a hierarchically based stewardship 
role towards supporting the individualistically based strategic goal of 
enhancing shareholder wealth. Hence, it is this change in patterns of 
social relations that is at the root of the demands that accountants evolve 
into strategists. Importantly, the chapter also draws on cultural theory 
to address an issue that, prima facie, appears anomalous in this context. 
Namely, although novel strategic management accounting techniques 
have been developed in recent years to support the pursuit of share-
holder value, there has been restricted take-up of strategic management 
accounting initiatives post-1980. 
 The next section in the chapter explains key aspects of Douglas’s 
cultural theory of risk. Section 3 then examines the hierarchical–individ-
ualistic cultural shift in the 1970s and links this to changes in strategy 
thinking. Section 4 considers how the change from a hierarchical to 
an individualistic culture has given rise to the notion of “management 
accountants as strategists”. In examining this change in the account-
ant’s role, the chapter explores why there has been restricted take-up of 
strategic management accounting initiatives in the post-1980 individu-
alistic setting. Finally, within the conclusion some wider implications 
of using Douglas as a framework for examining “management account-
ants as strategists” are considered. 
 Douglasian cultural theory of risk and 
the grid-group model 1
 The grid-group model Douglas has established in respect of her cultural 
theory of risk provides a framework which enables us to develop hypoth-
eses about, and analyse the behaviours of, four solidarities (Figure 15.1 ) 
(see, for example, Douglas 1986, 1992, 2003). 
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 The grid dimension in the model relates to the degree of regulation 
that society imposes upon individuals in selecting social roles. Where 
there are extensive prescriptions directing individuals’ behaviours this 
denotes a high grid society; in low grid societies individuals self-select 
social roles and can decide to cooperate with whoever they choose. The 
idea of group is concerned with an individual’s commitment to other 
members of that society. High group denotes a society where individuals 
are strongly committed to one another; however, where individuals feel 
little allegiance to other members this would form a low group society. 
 This results in a typology of four solidarities: individualists, hierar-
chists, egalitarians and isolates. Crucially, the risks and uncertainties 
each solidarity identifies as important will differ as each is endeavouring 
to protect its particular pattern of social relations. 
 The hierarchical solidarity corresponds to a form of society where 
there are sharply defined internal and external boundaries. The external 
boundary separates group members from outsiders, and the internal 
boundaries ensure strong role differentiation. It is a bureaucratic form of 
society that defers to authority. Hence, risks that threaten the boundaries 
are of the greatest concern. By contrast, actors within an individualist 
society are free to connect with whoever they like. Characteristically, 
the individualist solidarity is conceived of a free-market type of society 
Isolate
Low group, high grid
Hierarchist
High group, high grid
G
RI
D
Individualist
Low group, low grid
Egalitarian
High group, low grid
GROUP
Figure 15.1 Grid-group model
Source: Adapted from Douglas (1982) .
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where there is a preference for self-regulation, and risk-taking is seen as 
positive as it provides opportunity to profit. The primary motive under-
lying individual transactions is personal gain. A key difference regarding 
risk perceptions between a hierarchical and an individualistic society is 
the former is anxious about boundaries being violated whereas the latter 
fears risks that jeopardize the market or that threaten wealth creation. 
 In the egalitarian solidarity, the external group boundary assumes 
even greater importance than in the hierarchical solidarity as there are 
no internal boundaries. Hence, commitment to the group is of greatest 
importance and the egalitarian focus is upon any risks or uncertainties 
that might threaten the group. The fourth arrangement is the isolate 
solidarity. This comprises individuals who are limited in their selection 
of social roles and lack a sense of community. Isolates view the world 
as inherently uncertain. Consequently, they see little point in trying to 
plan ahead to manage risks. 
 Douglas argues that all four solidarities will be observable within 
any society or organization. Cultural dialogues imply a dynamic rela-
tion between the four solidarities as the supporters of each endeavour 
to convince others of the advantages of their cosmology. Thus, in any 
society, a particular solidarity may have greater influence but it may also 
be replaced over a period of time. 
 A further aspect of the relationship between the solidarities which 
Douglas discusses is how the hierarchical and individualistic solidarities 
have a greater hold on power. Therefore, these two solidarities are at 
the centre. Further, there is some reciprocity between these two domi-
nant solidarities as the individualistic solidarity “needs a political base 
to assure its basic security (and) ... the hierarchical (solidarity) needs an 
economic base” (Douglas, 1990, p. 12). By contrast, egalitarian groups 
are on the border and at a distance from the centre and its power. For 
this reason, it is less likely the egalitarian solidarity will have greater 
influence than the individualistic solidarity or the hierarchical solidarity 
in any particular society or organization. 
 The change from hierarchy to individualism 
during the 1970s and 1980s 
 The shift in dominant culture during the 1970s and 1980s 
 Heap and Ross (1992) note how in the UK and the USA the dominance 
of the hierarchical solidarity waned during the 1970s and was replaced 
by the individualist solidarity during the 1980s. This change in the 
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dominant solidarity was brought about by events that largely happened 
in the 1970s. These changes threatened the values held by supporters of 
the hierarchist solidarity thus making them vulnerable to the arguments 
of the other solidarities.
In the UK, economic problems present at the start of the 1970s wors-
ened as the decade progressed. The oil crisis of 1973 added further diffi-
culties to an already strained economy, and strike action by mineworkers 
eventually resulted in a three-day working week in 1974 as the govern-
ment sought to safeguard coal supplies. In 1976, the then government 
had to ask the International Monetary Fund for a loan and government 
incomes policies eventually lead to public sector workers striking during 
the winter of 1978–79. Similarly, the USA suffered from a declining 
economy and de-industrialization during the 1970s. There was a general 
sense of living standards declining and this resulted in people querying 
whether the assurances inherent in the hierarchical way of life were 
still being met. For example, Hendry (1999) has observed how down-
sizing programmes undertaken by companies in the 1970s adversely 
affected job security and, because employees no longer felt cared for, 
this made them doubt whether the company they worked for deserved 
their loyalty.
Overall, this resulted in a questioning of the current order; for example, 
many started to ask whether governments should reduce regulation for 
businesses (Fraser, 2005; Gersemann, 2004). The outcome was that there 
were highly charged political debates, particularly towards the end of the 
1970s, concerning whether a culture of dependency had grown up that 
should be replaced by an enterprise culture. Margaret Thatcher was voted 
into power in 1979 in the UK and the changes she instigated had a close 
fit with the individualist solidarity. Markets were deregulated, government 
spending was reduced, state firms were privatised and individuals found 
that they could not rely on the support of the welfare state to the extent 
they had previously done. A similar free-market approach was adopted by 
Ronald Reagan in the USA when he became president in 1981. 
 Strategy and the shift in culture 
 The changing ideas in strategy thinking across this period (pre- and 
post-1980) can also be interpreted as an outcome of the move from a 
hierarchical to an individualistic cosmology within companies. 
 The 1980s saw a shift in strategy thinking away from “the corporate 
planners of the 1960s and 1970s” (Kay et al., 2006, p. 34). The corpo-
rate planning view of strategy adopts a rationalistic approach to stra-
tegic planning whereby an orderly series of logical stages of analysing, 
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planning, implementation and control occur. Senior managers may be 
assisted by other experts in the analysis and planning phases, and it 
is a top-down method with an in-built expectation that lower-ranking 
managers will readily implement the strategic directives devised further 
up the command chain. 
 This approach to strategy is based on a procedural rationality and 
accords with a hierarchical cosmology. Deference is shown towards 
the authority of senior managers in the corporate planning process so 
that internal boundaries are not threatened. Kay et al. (2006) note a 
problem with the rationalist school is that although it emphasizes plan-
ning, “planning is not strategy” (p. 31). However, in the context of 
hierarchical societies it is to be expected that significant effort will be 
expended in the preparation of a strategic plan as this ritual reinforces 
group cohesion. 
 The fundamental criticism now levelled at the rationalistic approach 
to strategic planning is that it omits to recognize “the importance of 
practical craft” (Whittington et al., 2006, p. 616). This move away from 
a conventional idea of strategic management is rooted in Mintzberg’s 
(1987) ideas about the crafting of strategy where he discusses how 
strategies may not always be deliberately conceived, but rather may 
emerge unexpectedly in different parts of an organization in response 
to unfolding events. Thus, strategy making is no longer the preserve of 
senior managers and experts, nor is it wholly rational. 
 How Douglas’s solidarities accord with this idea of strategy as process 
can be seen by drawing upon Grant’s (2003) study identifying primary 
changes in strategic planning processes during the 1980s and 1990s in 
major oil companies. Grant, like Hendry (1999), notes that the impact 
of the market for corporate control in the 1980s demanded senior 
managers focus upon shareholder wealth and this caused substantial 
changes in the approach to strategic planning. 
 There was a move to informal systems of planning that accentu-
ated the role of direct discussion between managers at different levels. 
Strategic planning was now being undertaken by staff seconded from 
line management positions and other functional areas of the business. 
Accountability for strategic decision-making and, ultimately, perform-
ance was devolved to line managers. This changed the planning focus 
to enhancing divisional profitability with the purpose being to ensure 
that the financial performance of divisional managers could be meas-
ured against the metric of shareholder wealth. 
 The evolution of reoriented strategic planning systems can be 
explained through Douglas’s individualistic typology as the hierarchy 
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of managers was removed and divisional managers became free to 
transact as they saw fit. In a hierarchical organization, it is not deemed 
acceptable to challenge others as this implies disloyalty and endangers 
group solidarity, but in the individualistic firm discussions now became 
more open. Expertise is no longer a determinant of status within the 
firm; rather status derives from the ability to meet performance targets. 
Importantly, as one might expect in an individualistic setting, goals 
become financially based and the key risk is not meeting these financial 
goals. 
 Accountants as strategists and the shift in culture 
 Accounting prior to the 1980 cultural shift 2
 Ashton et al. (1995) state that for UK and USA companies in the 
1950s and 1960s “the dissemination of cost information tended to be 
slight ... (with) ... cost accounting systems ... only loosely integrated with 
management planning and control systems’ (p. 2). These “mechanistic” 
systems (cost systems, budgetary control systems, capital investment 
systems) were “reactive” (Ashton et al., 1995, p. 2). Cost containment, 
rather than cost reduction, was pursued and the focus of the firm was on 
managing resources to meet production needs (Ashton et al., 1995). 
 Chandler (1977) describes how the structure of multi-divisional firms 
consisted of a hierarchy of management and separated functional disci-
plines such as finance, purchasing and sales. Allegiances to functional 
disciplines were reinforced through professional associations dedicated to 
the various occupational fields (Chandler, 1977). Magdy & Luther’s (2006) 
discussion of the IFAC description of management accounting in this 
pre-1980 period confirms the objectives of management accounting as 
“oriented towards the determination of product cost ... supplemented by 
work on budgets and financial control of production processes” (p. 6). 
 If a hierarchical cosmology of accounting practice is now fashioned 
then a close match with the above descriptions of accounting practice 
pre-1980 can be discerned. As importantly, it is also possible to under-
stand why there is a lack of strategic purpose on the part of the account-
ants within a hierarchical solidarity. 
 The strong grid aspect of the hierarchical cultural typology implies 
departmental segregation, with the accounting department distinct 
from other departments. Within the accounting department, a relatively 
unambiguous organizational structure will be evident, typically with the 
finance director at the apex and accounting technicians or clerks at the 
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base. Job titles signify the status of each member of the accounting depart-
ment, supported by job descriptions that delineate levels of authority 
and set out the types of task that can be undertaken dependent upon job 
title. All of this ensures there are no doubts or uncertainties about the 
role of each member of the accounting department. 
 Similarly, pre-1980, organizations “clearly distinguished manage-
ment control from strategic planning” (Ittner & Larcker, 2001p. 351). If 
strategizing is not denoted as an element of the accountant’s role then 
that accountant is highly unlikely to strategize as this would arouse 
suspicions and create uncertainty regarding demarcations in respect 
of internal boundaries. Should an accountant presume to engage in 
strategizing when it is not designated a part of their role, there will 
be mechanisms for dealing with this aberrant behaviour to alleviate 
the uncertainty this creates. For example, in extremis, organiza-
tions will expel “troublemakers” from the “group” through dismissal 
procedures. These internal boundaries also hinder the development 
of novel management accounting initiatives as they do not facilitate 
cooperation between management accountants and others within the 
organization. 
 The actors within a strong grid (hierarchical) organization would view 
accounting staff as specialists possessing specific accounting-related 
proficiencies as denoted by professional accounting qualifications, 
which would confer respect and be important symbols of status across 
the organization. This view of accountants as specialists accords with, 
and upholds, the hierarchical pattern of social relations. 
 The design of accounting-based systems that support the strat-
egy-making process will also be affected by the prevailing culture. 
Management control systems, for example, will be organized differ-
ently in hierarchical and individualistic organizations. In the former 
type of organization these systems will tend towards being bureaucratic 
or “mechanistic”. Standardized procedures for the operation of the 
systems will have been drawn up by the accounting department and it 
will be expected that other parts of the organization comply with these 
procedures. It may appear strange that individuals will follow systems 
“blindly” and without querying their efficacy, but this can occur when 
there is a hierarchical expectation of compliance. The hierarchical 
organization is seeking to maintain the status quo wherever possible 
and any questioning of this creates uncertainty as it threatens the hier-
archical solidarity. 
 The strong group aspect of the hierarchical organization suggests the 
accountant is likely to view their role as dominated by a stewardship 
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function for he or she will perceive their primary duty as ensuring there 
is certainty in respect of survival of the group and this is best achieved 
by being a guardian of the organization’s capital. This implies a cautious 
and prudent approach to financial matters is adopted by the accounting 
staff. Therefore, the management accountant’s approach to risk manage-
ment is likely to be that there needs to be a very ‘(c)areful balancing of 
risks and rewards ... to keep the firm safe” (Underwood & Ingram, 2010, 
p. 28). 
 The manner in which accounting-related information is used within 
management control systems will also be impacted by the strength of the 
group dimension. In a hierarchical organization the manner in which, 
for example, comparisons of actual and budgeted results occurs will 
be driven by the need to ensure that poor performance is a collective 
responsibility. The result is it becomes more tolerable for managers in 
strong group organizations to be able to attribute adverse variances to 
unforeseeable external factors. Therefore, it is logical in a hierarchical 
setting that cost containment is practised rather than cost reduction 
(Ashton et al., 1995) as it then decreases the likelihood of the need to 
challenge “under-performing” managers or divisions. In a strong group 
organization there may also be a number of goals set that have some 
ambiguity. The difficulty associated with setting one clearly defined 
target in this culture is that it creates the potential for group members 
to be pitted against one another as this goal is pursued. Strong group 
organizations wish to avoid internal rivalries and consequently set less 
certain (and more moderate) goals that allow group members to gain a 
sense of achievement without competition challenging the strong group 
ethos. Roslender & Hart (2002) discuss how new initiatives in measure-
ment systems such as the balanced scorecard have a primary “concern 
with what firms are trying to become” (p. 260). Hierarchical firms are not 
“trying to become” they are “trying to remain as they are”. Their fervent 
hope is the future will be configured as the past as this brings certitude. 
 Accounting practice post-1980 
 In 1981 Simmonds first proposed the idea of strategic management 
accounting (SMA), which has at its root the premise that manage-
ment accounting and strategy be directly connected. However, a range 
of studies and surveys suggest the take-up of management accounting 
innovations in practice has been relatively weak. Drury & Tayles’ (1995) 
review of the results of practice-focused surveys studying changes in 
management accounting practice found only very modest changes to 
have occurred. They concluded that “in view of the considerable amount 
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of publicity that has been given over the past 10 years to the apparent 
limitations of traditional cost systems and the urgent need for organi-
sations to change their management accounting systems it is puzzling 
why most firms have been reluctant to change” (Drury & Tayles, 1995, 
p. 277). Similarly, studies such as Guilding et al.’s (2000) comparison 
of strategic management accounting practices in the UK, USA and New 
Zealand found “there is negligible use of the term ‘strategic manage-
ment accounting’ in organisations and that appreciation of the term 
amongst practising accountants is somewhat limited” (p. 129). 
 Prima facie, it seems paradoxical that new management accounting 
techniques and, in particular, strategic management accounting ideas 
are not being used more frequently. As strategy thinking changed post-
1980 and adjusted to fit with the individualistic culture then we might 
expect that management accounting would change and become more 
compatible with an individualistic culture by becoming more closely 
tied to strategy. This appears not to be so and, hence, explains why calls 
for accountants to have a greater strategy focus still persist. 
 The management accountant in an individualistic organization will, 
if sufficiently attentive, have perceived a shift in the basis upon which 
respect is accrued pre- and post-1980. Post-1980 status is no longer based 
upon having gained membership to one of the professional accounting 
bodies; more important is how well the individual accountant performs 
within the organization in supporting the creation of value for share-
holders (Ittner & Larcker, 2001) as the individualist fears any threat to 
wealth. Technical accounting knowledge is also more open to ques-
tion and, generally, there is less trust in and respect for the accounting 
profession (Linsley & Shrives, 2009). In an individualistic setting past 
certainties regarding the role and place of the accountant are cast out. 
The nature of the accounting role also changes, with a more informal 
approach allowing for some flexibility in the operation of accounting-re-
lated systems. In this less restrictive environment, users of such systems 
may via from, or sometimes bypass, set procedures or controls further 
undermining the accountants’ status. 
 A softening of the internal boundaries occurs as “functional speciali-
zation (through the use of cross-functional teams, as well as the elimina-
tion of traditional specializations)” is removed (International Federation 
of Accountants, 1998: paragraph 20). This provides the opportunity for 
actors in companies to have greater amounts of autonomy and suggests 
greater fluidity in roles is possible including permitting “a great deal 
of management accounting ... (to be) ... undertaken by the business 
managers rather than by the accountants” (Burns & Vaivo, 2001). 
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Armstrong (2002) explains that “some of the most successful applica-
tions of ABC have been initiated by operational managers” (p. 102). But 
this creates great uncertainty and associated anxiety for the accountant 
who cannot make the shift to the individualistic mode of life. 
 One possible explanation why the implementation of strategic 
management accounting innovations has been sporadic is that limited 
numbers of management accountants have completed the transition to 
an individualist culture. 
 A great difficulty for management accountants in changing to the 
individualistic culture may be that they have been steeped in the hier-
archical culture, and perhaps more so than other categories of manager. 
The professional bodies of which they are members are likely to be 
biased towards the hierarchical solidarity as strongholds of expertise and 
professional status. As firms changed post-1980 this may have engen-
dered considerable uncertainty as it threatened the perpetuation of 
their worldview. When dangers arise, hierarchists are ill-prepared to deal 
with the problem from the outset, because their inherent presumption 
is that the past will continue into the future. Hence, the change in the 
way firms were being configured could have been a difficult matter for 
accountants to acknowledge. 
 In due course if the danger is acknowledged, the hierarchists’ response 
to this uncertainty or threat is to use generalized justifications for main-
taining the prior way of doing things. In this way, the continued use of 
the traditional accounting methods might be defended and perceptions 
of certainty restored. 
 If the threat still remains then, to re-confirm the external boundary, 
the hierarchical community looks to itself to develop responses it 
considers acceptable. For example, the community of accountants 
might respond to the dangers “internally” via professional bodies such 
as the UK Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) 
re-developing syllabi to include strategy modules, producing technical 
reports on issues such as performance management and strategic enter-
prise management, and developing continuing professional develop-
ment programmes with a similarly broad scope. Whilst these initiatives 
can, in part, be seen as a means for developing accountants as strategists 
they also serve to renew the claim of accountants to expert status. If 
the primary purpose of these actions of the accountants is for the latter 
reason this would be not surprising for it can be understood as a hierar-
chical reaction to uncertainty during a period of change. 
 The difficulty in claiming expertise be judged “useful” is the previ-
ously discussed issue of the individualistic society being less impressed 
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by expertise and more impressed by performance. However, there is 
a part of accounting where a claim to expertise is considered appro-
priate in an individualistic context. A principal risk for the individualist 
is that the market does not operate efficiently. For this reason indi-
vidualists, who generally favour self-regulation, recognize there must 
be some regulation to ensure integrity in the marketplace and a legal 
framework must be in place that provides the confidence that contracts 
can be enforced. In this respect, the individualist understands the need 
for some collaboration with the hierarchist. This brings with it a need 
for some accounting expertise to, inter alia, prepare financial reports, 
ensure internal control mechanisms are effective, guide internal audit 
processes and liaise with the external auditors. Hence, some accounting 
staff are able to leverage their expert status in the individualistic setting. 
For example, Zorn (2004) concludes that the rise of the Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO) since the 1980s in US firms can be traced to a need for 
accounting expertise to manage a specific “regulatory change in earn-
ings reporting requirements (that) presented chief executives with a real 
threat to earnings” (p. 349). Zorn demonstrates that the CFO position 
first arose out of a need for accounting expertise in respect of FASB 33, 
and this was to ensure that the share price would be well managed. With 
regard to accounting roles of this type then firms may want to employ 
accountants with a hierarchical worldview as these roles are focussed 
upon issues of assurance, control and stewardship. However, this would 
not apply to management accountants whose role is not to manage 
relationships with the marketplace; rather the management accountant 
needs to have an individualistic worldview if they are to fully support 
the business in its strategic decision-making. 
 Conclusion 
 Douglas explains why different risks are deemed important by different 
solidarities by reference to patterns of social relations. Crucially each 
solidarity wishes to ensure it remains in existence and, hence, it identi-
fies uncertainties and risk as important if they threaten its particular 
pattern of social relations. In turn, this affects ways of organizing and 
dispositions towards accounting and strategizing. If the individualistic 
solidarity is compared to the hierarchical solidarity then the former 
encourages risk-taking and strategy making, whilst the latter prefers a 
procedural rationality. 
 If firms wish to employ staff, accounting or otherwise, who are active 
strategists then a possibility is to ensure recruitment processes screen 
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for individualistic traits. Individualistic accountants are less likely to act 
solely as functional specialists and will have a propensity to assist in 
strategic decision-making performance to enhance shareholder value. 
This is because wealth symbolizes success in this setting and risk to 
wealth is uppermost in the mind of the individualist. As the individu-
alistic culture is centred upon material self-interest, group loyalty does 
not hold staff together and, somehow, reward systems must substitute 
for this role. Individualistically induced behaviours may also lead to 
actions that threaten the very markets that individualists rely upon, as 
these individualists may look to game the system or gain competitive 
advantages. 
 The hierarchist is less concerned about threats to the market or to indi-
vidual wealth and more concerned about uncertainties and risks that 
threaten internal and external boundaries. Consequently, the hierarchical 
accountant is inclined to work within their job description, to establish 
mechanistic control systems and to be cautious when managing risk to 
ensure that the risk–reward trade-off has been carefully calibrated. Thus, 
they behave differently to avoid threats to the hierarchical solidarity. Of 
course, acceptability of behaviour will be dependent on the worldview of 
each individual, but this underlines why it is important to understand 
what behaviours may likely occur in respect of a particular worldview. 
 Further research is needed to address complexities that have not 
been considered within this chapter. Relevant questions needing atten-
tion might include How do accountants function in egalitarian firms 
where the principal risk focus is upon protecting the group boundary? 
Are hybrid firms possible that unite two or more solidarities and, if a 
hybrid is achievable, what will the hybridized cosmology be and how 
will uncertainty and risk be viewed? Can the cultural dialogues that are 
a continuous feature of organizational life be used to offset excessive 
behaviours associated with the dominant solidarity? Douglas’s cultural 
theory of risk has multiple implications and further research will assist 
in understanding the complexities and uncertainties associated with 
different accounting practices and different strategy practices in respect 
of the four solidarities. 
 Notes 
 1 .  Of necessity, only a very short overview of some key aspects of Douglasian 
cultural theory is provided in this section. 
 2 .  The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) (1998) considers the 
development of management accounting as a four-stage process and with the 
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critical period of transition in the 1970s. This supports the idea of discussing 
management accounting as a pre- and post-1980 activity. 
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1. Introduction
There has been significant research undertaken examining how culture may influence accounting and auditing practice.
With respect to the theory base that underpins this research Heidhues and Patel (2011) document the dominance of Gray’s
(1988) framework on accounting values. Gray’s conceptualisation of accounting values is founded on Hofstede’s research
into national cultural differences and Baskerville (2003) verifies that culturally related accounting research has had a near-
universal reliance upon Hofstede’s cultural dimensions as the underlying theory base. Hofstede’s ubiquity in accounting-
culture research has been previously observed by other researchers; for example, Harrison and McKinnon (1999) note that
‘‘Hofstede’s typology, together with the country rankings contained in his work, has been extensively, almost exclusively,
adopted by cross-cultural researchers in management control systems in recent years’’ (p. 485).
The employment of Hofstede as the prime theoretical underpinning in accounting-culture studies, whether directly or
indirectly via Gray’s accounting values, is highly problematic as important deficiencies have been noted in respect of his
cultural indices (see for example, McSweeney, 2002; Baskerville, 2003; Heidhues and Patel, 2011). It is for this reason that
Heidhues and Patel (2011) maintain there is a need for accounting research that is not ‘‘blinded by the simplicity of
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Hofstede’s . . . and Gray’s framework . . . but (that) . . . focus(es) on capturing the complexity of cultural and contextual
influences on accounting by including more holistic perspectives’’ (p. 274).
The purpose of this paper is to propose Mary Douglas’s cultural theory1 as a suitable theory base for culturally related
accounting research. Over a period in excess of forty years Douglas developed a formal and explicit typology of social
structures. This holistic systematisation of cultures uses a grid-group framework to connect social structures and
worldviews, resulting in a typology of four solidarities; individualists, hierarchists, egalitarians, and isolates.
A large body of studies have confirmed that cultural theory is generalisable (6, 2004) and some prior accounting research
has successfully employed Douglas’s work in the contexts of audit failure, emissions trading schemes and the socialisation of
risk (Linsley and Shrives, 2009; Mete et al., 2010; Moerman and van der Laan, 2012). Importantly, these prior accounting
studies have not drawn onDouglas’s notion of cultural dialogueswhich is an essential component of cultural theory. Cultural
theory proposes that within any community (or organisation or nation) the four solidarities are present and in constant
competition, and this gives rise to cultural dialogues as the adherents of the four ways of life promote their worldviews and
attempt to sway others to join their cause (see for example, Douglas, 1997, 2004). Consequently, the notion of cultural
dialogues implies that culture is not static and cultural theory does not equate nation states and cultures; on the contrary, it
questions the idea of unchanging groups and emphasises the dynamic nature of culture (Patel, 2007).
To support the proposal that Douglas’s cultural theory may usefully be adopted as a theory base for culturally related
accounting research the paper is structured as follows. In section two, key facets of Douglas’s cultural theory are clarified and
it is argued that the problems commonly raised in respect of Hofstede do not pertain to cultural theory. The second section of
the paper also rebuts criticisms that are commonly raised in opposition to cultural theory. In the third section we seek to
show that Douglas’s cultural theory can be usefully applied in an accounting context by employing the notion of cultural
dialogues to identify and analyse the voices of the different solidarities. The case used for this examination of cultural
dialogues is the set of comments letters submitted to the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in response to the discussion
paper issued at the outset of their ‘complexity of corporate reporting’ project. The paper is not seeking to assess the efficacy of
lobbying activities upon regulatory proposals. Rather, the paper relates the responses in the comments letters to the four
solidarities, and analyses how the relative power of the different solidarities affects how each seeks to have their voice heard.
In this section the voices of the two solidarities that hold most power are analysed; these being the individualistic and
hierarchical solidarities. The fourth section identifies and analyses the egalitarian voice. Typically, egalitarian groups are less
influential than the individualistic and hierarchical solidarities (Douglas andWildavsky, 1982). Consequently, the egalitarian
voice is more strident and will seek to find ways for its voice to be heard. The final section of the paper discusses how the
complexity project can be categorised as a ‘wicked problem’. That is, the problem is ‘‘intractable . . . (in an) inherently
contestable arena . . . and while we often turn a collective blind eye to such problems we cannot avoid making a decision at
some point’’ (Grint, 2008, p. 12). The authors propose that the best approach to solving ‘wicked problems’ in accounting, such
as complexity in corporate reports, is a clumsy solutions approach. Clumsy solutions are messy and require tolerance of
imperfections as they eschew elegance and, instead, opt to recognise the alternative perspectives of the differentways of life.
2. Douglasian cultural theory
2.1. The principal ideas
The foundations of Douglas’s ideas on cultural theory are located within Purity and Danger (1966) and then progressed
and refined in a series of texts and papers (see for example, Douglas, 1970, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993,1994,
1995, 1999, 2003, 2004, 2005; Douglas et al., 1999, 2013; Douglas andMars, 2003; Douglas andWildavsky, 1982). In Natural
Symbols (1970) the principal concern is to establish that the ordering of social relations is far more systematic thanmight be
presupposed. The grid-group diagram first presented in Natural Symbols is provided to support this argument as an
‘‘impressionistic account of cultural controls drawn from anthropologically reported examples from all over the world’’
(Douglas, 1982, p. 1). The grid-group model expounded in Cultural Bias (1978) represents a progression from the previous
diagram as it establishes a framework that can be used to investigate and analyse societies in connection with culture.
Accordingly it facilitates the formulation of hypotheses about, and the analysis of, behaviours and cosmologies in the
resulting four different solidarities.
The grid dimension relates to the amount of regulation that is imposed upon individuals in selecting social roles and in
negotiating with one another (Douglas, 1982, 1993). Where there are extensive prescriptions controlling individuals’
behaviours this denotes a high grid society; conversely, in a low grid society individuals self-select social roles and are
free to interact with whoever they choose. The concept of group is concerned with an individual’s commitment to other
members. High group denotes a society where individual actors have a strong allegiance to one another; where
individuals feel little or no commitment to other members of society and pursue their own agendas this would constitute
a low group society. The grid-group model therefore results in a typology of four solidarities (Fig. 1); individualists,
hierarchists, egalitarians (or sectarians), and isolates. It can be noted that cultural theory follows Boas in rejecting
1 Reference is made to Douglas’s cultural theory to ensure it is not confused with other ‘cultural theories’. However, it is important to note that others
havemademajor contributions in aidingMary Douglas in the development of the theory including: AaronWildavsky, Michael Thompson and Richard Ellis.
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orthogenetic accounts of culture, asserting that the four solidarities apply across all societies regardless of scale or
geographical location or historical period; hence, Douglas’s remark that there is ‘‘no such thing as traditional culture’’
(Douglas, 2004, p. 86). In addition, Douglas’s cultural theory is sometimes referred to as ‘neo-Durkheimian theory’ as this
calls attention to how her theory can be partly understood as an extension of Durkheim’s two-fold classification of social
integration and social regulation.
The hierarchical solidarity (high group–high grid) ‘‘is a system of coordination based on authority, precedent, rules, and
defined statuses (often hereditary, or based on age or gender) . . . Its upholders justify it by appeal to traditions to be
conserved’’ (Douglas, 2004, p. 291). Within the group social roles are restricted and strong internal boundaries ensure there
is clear differentiation between roles. It is a form of society that values tradition and expects authority to be respected; rules
are to be followed and the maintenance of order is important. Douglas perceives hierarchy as an environment where ‘‘an
individual knows his place in aworld that is securely bounded and stratified’’ (Douglas, 1982, p. 4). Hierarchists, in seeking to
preserve their way of life, are especially concerned about dangers to the boundaries. Hence, loyalty to the group is of great
importance and acts of social deviance committed by insiders will be dealt with robustly as this constitutes a threat to the
internal boundaries. Outsiders are also perceived as potentially dangerous as they may violate the external boundaries, but
they may become group members if they will conform.
By way of contrast, actors within an individualistic solidarity (low group–low grid) are at liberty to co-operate and
network with whomever they choose. The cosmology of the individualist tendency is that it ‘‘explicitly sanctions individual
competition’’ (Douglas, 2004, p. 291). Hence, Douglas conceives of this form of solidarity as an entrepreneurial form of
society that is unconstrained by internal or external boundaries. The primarymotive underlying individual transactions is to
gain resources. There is no loyalty to others and ‘‘people are expected to go forth entrepreneurially, get new ideas, work hard,
and compete for esteem and income’’ (Douglas, 2003, p. 1358). Consequently, the ‘‘prominent virtues are individual courage,
intelligence, perseverance, and success (whilst) (p)ower and wealth are the rewards’’ (Douglas, 2005, p. 28). This is a very
demanding form of society and those who fail have only themselves to blame; equally, those who fail cannot expect to
receive assistance fromothers. The difference between a hierarchist’s and an individualist’s perceptions of dangers is that the
former is focused on the breaching of boundaries whereas the latter is most concerned about threats relating to the
acquisition andmaintenance of personal wealth. Thus, any threat to the legitimacy of the ‘marketplace’ will be responded to
vigorously (Wildavsky and Dake, 1990).
The high group–low grid typology corresponds to the egalitarian solidarity (or ‘‘sect’’ or ‘‘enclave’’) (Douglas, 1992). This
combines facets of both the individualistic and hierarchical cultural forms. The external group boundary has, however, even
greater significance than in the hierarchical culture, as it lacks internal divisions. Admission of new members to egalitarian
groups is monitored very carefully as preservation of the group boundary is so important (Douglas, 1978). To unite its
members the enclave defines itself by setting itself in opposition to the wider community. This can result in enclaves
‘‘striving to hold the moral high ground’’ (Douglas, 1993, p. 31) and, for this reason, ideas of equality and justice are
important. In short, insiders bond together against outsiders (Douglas, 1992). Commitment to the group is of the utmost
importance and disloyalty considered a heinous act likely to result in exclusion. Although egalitarian groups are close-knit
communities, establishing authority is difficult. This is because there is no demarcation between internal roles with the
result that asserting authority is problematic.
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Isolate
Low group, high grid
Isolates feel excluded and are
resigned to their fate. They may feel
imposed upon by others and
frustrated by life.
Hierarchist
High group, high grid
Tradition and authority are valued. 
Competition and social mobility may 
be compromised to protect the group 
and to defend internal boundaries.
Individualist
Low group, low grid
Upbringing is immaterial as social 
mobility and equality of opportunity 
are espoused. Self-regulation is 
preferred over legislation. 
Egalitarian
High group, low grid
Members have strong ideals and a
stakeholder view of the world is 
valued. All arrangements are open to 
negotiation.
GROUP
Fig. 1. Grid-group model.
Source: Adapted from Douglas (1978, 1982, 1986, 2004).
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The final classification is the isolate solidarity (low group–high grid). This comprises individualswho are highly restricted
in their selection of social roles and in the ‘‘kinds of contracts they can negotiate’’ (Douglas, 1993, p. 30). Relatively excluded
and isolated, they possess no sense of community. Their perception is that unfairness is an inherent feature of life. Because
the world is arbitrary and capricious the isolate has a passive attitude to risk. Their perception is that they have no control
over events and are simply victims of fate.
An important aspect of the relationship between the four solidarities concerns Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982)
deliberations on the ‘center’ and the ‘border’. The hierarchical and individualistic solidarities are at the centre as they
‘‘constitute the major line of control and command in any society’’ (Douglas, 2004, p. 291). These two solidarities ‘‘make a
formidably stable combination’’ (Douglas andWildavsky, 1982, p. 181) and there is some reciprocity as ‘‘individualismneeds
a political base to assure its basic security (whilst) . . . the hierarchical (solidarity) needs an economic base’’ (Douglas, 1990, p.
12). Thus, these two solidarities are both collaborators and adversaries, and the dominance of the centre is particularly
evident when the interests of the hierarchical and individualistic solidarities coincide (Douglas, 2004). Conversely, the
border comprises egalitarian groups who are remote from, and critical of, the centre and its power. The critical stance that
egalitarian groups adopt towards the institutions of the centre, and that arises from the identification of the outsideworld as
inequitable and unjust, both strengthens the egalitarian group through reinforcing the group boundaries and results in
hierarchists and individualists perceiving egalitarian groups as troublesome and a possible threat. The ‘‘sectarian tendency
presents an opposed identity . . . (and) stirs the conscience of society’’ (Douglas, 2004, p. 291).
2.2. Clarifying Douglas’s cultural theory and addressing criticisms of Hofstede
It is important to clarify facets of Douglas’s cultural theory as it has beenmisinterpreted. These clarifications also provide
an opportunity to explain why the problems repeatedly raised in respect of Hofstede do not apply to cultural theory.
Baskerville (2003) summarises the criticisms that are commonly raised against Hofstede as being: the need to understand
cultures from-within rather than from-without, problems in the adoption of numeric dimensions, the inappropriateness of
positing a direct association between nation states and cultures, and that it is unreasonable to assume that cultures remain
static.2
Douglas’s research is firmly rooted in the anthropological tradition of ‘understanding from within’. For example, Purity
and Danger (1966) developed out of fieldwork undertaken in the then Belgian Congo (now the Democratic Republic of
Congo). Further, the grid-groupmodel was founded upon analyses of ethnographic studies (see for example, Douglas, 1970).
Therefore, the first criticism that Baskerville (2003) raises in respect of Hofstede does not apply to cultural theory.
Notwithstanding that Douglas’s work derives from experiencing societies in action, it is commonly argued that the grid-
group framework is ineffective because it is an oversimplification of the real world. However, inherent in this criticism is a
failure to recognise that the grid-group framework is intended as a heuristic device having been developed as an aid for
understanding how social structures result in distinct worldviews. It needs to be understood that grid and group are
continuous dimensions and should not be construed as comprising purely a high or low status. Douglas (1982) is fully aware
that she is ‘‘gently . . . push(ing) what is known into an explicit typology . . . (and) . . . reducing social variation to a few grand
types’’ (pp. 1–2) and that ‘‘eleven thousand or a million (types) would not be enough to cover the variety that is out there’’
(Douglas, 1999, p. 411). However, an explicit and parsimonious typology is necessary for meaningful analyses of cultural
dialogues; even though at the level of nations this will likely be an especially difficult task (Douglas, 1999, 2004).
Baskerville’s second criticism in respect of Hofstede is that culture cannot be quantified using numeric dimensions and the
preceding discussion on the grid-group framework indicates that it is not intended that this framework be used as a
measurement device. Very importantly, nor is it expected that a particular society or group will solely exhibit the features
thatwould typically be associatedwith one of the four solidarities. As Douglas develops the ideas associatedwith her version
of cultural theory she continuously emphasises that any community will comprise all four solidarities and there will be
continual cultural dialogues as to which way of life should be favoured (Douglas, 1997, 2004).
A community at any one time is constituted, not by one, but by four distinctive cultural tendencies, each based on its
part in the organization of the whole system . . . They constitute the community as a four-fold cultural unit engaged in
a continuous internal dialogue. At all times a culture is responding to the individual culture bearers and how they are
dealing with each other. (Douglas, 2004, p. 290)
Consequently, the four solidarities are not detached from one another and interaction between the four is a fundamental
aspect of cultural theory. They are perpetually debating which form of organisation is ideal andwhilst they are in opposition
to one another, this opposition sustains them as the debates between the solidarities (whether the debates concern
immigration, terrorism, accounting regulation or whatever) reaffirm what the respective forms of life represent (Douglas,
1993). As important, each solidarity needs the others to remain viable. For example, individualists need hierarchists to
implement laws that provide remedies if contracts are reneged upon, whilst hierarchists need the taxable profits of
entrepreneurs to maintain welfare systems.
2 As previously stated Baskerville is not alone in her criticism of Hofstede (see for example, Greer and Patel, 2000; McSweeney, 2002). However,
Baskerville raises the most important key concerns.
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Further, the tensions between the four solidarities help ensure that they do not become parodies of themselves; for
example, egalitarian groups can restrain hierarchies who may have a tendency to repress deviant individuals (Verweij,
2004). The cultural biases of the four solidarities will, therefore, be observed within any society as each attempts to win the
debate as to the most appropriate ‘‘form of life to be led in common’’ (Douglas, 1997, p. 129). As Douglas (1997) states:
Because I need to avoid giving the impression of a culture as a sharply defined group of people, I would like to try
presenting culture as a dialogue . . . Intercultural dialogue is inherently agonistic . . . the contest is about the form of life
to be held in common. (Douglas, 1997, pp. 128–129)
Douglas’s cultural theory has also been criticised as being deterministic. This chargewas raised against Douglaswhen she
first proposed the grid-group model in Natural Symbols (1970). By Douglas’s own admission Natural Symbols is confusing
and this initial attempt at presenting a ‘grand theory’ of types resulted in a conception of the grid-group model that had not
been fully thought through. Douglas later acknowledged that the, then under-developed, ideas might be misconstrued as
deterministic for she had presented an inert model within Natural Symbols which plotted values onto four seemingly fixed
solidarities and the ‘‘role of individuals appeared to be passive in a determining social environment’’ (Douglas, 1999, p. 412).
Douglas significantly developed the ideas underlying cultural theory subsequent to the publication of Natural Symbols.
Importantly, Douglas was aware that cultural theory needed to be able to account for cultural change; in the sense of
understanding how andwhy the dominant solidarity in a communitymay be replaced by a different solidarity and, relatedly,
how and why individuals change allegiance from one solidarity to another. The creation of a dynamic ‘version’ of cultural
theory cannot be solely attributed to Douglas and she particularly acknowledges the role that Michael Thompson played in
its development.
If Douglas’s later ideas are reviewed then it is inappropriate to apply the charge of determinism to cultural theory. Rather
it can be seen that cultural theory is seeking to connect agency and structure in a particularway. Douglas (1986) is concerned
that the dynamic association between ‘minds and institutions’ (that is, the relationship between individual actors at the
micro-level and communities or societies at the macro-level) is understood in terms of an interaction between agency and
structure.
A fundamental tenet of cultural theory is that we are social beings who are predisposed to want to live with others and,
hence, that the ‘self’ is constructed by reference to others (Douglas et al., 2013). It is because we are inherently social that we
consent to the creation of social institutions that have claims over us (the types of claims being dependent upon the outcome
of the cultural dialogues about ‘‘the form of life to be held in common’’) and, hence that constrain our behaviours. These
structures impose constraints on individuals, but there are also compensations that derive from the chosen way of life.
This rejection of individuals acting on self-interested preferences, and the argument that it is patterns of social relations
that matter, have lead some to conclude that cultural theory assumes there is no agency and that structures determine
behaviours.
However, in Douglas’s conception of cultural theory individuals are active, not passive, agents and patterns of social
relations are not forced upon individuals fromwithout. The way of life (and the associated pattern of social relations) that is
dominant at any particular time in a society is the product of all the separate cultural dialogues that have been taking place
and is an outcome of individuals’ verdicts on what form of life they would prefer. If the existence of cultural bias were to
permanently tie an individual to a particular form of society then changes in the dominant way of life would not be possible
and nor would it be possible for an individual to move from one solidarity to another.
As Douglas (1978) clarifies: ‘‘(w)hat I claim to be stable . . . is not (a person’s) individual positions but the range of
cosmological possibilities in which they can possibly land themselves’’ (p. 15). Cultural dialogues imply a dynamic
relationship exists between the fourways of life and cultural theory permits individuals shifting support for oneway of life to
another should they find their current way of life unsustainable. Without individual agency it is not possible to explain how
support for different ways of life change over time.3 Hence, Douglas notes that:
Culture is not amechanical control on the individualmembers of a community. If enough individualswant to be free to
compete, they will abolish the rules that check competition . . . If the consensus prefers a society that will honour the
old, and care for the infirm, or reduce accidents, or maintain a monarchy, they will set up regulations to restrain free
enterprise. (Douglas, 2004, p. 290)
Further, Douglas does not argue that an individual will always conform to the expectations of the solidarity of which they
are a member. For example, although there will be pressures to support traditions within institutions created on the basis of
a hierarchical pattern of social relations, an individual in that setting can still choose not to uphold the traditions. The
consequences that result from rejecting the traditions will vary, dependent on the relative importance of the traditions
rejected, the manner in which they are rejected and whether the rejection is performed overtly or surreptitiously; but there
is always freedom to think for oneself and to reject the traditions.
3 For a full account of the dynamics of how individuals’ support for different ways of life change over time see Thompson et al. (1990) who explain that
‘‘(t)he movement of individuals between the different ways of life is not some additional complication that the . . . (cultural theory) framework has
somehow to cope with; it is essential to that framework’s very existence’’ (p. 190). For analyses of changes in respect of the dominant way of life see, for
example, Heap and Ross (1992) and Linsley and Linsley (2010).
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It is evident that cultural theory, with its attendant notion of cultural dialogues, accords with Baskerville’s view that
nations are not susceptible to being analysed as one relatively homogenous unit (the third criticismBaskerville raises against
Hofstede). If we analyse a nation we should expect to find the four solidarities to be co-existing and, whilst this will not be a
peaceable co-existence, there is some mutual dependence between the four ways of life.
Baskerville’s final criticism of Hofstede is to question whether it is reasonable to assume that cultures remain
static. Cultural theory does not presume this to be the case and fully allows for change. It has been explained
that the four solidarities will be present in any society and competing to win adherents. Consequently, in any given
society a particular solidarity may be dominant for a period of time, until another solidarity gains ascendancy. For this
reason Wildavsky (1987) proposes that we should be ‘‘comparing countries by contrasting their combinations of
culture’’ (p. 18).
3. Cultural dialogues: the case of the FRC complexity project
3.1. The FRC complexity of corporate reporting project
The case selected to apply the notion of cultural dialogues in an accounting context concerns the Financial Reporting
Council’s (FRC) complexity of corporate reporting project.4 The FRC is the ‘‘UK’s independent regulator responsible for
promoting high quality corporate governance and reporting . . . and . . . monitor(ing) and enforc(ing) accounting and auditing
standards’’ (FRC, 2010). In June 2009 the FRC issued a discussion paper, ‘Louder than words: principles and actions for
making corporate reports less complex andmore relevant’ (FRC, 2009a). The FRC requested feedback on the proposals set out
in the discussion paper and thirty one comments letters were received during the consultation period. The comments letters
were submitted by a range of individuals, professional bodies, companies, and professional services firms, and itwas possible
to analyse the responses according to Douglas’s typology consistent with the individualist, hierarchical and egalitarian
solidarities.
A thematic approach to content analysis was adopted to code the comments letters and to identify the dominant
solidarity and, where applicable the sub-dominant solidarity, pertaining to each respondent. Coding individual words was
deemed inappropriate, aswords can only be interpreted in the context of a sentence or paragraph. Further, as sentences often
only represent part of an argument it was concluded that paragraphs should be used to identify a codeable ‘moment’
(Unerman, 2000). The paragraphs in the comments letters were coded to solidarities independently by the two authors, both
of whom have substantial research coding experience. Detailed coding decision (disambiguation) rules were created by the
authors to improve coding reliability (Beattie et al., 2004). These decision rules were based upon the characteristics
associated with each of the four solidarities. Initially, a sample of five comments letters were independently coded by both
authors and the results compared. The results of this pretesting were used to refine the decision rules (appendix 1 sets out
indicative characteristics of the four solidarities used for coding and further coding details are available from the authors).
The remaining twenty six comments letters were then also independently coded by both authors. There was minor
disagreement in respect of a number of paragraphs in six of the comments letters, requiring the two coders to discuss the
allocated codes and to re-code. This resulted in full agreement on coding for all thirty one comments letters. Table 1 details
the dominant and sub-dominant solidarity identified for each respondent. In summary, there are seventeen individualistic
responses, twelve hierarchical responses, two egalitarian responses and no isolate responses based upon the dominant
solidarity.
The next two sub-sections of the paper analyse and discuss these patterns of responses for the individualistic and
hierarchical solidarities.
3.2. The individualistic cultural bias in the framing of the discussion paper and supporting individualistic responses
It is evident the FRC’s framing of the paper has an individualistic bias. The FRC executive summary prefacing the
discussion paper states there is a need for re-focusing the corporate report towards the provision of decision-useful
information for investors (in preference to other stakeholders) and this is re-emphasised in themain body of the paper (FRC,
2009a). This view that the primary function of the annual report is to assist investors to evaluate risky decisions as they seek
to build wealth implies a free-market orientation that accords with the individualistic solidarity. Additionally, the FRC
recommends that a ‘‘commonsense approach’’ needs to be adopted to simplify regulation for businesses preparing corporate
reports. This recommendation alludes to the belief that interventions in the marketplace, regardless of whether by the state
or other actors, hinder the operation of the market by impeding the individualist’s ability to act without constraint. The
individualist has a desire for self-regulation, albeit there is an acceptance that some limited degree of regulation or
legislation is required to permit the enforcement of contracts and to keep the market functioning.
That the initial framing of the discussion paper by the FRC is biased towards the individualistic culture is not unexpected.
The FRC’s overall strategy expresses a belief in: ‘‘wealth creation’’, the promotion of ‘‘enterprise’’, attending to ‘‘signals from
themarket’’ and ‘‘not imposing unnecessary burdens’’ (FRC, 2009b). This overall strategy upholds the individualist’s primary
4 Hereafter referred to as the complexity project.
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concern – wealth creation – and promulgates the individualist’s key policy mantra – do not burden the market as we must be
given freedom to transact as we see fit.
As the FRC discussion document has an individualistic bias, those respondents identified as also holding an individualistic
worldview (see Table 1) are able to endorse the discussion paper. The central argument presented in these individualist
responses is that those engaged in business activities need to be left free to get onwith ‘the business of business’ unimpeded.
This argument provides the justification for asserting there is a need to reduce complexity, forms the basis for appealing for
relief from ‘‘the ever increasing burden of regulation’’ (The Quoted Companies Alliance response) and judging that ‘‘cut(ting)
clutter’’ (British Land response) is of central importance. That is, this group of respondents are cleaving to the individualistic
belief that if businesses are given freedom to operate and are not constrained by regulation then the marketplace would
ensure that ‘‘his (the individualist’s) activities will leave the future better off’’ (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982, p. 99).
This aversion to regulation on the part of the individualist is related to the individualists’ idea of time.Malsch et al. (2012)
explain how hierarchists deliberate upon present actions by constantly referencing the past; whereas individualists do not
consider the past an appropriate guide for making decisions as they view markets to be in a constant state of change.
Therefore, individualists viewmarkets as ‘‘ahistorical . . . (and) (i)n line with this conception of time, rule-based regulation is
seen as paralyzing the vitality of market mechanisms and restraining the scope of individual negotiations’’ (Malsch et al.,
2012, p. 402).
For an individualist, regulation is problematic not solely because it potentially constrains freedom of entrepreneurial
activity. Additionally, it is asserted that ‘‘complexity has a cost for companies . . .which costs are ultimately borne by
shareholders’’ (Confederation of British Industry response). Thus, individualist respondents are concerned that the costs of
regulation mar profits and, in turn, this threatens wealth acquisition.
A further indicator of the individualistic response is a preference for practice over theory. There are two aspects of the
individualistic culture that give rise to this preference. First, it arises because for the individualist ‘doing’ is more important
than ‘thinking’. You cannot think yourway tomaterial success. You have to get your ‘hands dirty’ and be proactive to achieve
success. Underlying this propensity to want to act is the awareness of the individualist that if you do not perform to a high
level then failure could arise, and if failure occurs this is a serious matter as you cannot expect support post-failure. Second,
theory is of little interest to individualists as they consider that knowledge need only be adequate for the matter in hand,
whereas the hierarchist has a preference for knowledge to be whole and systematic (Thompson, 1992).
Table 1
Dominant and sub-dominant solidarity by respondent.
Respondent Respondent type
(n = not UK based)
Primary
solidarity
Secondary
solidarity
(where identified)
Reference made
to the global
financial crisis?
A.R. Morton Individual Individualistic Hierarchical No
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) Professional body Individualistic Hierarchical Yes
A. Dangerfield Individual Individualistic – No
A. Blair Individual Egalitarian – No
Association of British Insurers (ABI) Trade association Individualistic Hierarchical No
Association of Friendly Societies (AFS) Trade association Individualistic – No
Baker Tilley Audit firm Individualistic Hierarchical No
British American Tobacco (BAT) Company Individualistic – No
BDO LLP Audit firm Hierarchical Individualistic No
British Land Company Individualistic – No
BT Company Individualistic Hierarchical No
The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) Trade association Individualistic Hierarchical Yes
Centre for Financial Market Integrity Trade association Individualistic Hierarchical No
Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) Professional body Hierarchical – Yes
Deloitte LLP Audit firm Individualistic – No
Deutsche Pru¨fstelle fu¨r Rechnungslegung (DPR-FREP) Regulatory body (n) Hierarchical Egalitarian No
Ernst & Young Audit firm Individualistic Hierarchical Yes
Danziger Capital Partners LLP Consultancy Individualistic – No
Global Accounting Alliance Alliance of bodies (n) Individualistic Hierarchical No
Grant Thornton LLP Audit firm Hierarchical Individualistic Yes
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (ICAA) Professional body (n) Hierarchical – No
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales
(ICAEW)
Professional body Hierarchical Individualistic Yes
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland (ICAS) Professional body Hierarchical Individualistic No
KPMG LLP Audit firm Hierarchical Individualistic No
Local Authority Pension Fund Forum (LAPFF) Trade association Egalitarian – Yes
P. van Wijck Individual (n) Hierarchical – No
PwC LLP Audit firm Individualistic Hierarchical Yes
Quoted Companies Alliance (QCA) Trade association Individualistic – No
RAAS Consulting Consultancy Hierarchical Egalitarian No
Radley Yeldar Consultancy Hierarchical Individualistic No
The Actuarial Profession Professional body Hierarchical – No
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Relatedly, differences in cosmology between the solidarities has an important influence upon the preference for
principles-based or rules-based accounting standards. In the low group–low grid setting of the individualist one would
ordinarily expect a preference for a principles-based approach to accounting and accounting standards. This preference is
present in the complexity project responses identified as individualistic with, for example, the British American Tobacco
response stating ‘‘the balance has swung too far fromprinciples’’. This preference arises as it permits the individualist the use
of individual judgement rather than being tied to rules. The individualist wants freedom to takewhatever action is necessary
that best allows them to pursue success. They prefer practice that, typically in accounting, allows for a variety of possible
treatments (rather than having to follow the treatment that is theoretically best) and this permits them to adopt a treatment
that suits their purposes. Equally, they also prefer principles-based standards which can be manipulated to suit their own
purposes, rather than being compelled to follow a rule.
In summary therefore, the individualistic responses are built upon the principle that businesses need to be left to get on
unhindered. Further, the individualistic responses are identifiable because of the investor focus, advocacy of the removal of
regulation and associated costs, a preference for practice over theory and support for principles over rules.
3.3. Hierarchical responses and self-assurance of the centre
Hierarchists will not accommodate anymeasures that pose a danger to either group loyalty or the social hierarchy as this
threatens the hierarchical worldview. As the framing of the FRC paper matches the individualist’s worldview, we might
expect hierarchist’s to promulgate their worldview with some diligence. A caveat to this relates to Douglas andWildavsky’s
(1982) observation that the individualist and hierarchical cultures are at the centre because of the power they hold. One
outcome of this is that complacency can arise whereby individualists and hierarchists alike assume they do not need to
expend great effort to garner support for their worldviews.5
In respect of the complexity project it is evident that whilst the comments letters of hierarchically biased
respondents do not match the brevity of the individualistic comments letters, they are still more concise than the
responses from the egalitarian solidarity. Notwithstanding this observation, it is apparent that there is a set of
respondents who are promoting views that have a strong correspondence with a hierarchical bias (see Table 1). The
three principal factors that suggest these respondents are adopting a hierarchical position relate to discussions
concerning: goal commonality and the avoidance of conflict between different parties, stability and conformity, and a
pro-regulation disposition.
The perpetuation of a hierarchical society requires group members to possess shared aims. This strengthens group
cohesion and militates against societal conflict. This aspiration that the interests of the group be placed above individual
interests is present, for example, in the response from the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland (ICAS) who claim
that a suitable outcome could ‘‘only be achieved if all those involved; the regulators, the preparers and the users, can
adjust . . . their behaviours sufficiently and in a combined effort to work towards a common goal. The collective buy-in, not
self-interest, is essential . . .’’ (ICAS response).
The avoidance of discord through the setting of common goals in a hierarchical solidarity is intimately connectedwith the
issue of blame. Hierarchists havewell established systems of justice that can attribute blame to, and punish, individuals who
transgress internal or external boundaries. These systems exist because transgressors threaten the existing way of life.
However, a hierarchical society is also careful not to jeopardise the notion of collective responsibility. That is, the hierarchical
societywill normallywish to avoid situationswhere, when common goals have been set but are then notmet, one individual
(or a small cluster of individuals) is held to account. This is because it could be divisive for this to occur. For this reason such a
society is careful not to fashion unrealistic or unattainable goals. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and
Wales (ICAEW) makes reference to these interconnected issues of goals, blame and the wish to avoid destabilising group
relationships in the context of standard setting, maintaining that it is unfair to blame standard setters for unintended
consequences arising out of the standard setting process. This is because it is unreasonable to ‘‘assume that the standard-
setter can always get things right first time . . . perfection is an unrealistic objective’’ (ICAEW response). It is also significant
that this respondent chooses to defend the standard setter. Hierarchists are prone to place trust in professional expertise and
look to these professionals to uphold order. The respect that hierarchists accord to expertise and to the theoretical bases that
underpin this expertise is also present in the ICAEW’s suggestion that the accounting expertise of professional services firms
serves a valuable role as ‘‘(a)ccounting manuals produced by audit firms seem to us to be a useful way of helping preparers
cope with complexity’’ (ICAEW response).
A pro-regulation stance is also present in the hierarchical responses. Regulation aids hierarchical organisations to
maintain order and the need for regulation is defended in different ways by the hierarchically biased respondents. For
example, both the ICAEW and ICAS argue that financial report-related regulation is needed on grounds of ‘necessary
complexity’ to satisfy the disparate requirements of user groups. Hence, again there is reference being made to the need to
avoid discord amongst different sub-groups. However, there is an avoidance of equating regulation with bureaucratization.
Thismay be deliberate, with the hierarchists judging that amessage that implies increasing bureaucracywould be difficult to
‘sell’ to potential recruits from either the individualist or egalitarian camps.
5 This complacency only dissipates when the dominance of the centre is threatened and this is discussed later in the paper.
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A hierarchically oriented pro-theory stance is also observable. Hierarchists prefer knowledge to be complete and, hence,
are supportive of theory (unlike individualists). For example, the ICAEW defend their view that theory is necessary in the
following manner:
The (discussion paper) talks about the view of some that ‘accounting is becoming too theoretical’ and no longer
describes business reality . . . The restrictions on hedge accounting are given as an example of ‘theoretically
correct’ requirements, which lead to reported results that do not match economic performance as perceived by
management. But users surely would not want a complete free-for-all and so some level of restriction is required.
(ICAEW response)
It is notable that of the six professional body respondents, five have been identified as corresponding to the hierarchical
solidarity (Table 1). This might be expected as internal and external boundaries are important in the context of professional
bodies. The importance of expertise and trust in the hierarchical context has been discussed above. To maintain the expert
status of its members, a professional body needs to monitor its external boundary carefully and it can do this in different
ways. For example, members will only be admitted after successful completion of professional examinations and after
completing relevant work experience with authorised training employers. Those who become members can be expelled
from the group and, hence, disciplinary committees and the like are used by professional bodies to identify and deal with
transgressors. These types of mechanism protect the external boundary and maintain order. At the same time, internal
boundaries corroborate the status of members; delineating between trainees, newly qualified members, or fellows of the
institute. In addition, internal boundaries matter as the professional qualification signals status both in a work and social
context.
4. Cultural dialogues: the egalitarian voice
4.1. The egalitarian worldview: the border attacks the centre
It is not unexpected that only two of the thirty one responses are identified as matching the egalitarian solidarity (the
Local Authority Pension Fund Forum (LAPFF) and A. Blair; see Table 1). Complexity in financial reporting is not an obvious
subject likely to arouse the interest of egalitarian groups. It has been previously explained that egalitarian societies have a
predisposition towards ideas associated with justice and equality, arising from their classification of the outside world as a
threat, and that this is coupled with the low-grid dimension. Hence, egalitarian groups seek out causes that more obviously
involve issues of injustice, inequality, discrimination or the like. These types of cause enable them to act ‘‘as the conscience of
the larger community’’ (Douglas, 1993, p. 31), challenging the centre (the hierarchists and the individualists) which, in turn,
unifies the group.
Overall, the centre (the individualists and the hierarchists) is inclined to speak with greater confidence and self-
assurance. The egalitarian camp is less powerful and, therefore, to have its voice heard it must be much more assertive.
Hence, a more strident tone is present in these two egalitarian responses.
The first section of the LAPFF response outlines a commitment to ‘corporate social responsibility’, ‘high standards of
corporate governance’, ‘working conditions’ and ‘the environment’. These ideas accordwith the aspirations of the egalitarian
solidarity for the creation of a more just society:
LAPFF is . . . a voluntary association of 49 local authority pension funds based in the UK. It exists . . . to maximise their
influence as shareholders to promote corporate social responsibility and high standards of corporate governance
amongst the companies inwhich they invest . . . LAPFF’s interest in this (discussion paper) arises from the effects of the
financial reporting system on real economic decision-making. This impacts on business choices affecting job creation,
working conditions, salaries and pensions, tax receipts, training and development, the environment and other issues
across society (LAPFF response).
The LAPFF elaborates on its opening comments by explaining that it wishes to pursue a campaign for ‘‘more effective
communication’’ because of its potential to engender transparency. The attitude to transparency of the individualistic,
hierarchical and egalitarian solidarities differs markedly. Individualistic organisations consider that transparency should
apply to others, but not to themselves. This is because access to information relating to rival organisations can be
advantageous to the individualist; for example, when bidding for a contract or developing a marketing strategy. Conversely,
individualists do not want transparency to be required of their organisation; they want to hoard their own information to
ensure no benefit falls to competitors. Hierarchists do not want transparency if it emphasizes the privileges that accrue to
those of higher rank in the social hierarchy as this may cause discontent. Transparency is only relevant to the hierarchist if it
facilitates monitoring of boundaries as this aids in identifying (and subsequently dealing with) transgressors. However, for
the egalitarian solidarity, transparency is important for its potential to publicly expose unethical or dishonest practiceswhen
these are undertaken by the centre. In turn, egalitarian groups hope this exposurewill help in building a better society. Thus,
in the context of the FRC discussion paper the LAPFF explain that ‘‘the numbers produced by management are incapable of
being properly scrutinised . . . (and consequently) (r)ather than seeking to reduce complexity in reports, LAPFF believes the
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FRC should be seeking to increase transparency . . . increased scrutiny can act as a spur to raise standards . . . and . . . in holding
the board to account’’ (LAPFF response).
The LAPFF also argue that transparency is important as it can aid in stopping individualistic companies from ‘gaming the
system’ to achieve their own objectives:
It cannot be healthy . . . that company accounts are understandable by relatively few rather than subject to wider
informed debate. This leaves the field open to those who would exploit it either to game the system for their own
ends . . . (LAPFF response).
The LAPFF’s commitment to a justice-based notion of transparency is also observable in other parts of its response to the
discussion paper. For example, the discussion paper asks the question: ‘Would a project on disclosures help stem the
constant growth of accounting disclosure requirements?’ (FRC, 2009a, p. 60). The LAPFF’s reply is that transparency is a far
more important objective than stemming the growth of accounting disclosures. The LAPFF bolster their claim for the
necessity of transparency through citing ‘‘the UN Principles for Responsible Investment (which) call on investors to be both
informed and engaged’’ (LAPFF response). This lends a moral tone to their argument and is further evidence that the LAPFF
response can be categorised as egalitarian.
The perspective of the LAPFF on regulation is also rooted in an egalitarian worldview. In an ideal world it would be
unnecessary to have to enact regulations compelling people to act appropriately as ‘‘(r)esponsive boards will seek to
understand, and . . . meet the information demands of their shareholders – whether they are required to do so by regulation
or not’’ (LAPFF response). However, the egalitarian-rooted LAPFF assert that businesses in the ‘center’ are prone to
interpreting regulations to benefit themselves as ‘‘there are . . . boards that will rely on a certain interpretation of the letter of
the regulations to their own advantage’’ (LAPFF response). This distrust of the centre in respect of its attitude towards
regulation also leads the LAPFF to raise doubts about how these firms would act should regulation be simplified:
Simpler regulation does not guarantee that companies will not simply adopt a boxticking compliance approach rather
than seeking to achieve best practice. (LAPFF response)
The LAPFF has little empathy with individualistic calls for the removal of some of the regulatory burden. For example, the
LAPFF dismisses the argument that regulation could be unhelpful because it might lag behind market practice stating that,
‘‘(r)egulation takes time to catch up with market practice and there will be a certain amount of irrelevant information as a
result of regulation that becomes outdated. But, as supporters of transparency, LAPFF considers this to be less of an issue than
premature removal of data’’ (LAPFF response).
Similarly, the LAPFF’s response to the FRC question, ‘‘Would it increase or decrease complexity if national and international
regulatorsworked together in amore joined-upway?’’ is to reason thatdirectorsneed tounderstand that ‘‘regulation is the cost
of doing business in a certain jurisdiction’’ (LAPFF). This is because, for an egalitarian group, the purpose of regulation is not to
address issues of complexity; rather regulation is to serve the purpose of creating a fairer world.
The second respondent identified as egalitarian, A. Blair, expresses similar views to the LAPFF. His judgement is that
supplanting the ‘center’ is extremely difficult because of its dominance and, consequently, the tone of his response is
somewhat less optimistic. He is similarly concerned that annual reports lack transparency and to support his contention he
cites an example of the disclosure of share-based payments in ‘‘which the company did not make that figure clear . . . (and
that) (t)hose extraordinary mortals who attempt to read it will struggle to understand much of the material’’ (A. Blair
response). He then claims that ‘‘(i)t is open to any chief executive . . . to cut through the . . . ‘‘cackle’’ and describe what is
really important . . . (b)ut they’re simply not going to do that . . . (as) (i)nformation is power and those in possession of it
are . . . going to disburse it sparingly’’ (A. Blair response). His view on regulation is that The Companies Act, IFRS, and the FRC’s
Corporate Governance Code are ‘‘gumph’’ and merely complied with. He argues that regulation of itself does not improve
transparency and concludes that the FRC’s suggestion that companies simply need to be encouraged to communicate clearly
will not result in any change. Instead, he suggests ‘naming and shaming’ those companies with the most opaque annual
reports might be the only way to bring about improvements in transparency.
4.2. Egalitarians and leveraging current events
Egalitarians believe they need towork hard to counter the power of the centre andwill look formeans that enable them to
have their voice heard. One method is to leverage support by reference to current events. If these events are unsettling or
disruptive then it may make an individual susceptible to re-consideration of their cultural bias. The publication of the FRC
discussion paper was in June 2009 and at this time the recent global financial crisis was well advanced. The crisis had
resulted in significant criticisms of the banking industry and there were grave concerns that there may be a repetition of the
Great Depression (Linsley and Linsley, 2010). The problems stemming from the financial crisis had the potential to make the
centre vulnerable to losing adherents. For example, resentment towards bankers had arisen in many sections of the UK
population (see for example, Bowers, 2008; Hanson, 2009).
Cultural theorists have observed that the border (egalitarian groups) ‘‘tend(s) to ‘recruit’ members most successfully
when individuals become critical of organisations at the center’’ (Linsley and Shrives, 2009, p. 505). That the FRC discussion
paper was released at a time when there was persistent condemnation of the established order presented an opportunity to
attempt to gain wider acceptance of the egalitarian view. The LAPFF response states that the financial reporting system prior
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to the crisis had ‘‘failed to effectively warn of the risks that companies were taking . . . (and the LAPFF is seeking) . . . a change
in mindset from those boards that have treated shareholders’ views as an inconvenience’’ (LAPFF response). The LAPFF
references specific aspects of the financial crisis and in different contexts, and this provides ameans of attempting to ‘sell’ an
egalitarian vision. For example, the LAPFF revisit the theme of transparency and situate it both in the specific context of
Lehman Brothers’ well publicised bankruptcy and in relation to more generalised concerns about the questionable motives
of bankers and thewider business community. A further example of leveraging the crisis occurswhen the LAPFFmakes direct
reference to the precautionary principle as follows:
. . . at a time when investor confidence has been severely shaken, we consider the precautionary principle makes it
incumbent on the producers of the accounts to demonstrate why the publication of information is not appropriate.
(LAPFF response)
The precautionary principle holds great significance for egalitarian groups. A key aspect of theworldview of individualists
and hierarchists is, respectively, the world is wholly resilient and the world is resilient within parameters. By contrast,
egalitarians perceive the world as fragile. Hence, it is imperative for egalitarians that due regardmust be had for the fragility
of the world by adhering to the precautionary principle.
In emphasising the crisis the LAPFF’s response can be understood as an attempt at creating a landmark narrative that will
draw in new followers (Nichols, 1997). The second egalitarian respondent, A. Blair, makes no reference to the credit crisis;
however, limited references are present in responses of those identified as individualistically biased or hierarchically biased
(see Table 1 forwhich respondentsmade reference to the crisis). The remarksmade in respect of the credit crisis by these two
solidarities are brief and supportive of their particular worldview. Individualistically biased respondents who mention the
credit crisis focus upon explaining the credit crisis as providing an opportunity for re-examining and better understanding
shareholders’ requirements. Hierarchically biased respondents who refer to the crisis either suggest it is a technical (expert)
issue in that it is amatter of how to account for financial instruments or that it signifiesmore regulation is needed in the form
of increased disclosure requirements.
5. Discussion and conclusions
In the FRC complexity project the voices of threeof the solidarities havebeen identified in the comment letter responses and
the proposed policy solutions disentangled through drawing upon cultural theory. The individualists, as supporters of self-
regulation and the market, endorse the goal of removing complexity from corporate reports. The hierarchists want to ensure
that social structures are not threatened and boundaries are not breached. Therefore, they view regulation as necessary and
judging there is a need for all parties towork together to address the problemof complexity in corporate reporting. Inpursuit of
fairness and equity, the egalitarianswant corporate reports to be transparent so thatmanagement actions can be scrutinised. It
is only the isolates who have not taken part in the dialogue. Vroom’s expectancy theory of motivation proposes that an
individual’s behaviour is based on their expectation of the likely effect of that behaviour. Isolates are liable to judge that it is
pointlessattempting to lobbyas theyassumenoonewill listen.Hence, this judgement thatanyattemptat lobbyingwillhaveno
impact is likely to result in them not deeming it worthwhile contributing to the FRC debate.
Verweij (1995) notes a key strength of cultural theory is that it can ‘‘provide a systematic and coherent taxonomy of the
ways in which actors perceive and construct all kinds of . . . issues’’ (p. 95). Hence, by drawing on cultural theory it has been
possible to observe the followers of each culture in the context of the complexity project as they engage in a ‘‘three-sided
policy struggle’’ (Douglas, 1997, p. 130).
It is possible to envisage analysing the FRC comments letters based upon the presumption that nations are susceptible to
being analysed as one relatively homogenous unit. Drawing upon an appropriate methodology the analysis might conclude
for example that, vis a` vis regulation, the overall national preference is for self-regulation. However, this conclusion would
mask that alternative views on self-regulation have been expressed and this type of approach would not provide insights
intowhy some respondents advocate greater regulation rather than self-regulation, or why some respondents are suspicious
of self-regulation. Cultural theory can explain these different responses. It can explain the wish for greater regulation by
reference to the hierarchical solidarity which needs tools for imposing order upon society and preserving internal and
external boundaries. It can connect those who are suspicious of self-regulation to the egalitarian soldarity which perceives
the ‘outside world’ as unscrupulous and, consequently, sees self-regulation as providing ‘outsiders’ with the freedom to
perpetuate inequities. And it can explain the desire for self-regulation by reference to the individualistic solidarity which
requires freedom to pursue advantageous opportunities. Thus, each of the three cultural solidarities presents an internally
consistent ‘story’ regarding their stance on self-regulation, and this internal consistency will apply to all matters for the
different ways of life.6
Importantly, cultural theory does not ‘‘ignore the existence of cultural differences within societies’’ (Greer and Patel,
2000, p. 309). Rather, cultural theory enables the different voices of the hierarchists, individualists and egalitarians (and the
silence of the isolates) to be identified. This identification is possible aswe can predict and explain alternative preferences for
6 The isolates also have an internally consistent story in respect of regulation. Their view on thematter is that because the future is uncertain thenwe can
never know if regulation is likely to be beneficial. Therefore, they are largely indifferent to the enactment of regulation.
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solutions by reference to the four solidarities, as each will suggest a solution that supports their worldview and with the
ultimate aim being to preserve that way of life.
When the FRC or any other accounting body engages in activities such as making policy, reviewing accounting standards
or auditing standards, or reworking the conceptual framework we will not be able to understand why the debates are
progressing as they are if we assume there is a single national culture influencing the outcome of those debates. To
comprehend how the eventual outcome has been arrived at in the making of policy or the reviewing of an accounting
standard or auditing standard we need to unscramble the debates that preceded the final decision through analysing the
cultural dialogues that are the origins of the different proposals for solutions. Each solidarity will seek to win sufficient
support for their worldview to hold sway and to have their policy solution enacted. In this respect it might be potentially
helpful to understand which worldview is dominant at a given time as this may explain why the policy solutions of that
solidarity are being enacted to a greater extent than the policy solutions of the other solidarities. However, it is important not
to then identify this as equating to the national culture, for although that solidarity may appear to be gaining more victories
than the other solidarities it must be borne in mind that there will always be ongoing and vigorous cultural dialogues.
Additionally, we must be very careful to recognise that cultural theory ‘‘offers a dynamic account of social and political
life . . . and there is a continuous waxing and waning of the relative strengths of the . . . (solidarities)’’ (Verweij, 1995, p. 7) as
individuals move from one way of life to another. This movement of individuals from one solidarity to another has been
observed in practice. For example, Heap and Ross (1992) have recorded how the individualist worldview won adherents in
the UK and USA as the hierarchical way of life failed to deliver on its promises in the 1970s and following the intense cultural
dialogues associated with the economic and political difficulties of that period (for further details see also Thompson, 1992;
Linsley and Linsley, 2010). Consequently, although a particular worldview may be dominant during a given time period,
subsequently another worldview may come to dominate and cultural theory is able to explain this dynamic change.
Acknowledging the existence of the four solidarities, and the resulting cultural dialogues, is important as it has
implications concerning the resolution of debates about accounting or other issues.We have seen that each solidarity offers a
restricted view of the world and the solutions each solidarity offers up is similarly restricted as solutions must be internally
consistent with worldviews. Rayner (2006), Thompson (2008) and Grint (2010) have argued that these internally consistent
solutions might be satisfactory for solving tame problems, but they are unsuitable for solving wicked problems where a
clumsy solution is required. Tame problems are ‘‘akin to puzzles for which there is always an answer’’ and, whilst they may
be complicated, can be solved by applying the ‘‘appropriate process’’ (Grint, 2010, p. 307). Wicked problems are complex
(rather than complicated) and cause and effect is unclear with circularity often a feature (Rayner, 2006; Grint, 2010).7 Often,
wicked problems will not have ‘‘stopping points . . . that is the point at which the problem is solved’’ (Grint, 2010, p. 307).
Thus, the FRC corporate reporting complexity project would fall to be a wicked problem for it is endeavouring to ensure that
information in corporate reports is not unnecessarily complex, whilst retaining key characteristics such as relevance,
comparability, reliability, and decision usefulness.
Applying the solution of one solidarity to a wicked problem is likely to result in failure. First, each of the solidarities’
‘‘responses . . . shapes the definition of the problem and this . . . complicates wicked problems’’ (Rayner, 2006, p. 5). Second,
the perspective each solidarity has is necessarily restricted and, consequently, each solution is only a partial solution. Third,
each solution will only be supported by the adherents of that solidarity. There is no incentive for followers of other
solidarities to endorse the solution; conversely, they may seek to undermine it.8 Policy makers may look to craft a solution
that rises above the differences of the supporters of the four solidarities. However, this is problematic as the solidarities
oppose one another and the likely outcome is that no-one will be satisfied.
To address these difficulties cultural theorists propose that wicked problems require clumsy solutions (see for
example, Rayner, 2006; Thompson, 2008; Grint, 2010). Clumsy solutions start by accepting that any solution will be
imperfect. Thinking that there is one best solution is a problem in itself and clumsy solutions recognise that the hope is
for an improvement not a full solution. A key part of a clumsy solution is the need to listen to all solidarities as the
‘‘multiple viewpoints . . . (all) have something to tell you when they are brought together collectively about how you
might grapple with the problem’’ (Rayner, 2006, p. 7). It is common in policy debates for participants to talk over others,
but this may not work with clumsy solutions where each group is entitled to speak. This is not to imply that a clumsy
solution is dependent on consensus per se; rather that there should be an avoidance of alienating any particular
constituency. Each voice must be represented and heard in the consultation processes, and seen as part of the solution. If
we are insufficiently clumsy our solution will lack democracy and its legitimacy will be questioned (Rayner, 2006).
Inevitably, clumsy solutions require compromise and as Grint (2008) asserts: ‘‘a critical component of a necessarily
clumsy solution is to combine elements of . . . (the) (solidarities) . . . into a (clumsy) solution-space and within each of
these (solidarities) are techniques that, when combined, might just prise the wicked problem open enough to make some
progress with it’’ (Grint, 2008, p.14).
7 For example, Rayner (2006) cites educational underperformance as a wicked problem which is complex and circular. Educational underperformance
might be traced to poverty, which might be traced to social class, which might be traced to educational underperformance. Grint (2010) cites the Greek
economic crisis and its implications for the euro as a wicked problem.
8 For example, Underwood and Ingram (2010) have observed how rule-based, top-down (hierarchical) risk management systems have foundered as
(individualistic) managers have perceived the system as hampering their ability to take on risky but, in their view, advantageous projects.
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The FRC asks for respondents to the discussion paper to be ‘‘frank in the feedback that you give us’’ (FRC, 2009a, p. 3), but
what is also needed is that each solidarity should listen attentively to the feedback of the others. The FRC is now moving
aheadwith the plan to reduce complexity and has established the next phase of the programme as the cutting clutter project.
As the next phase is in the same form as set out in the discussion document this suggests that the FRC has listened to the
arguments of the individualists. This is unsurprising as these arguments accordwith the FRCworldview. There is an inherent
difficulty in any solidarity properly hearing the arguments of others, as its focus is on attempting to get others to attend to its
views and a dialogue of the deaf is prone to occur. A truly open debate about corporate reporting and complexity would be
one where all the differing views of the solidarities are not only voiced, but also heard. The view of the LAPFF is that the FRC
need to act to bring about broader representation in the membership of the FRC council. It is important the voice of the
border is clearly heard and that the isolates are also drawn in to the discussions. Therefore, the FRC should be ensuring each
group is sufficiently engaged in the process.
The FRC complexity project is relatively small and nor is it especially contentious or high profile. Research studies
examining cultural dialogues in respect of responses to much larger projects and that are more controversial or politically
sensitive, such as the joint IASB-FASB conceptual framework project, are likely to reveal cultural dialogues that are even
more vigorous. However, future research that draws upon Douglas’s cultural theory and the notion of cultural dialogues
should not be confined to studies that examine other accounting projects and how they are responded to. For example, future
research could seek to determine the dominant solidarities for a sample of accounting firms and to establish whether this
results in the firms attracting graduates who support, and will perpetuate, this way of life. There is also a need to revisit the
accounting values that Grey proposed and to assess whether it is possible to re-work these in the light of Douglas’s typology
and cultural dialogues. This re-working has been outside the scope of this paper but would address Greer and Patel’s (2000)
call for ‘‘an alternative framework for the examination of culture’’ (p. 309) that recognises inter-societal cultural differences.
Appendix 1: Indicative characteristics of the four solidarities
Individualist (low grid, low group) Indicated by concepts related to: individual freedom, entrepreneurial activity, unconstrained
activity, personal gain or wealth or success, group activity only relevant if there exists opportunity
for trade or exchange, negotiation, failure a personal responsibility
Accounting specifics indicative of this solidarity might include: burden or cost of regulation,
minimising avoidable work, principles over theory, practice over theory, common sense, focusing
on shareholders/investors rather than other stakeholder groups
Hierarchist (high grid, high group) Indicated by concepts related to: tradition, authority, policing access, rules, theory, concerns over
boundaries, loyalty
Accounting specifics indicative of this solidarity might include: regulation, need for further
subcommittees, necessity for regulation, professional integrity or qualifications, accounting
expertise
Egalitarian (low grid, high group) Indicated by concepts related to: idealism, justice, fairness, acting ethically, environment
Accounting specifics indicative of this solidarity might include: CSR, philanthropy, triple bottom
line reporting, sustainability reporting, social accounting, social audits, consideration of wider
constituency
Isolate (high grid, low group) Indicated by concepts related to: isolation, world is arbitrary and capricious, resignation to fate
Accounting specifics indicative of this solidarity might include: no response provided, accounting
unlikely to change anything9
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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to propose Neo-Durkheimian institutional theory, developed by the
Durkheimian institutional theory, as developed by anthropologist Mary Douglas, as a suitable theory base
for undertaking cross-cultural accounting research. The social theory provides a structure for examining
within-country and cross-country actions and behaviours of different groups and communities. It avoids
associating nations and cultures, instead contending any nation will comprise four different solidarities
engaging in constant dialogues. Further, it is a dynamic theory able to take account of cultural change.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper establishes a case for using neo-Durkheimian
institutional theory in cross-cultural accounting research by specifying the key components of the
theory and addressing common criticisms. To illustrate how the theory might be utilised in the domain
of accounting and finance research, a comparative interpretation of the different experiences of
financialization in Germany and the UK is provided drawing on Douglas’s grid-group schema.
Findings – Neo-Durkheimian institutional theory is deemed sufficiently capable of interpreting the
behaviours of different social groups and is not open to the same criticisms as Hofstede’s work.
Differences in Douglasian cultural dialogues in the post-1945 history of Germany and the UK provide
an explanation of the variations in the comparative experiences of financialization.
Originality/value – Neo-Durkheimian institutional theory has been used in a wide range of contexts;
however, it has been little used in the context of accounting research. The adoption of the theory in
future accounting research can redress a Hofstedian-bias in accounting research.
Keywords Culture, Hofstede, Social relations, Cross-cultural, Cultural change, Mary Douglas
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
There has been significant criticism of Hofstede’s approach to understanding and
examining culture (see e.g. Baskerville, 2003). The association of nations and cultures is
particularly problematic in respect of Hofstede’s work as it does not facilitate nuanced
analyses of preferences and behaviours of different groups and communities with
regards to either within-country or cross-country analyses. This suggests that if
accounting researchers are to undertake meaningful analyses of ethnic groups,
however conceived, there is a need to draw on a theory (or theories) not subject to the
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same criticisms as Hofstede and with sufficient subtlety and explanatory power to
examine the complexities inherent in cross-cultural research.
This Special Issue addresses ethnicity and is “aimed at operationalising ethnicity in
accounting and accountability research”; the specific area where we seek to make a
contribution concerns “learn(ing) from the manner in which ‘humanities scholars’ have
addressed and executed ethnicity-based research”. The proposal of this paper is that
neo-Durkheimian institutional theory, as developed by the anthropologist
Mary Douglas, is able to provide a structure for examining both within-country and
cross-country preferences and behaviours of groups and communities. This theory
does not assume an association between nations and cultures, and accords with
Kanbur et al.’s (2009) belief that “the anthropological optic is useful as a corrective to
the methodological nationalism of the social sciences generally and as a way of
understanding the complexities of the local” (p. 147). Unlike Hofstede, neo-Durkheimian
institutional theory contends that any nation, and indeed any community, will comprise
four different solidarities each having distinct beliefs and worldviews which are a
product of their different patterns of social relations (see e.g. Douglas, 2003). Another
important criticism of Hofstede is it is inappropriate to assume cultures will stay
constant (Baskerville, 2003). Neo-Durkheimian institutional theory does not make this
assumption; rather, it is a dynamic theory that is able to explain cultural change via the
interactions between the different solidarities that occur as they engage in continual
“cultural dialogues”.
What is important to note is that this theoretical approach can be used to study
groups or communities of all forms. Therefore, whilst it can be drawn on to yield
additional understandings of accounting practices in Indigenous communities (see e.g.
Chew and Greer, 1997; Greer and Patel, 2000; Jayasinghe and Thomas, 2009; who have
previously researched accounting in the contexts of Indigenous Australians and
Sri Lankans), its adoption need not be restricted to the study of Indigenous
communities, ethnic groups or subaltern communities. In prior empirical studies, neo-
Durkheimian institutional theory has been used to understand a very broad range of
issues from, for example, terrorism (Douglas and Mars, 2003) to vaccination policy
preferences (Song et al., 2014). Cross-country and within-country studies have been
undertaken that draw on the theory; for example, Grendstad’s (2003) and Spalding’s
(2000) studies examine political preferences across Nordic countries and ethnic
“antagonisms” within Nigeria, respectively. Additionally, Buonfino and Thomson
(2007) in their report for the Commission on Integration and Cohesion analysing “what
it means to ‘belong’ in contemporary Britain” (p. 5) judge Douglas’s ideas offer nuanced
understandings of the dynamics of group memberships, identity and belonging.
At present, the theory has been employed in the field of accounting only to a limited
degree with studies having been undertaken by Linsley and Shrives (2009), Moerman
and van der Laan (2012) and Linsley and Shrives (2014). The first two of these
accounting-based studies focus primarily upon how risk perceptions are constructed
according to neo-Durkheimian institutional theory in the contexts of the Enron failure
and asbestos claims; the third paper draws more widely on the theory examining
cultural dialogues occurring in the responses to a discussion paper issued by the
Financial Reporting Council.
It is important to note that the prior studies of Linsley and Shrives (2009) and
Moerman and van der Laan (2012) do not incorporate Douglas’s ideas regarding
cultural dialogues and how, within any nation or community, the four different
solidarities will be present and interacting. Linsley and Shrives (2014) incorporate the
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idea of cultural dialogues but to a limited extent. Their paper maps each response
submitted to an FRC consultation to one of the four solidarities and analyses how each
solidarity is interacting with the other three; however, what they are unable to do is to
examine the cultural dialogues that will have occurred as each stakeholder group
developed its response and nor can they observe how the dynamics of these cultural
dialogues will alter over time within each stakeholder group. Cultural dialogues
(as described later in this paper) are a fundamentally important part of
neo-Durkheimian institutional theory as they provide the mechanism through which
cultural change occurs. In this paper we draw fully on the ideas of cultural dialogues and, in
this way, extend the work of Linsley and Shrives (2009), Moerman and van der Laan (2012)
and Linsley and Shrives (2014).
This paper first of all specifies key components of Douglas’s theory and lays out
how the grid-group classificatory structure is composed. This enables us to assert the
theory merits serious attention as being suited for undertaking cross-cultural research.
Then, to illustrate how the theory can be used in cross-cultural accounting and finance
research, a comparative interpretation of the different experiences of financialization in
Germany and the UK is provided drawing on the grid-group schema and notions of
cultural dialogues. Financialization experiences in Germany and the UK have been
selected to demonstrate the value of neo-Durkheimian institutional theory and to show
how the theory can be used as a frame through which to view temporal and spatial
variations in economic and social relationships in two different countries over the last
four decades. The argument proposed is that through this stylised interpretation of the
historical experience of financialization in both Britain and Germany, differences in
Douglasian cultural dialogues can be identified in this history of the respective
countries that can provide an explanation of the variations in the different experiences
of financialization.
Financialization has attracted substantial and increasing attention across different
social science and humanities disciplines. In turn this has generated a rich and varied
set of typologies and conceptualised modalities of financialization. These have been
used to describe, analyse, and theorise the different forms of financialization that
appear to have occurred across time and space (e.g. Krippner, 2005; Lapavitsas, 2011;
Pike and Pollard, 2010). These different modalities offer sometimes contradictorily
divergent attempts to theorise the increasing and intensifying role that finance plays in
shaping economic, social, and political outcomes in the contemporary world.
The plural nature of work to date on financialization is observable with respect to
the different definitions of financialization and the different schools of thought that
have evolved (Pike and Pollard, 2010). Financialization definitions fall into two
groupings focusing upon either shareholder value or the increasing scope of finance
(see e.g. Haslam, 2010). Those adopting the shareholder value focus examine the
consequences this has for management, strategies and firm performance. The scope of
the definitions in the second grouping is broader. Definitions range from Froud et al.’s
(2002) and Erturk et al.’s (2008) ideas relating to “coupon pool capitalism” to Krippner’s
(2005) definition of financialization “as a pattern of accumulation in which profits
accrue through financial channels” (p. 174). The implications of financialization for
individuals has been examined by, for example, Langley (2008) and Aalbers (2008) who
have been concerned with understanding how governments have devolved
responsibility (and risk) for financial planning down to the individual.
The array of financialization definitions highlight how wide a spectrum of effects
financialization is judged to have had across the economic, corporate and social spheres.
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Thus far no conceptual framework has been advanced that has successfully integrated
these differing approaches and can account for financialization not having been a globally
uniform phenomenon (Engelen, 2008). If Douglas’s grid-group schema can be used to
interpret differing financialization processes across space and in time, and as a means of
conceptualising cultural discourse and cultural change both within and between social
groups in a way that is sensitive to temporal dynamics, then this can serve to illustrate its
potential usefulness for cross-cultural accounting research.
In arguing in this paper that neo-Durkheimian institutional theory can provide an
approach for accounting researchers to undertake within-country and cross-country
research there are two points to emphasise. First, while we find this interpretation of
the different financialization experiences historically convincing, we highlight that it is
subordinate in this paper to the theoretical aspect outlined. Second, it should be noted
the framework is being used heuristically, and necessarily, as an aid to interpretation.
This interpretation is performed from the perspective of historical sociology (Fischer,
1995) whereby we emplot “constructed evidence” which, though partial and necessarily
incomplete, nevertheless “confronts theory” (Fischer, 1995, p. 20). This implies we are
not claiming a definitive interpretation for although there is a historiography
(qua history) of financialization, our treatment of British and German history is
undertaken to show how such a comparative interpretation might be achieved using
neo-Durkheimian institutional theory rather than being a claim to the last word on the
Anglo-German experiences of financialization. Further, because we are looking across
such an expansive period of time then it is not possible to claim a definitive
interpretation. The chief contribution of this paper is to enable nuanced interpretation
of typological variations within a theoretical whole and so articulate with the aims of
this Special Issue.
Neo-Durkheimian institutional theory and cultural dialogues
Neo-Durkheimian institutional theory has been described as “one of the most profound
and ambitious bodies of social theory to emerge from within anthropology” (6, 2014a,
p. 287). Douglas’s (1963) extensive body of work initially stemmed from ethnographic
studies undertaken in Africa and this lead to the development of the theory over a
significant period of time. The theory seeks to describe the connection between
preferences, social relations and ways of life. It assumes we are social beings and that
ideas of “selfhood” are formed by reference to others. Hence, preferences are constructed
dependent upon how social relations are arranged. Social relations and cultural biases
augment one another as “adherence to a certain pattern of social relationships generates
a distinctive way of looking at the world; adherence to a certain worldview legitimises a
corresponding type of social relations” (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 2).
To understand how social relations and cultural biases connect, Douglas developed
the now familiar, grid-group typology (Douglas, 1970, 1978, 1986, 1993, 1994, 1997,
1999, 2003, 2004; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). This classifies social structures on
two dimensions of grid and group commensurate with Durkheim’s two dimensions of
social regulation and social integration, and with the outcome that four solidarities are
distinguished. Each of the four classifications or solidarities (individualist, hierarchist,
enclave, and isolate) supports four distinctive ways of life (see Figure 1). Because
Douglas (2004) establishes the four solidarities by reference to distinctive patterns
of social relations, then we can understand why she considers it amiss to talk of
“traditional culture” in its recognition that “(g)roup cultural markings are products of
the human interactions that form and sustain groups” (Richards, 2009, p. 3).
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This neo-Durkheimian approach helps us explain the different preferences and
behaviours of the supporters of each solidarity across a very wide range of issues
including, for example: the apportionment of blame, views of time, relevant risks,
perceptions of resources and nature, and preferences in respect of regulation. (See e.g.
Thompson, 1992, for a summary of the preferences of the four solidarities in respect of
a very wide range of issues.) Douglas (1997) recognises the typology is open to
misinterpretation and stresses that the:
[…] typology of cultures is derived from cultural biases […] A cultural bias is a point of view,
with its own framing assumptions and readily available solutions for standardized problems
[…] It is a question of a way of life, and the way of life depends […] on the social relations that
are entailed (p. 128).
If the form of social relations is hierarchical the high grid-high group configuration
entails clearly defined outer and inner boundaries. The strong outer boundary
separates insiders (group members) and outsiders who are a potential threat to the
group, whilst the strong inner boundaries delineate societal roles. To maintain
the boundaries hierarchical societies have systems of punishment should boundaries
be transgressed (Heap and Ross, 1992). In this form of society “tradition and respect for
authority are features […] and abnormal or anomalous behaviour deemed
unacceptable” (Linsley and Linsley, 2010, p. 197) and there is an “integrated status
system based on authority” (6, 2011, p. 65). By contrast, in the individualistic (low grid-
low group) society or community individuals are “relatively free from control by others
(although) that does not mean the person is not engaged in exerting control over
others” (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 7). This is a competitive form of society and
Isolate 
Strong social regulation 
Weak social integration 
Social ties weak 
Limited scope for self-determination 
May see the world as capricious 
Potentially passive 
Looking to “get by” 
Hierarchy 
Strong social regulation 
Strong social integration 
Defer to tradition and authority 
Rules and regulations important with 
interactions being regulated 
Mechanisms for dealing with internal 
and external boundary transgression 
Little toleration for unconventional 
behaviour  
Confident in planning for the long term 
Individualist 
Weak social regulation 
Weak social integration 
Belief in market mechanisms 
Preference for self-regulation 
Belief in unconstrained activity  
Failure deemed personal responsibility 
Limited support in the event of failure 
Risk not wholly but provides opportunity 
and the expectation is profits will exceed 
losses in the long run
Enclave 
Weak social regulation 
Strong social integration 
Strongly committed to the group 
Disloyalty to the group may result in 
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individuals who fail to prosper find limited support is to be had. This can result in an
entrepreneurialism and willingness to bear risk (6, 2011).
The social structure in an enclaved solidarity is of the low grid-high group form.
The high group element results in a strong exterior boundary, and the low grid facet
provides actors with freedom as there is a lack of social regulation. Loyalty to the
group is of even greater consequence than in a hierarchical society as there is only an
exterior boundary. To buttress the exterior boundary and “to maintain stability
within the group (enclaves) identify the outside world as a threat” (Linsley and
Shrives, 2009, p. 496). Hence, they will commonly identify the outside world as unjust
or unequal. To create sufficient unity in enclaved groups requires members to, in
advance, commit to forego “individual choice in favour of commitment to live by
collectively agreed practices” (6, 2011, p. 67). It can be argued that the hierarchists
and individualists are slightly fearful of enclaves as potentially they “bring threats of
radical change to the fabric of society” (Malsch et al., 2012, p. 96). For this reason the
hierarchists and individualists can be willing to collaborate to protect their interests
when threatened by enclaves.
The fourth way of life is the isolate (high grid-low group) solidarity. Isolates are in a
position where there are strong prescriptions in respect of social regulation and,
consequently, there is reduced scope for acting independently. Additionally, they are
not a part of a community. Consequently, it is commonly argued they are prone to be
“pessimistic […] expecting that attempts to improve their lot will result in failure”
(Chai, 1997, p. 53). This implies passivity on the part of isolates, although this need not
always be the case as isolates will also develop tactics for “getting by” (6, 2014b).
Douglas’s fourfold matrix assists in understanding how different patterns of social
relations result in different worldviews. (Douglas, 1978) is aware that she is “reducing
social variation to a few grand types” (p. 185), but these four basic types are the forms
of social relations that have been observed to be stable and recurrent. Therefore,
Douglas is arguing that the “limitation in variety should be explained at the level of the
most fundamental dimensions of the ordering of relations among people, rather than by
locally contingent and case-specific features of context” (6, 2014a, p. 290).
Cultural dialogues and change
Essential to neo-Durkheimian institutional theory is the notion of cultural dialogues.
The theory does not consider nations or communities or other forms of group to be
homogenous cultural entities. Therefore, it is not expected that a community or society
would exclusively display characteristics connected with one of the solidarities. The
four solidarities do not operate in isolation; rather, in any society or community they
co-exist. This co-existence between the four solidarities is discordant as each is vying to
gather new adherents and endeavouring to win the debate as to the most appropriate
“form of life to be led in common” (Douglas, 1997, p. 129). The interactions between the
four solidarities are important with cultural dialogues arising as they debate which
form of community is preferable with the “adherents to the […] ways of life […] (trying)
to impose their interpretations on others and […] to institutionalise their preferred form
of social relations” (Verweij, 1995, p. 96). Consequently, the relationship between the
solidarities is dynamic. These wrangles between the four solidarities also serve to
remind adherents what each form of life signifies and the tensions between the four
solidarities can aid in ensuring they do not become exaggerations of themselves
(Douglas, 1993). In this sense Douglas is indicating “that ‘culture’ is never coherent but
always riven with conflict” (6, 2014a, p. 298).
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Douglas’s early versions of the theory presented a static model, and Douglas accepts
the static version seemed to map four apparently fixed solidarities with individuals in a
submissive role, and this potentially implied the theory was deterministic. But Douglas
was aware the theory needed to be able to explain change. That is, it needed to be able
to explain how and why the dominant solidarity in any organisation or society may
come to be supplanted by a different solidarity and, relatedly, how and why individuals
switch commitment from one solidarity to another. The dynamic version explains that
individuals may swap allegiance either because they have been expelled from their
present solidarity (e.g. this might occur in an enclaved community where an individual
has transgressed the group boundary) or because that individual’s commitment to the
solidarity is undermined. The latter situation arises when “successive events intervene
in such a way as to prevent a solidarity from delivering on the expectations it has
generated, thereby prompting (that) individual to seek more promising alternatives”
(Thompson et al., 1990, p. 4). For example, an inherent promise in respect of the
hierarchical solidarity is that the community will offer some support to individuals who
encounter difficulties; if such support ceases to be available then this may cause an
individual to question whether to continue to commit to that solidarity. That is, “(a)s
disappointment and frustration set in, people have no option but to try to organise
under one of the other elementary forms, thus giving rise to negative feedback”
(6, 2014a, p. 292)[1].
The direction in which an individual moves as they transfer allegiance will depend
on the nature of the events that are provoking the change and the persuasiveness of the
arguments that proponents of the other solidarities assemble. As a consequence, in any
society one of the solidarities may have greater influence than the other solidarities,
but it may also be superseded over a period of time. Knowing which is dominant at
any point in time can be useful because it helps explain why the policy solutions of
that solidarity are being enacted to a greater extent than the policy solutions of the
other solidarities. Further, although the four solidarities may have a frictional
relationship, they may also make “provisional settlements […] and […] hybrids might
arise but also decay” (6, 2014a, p. 292). These ideas of cultural dialogues and dynamism
are important in neo-Durkheimian institutional theory as they allow for, and can
explain, cultural change. This ensures that the theory avoids assuming that cultures
are unchanging.
A criticism that is sometimes aimed at neo-Durkheimian institutional theory is that
it is deterministic. However, what needs to be recognised is the theory is asserting that
individuals are active agents and the solidarity that achieves primacy only does so as
an outcome of individuals’ verdicts on what form of life they would prefer. It is our
instinctive sociability that leads us to approve the establishment of social institutions
that limit our actions and can lay claims over us. In return compensations arise from
selecting that way of life. Consequently, the individual-society relationship should be
understood as a collaboration between structure and agency (Douglas, 1999).
Individuals can cease lending their support to a particular way of life and transferring
allegiance is only possible because individuals have agency.
These discussions indicate that neo-Durkheimian institutional theory is “against
[…] the methodological timidity of merely piling up local descriptions, (with) Douglas
insist(ing) that humanity is one species subject to many of the same basic constraints”
(6, 2014a, p. 290). These basic constraints, social regulation and social integration,
result in a typology where there is limited variation in the different forms of social
organisation. The classification provides a structure for the analysis of actions and
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behaviours associated with the four solidarities (and hybrids of these four) across all
types of group or community regardless of geographical setting or time period. The
names ascribed to the four solidarities can sometimes be contentious, but these should
be understood simply as labels and it is the underlying theory that is of paramount
importance. Understanding “cultural markings” by reference to patterns of social
relations carries the implication that “loose and lazy notions of ethnic, national,
traditional, class cultures cannot describe coherent systems of belief and motivation
that drive individual action” (6, 2014a, p. 298). Instead, neo-Durkheimian institutional
theory posits that we can understand cultural markings (such as rituals, dress, food
classifications, forms of blaming, use of stories) as a product of social organisation and,
hence, can recognise them as epiphenomena (Richards, 2009). It is also important to
re-state that neo-Durkheimian institutional theory is not subject to the criticisms
commonly aimed at Hofstede. These are the criticisms that his approach does not
examine cultures from-within, assumes a direct relation between nations and cultures,
and assumes cultures are constant.
The next section reviews and compares the experiences of financialization in the
UK and Germany. The two subsequent sections then examine, on a necessarily broad
level, key cultural dialogues in the UK and Germany in the period post-Second World
War. This examination of cultural dialogues suggests that the dominant solidarity
in each country lost adherents as individuals transferred allegiance from one way of
life to another. In the UK the dominant hierarchical solidarity is replaced by a
dominant individualistic solidarity whereas in Germany the dominant hierarchical
solidarity is replaced by a hybrid hierarchical-enclaved-individualist solidarity.
Importantly, overlaying the analysis of cultural dialogues onto the different
financialization trajectories of the two countries reveals a strong match in respect of
both the UK and Germany.
Comparing the experience of financialization in the UK and Germany
There is an established consensus that the UK, together with the USA, has “moved
furthest in the direction of being truly ‘financialized’ ” (Engelen, 2008, p. 114) and that
financialization in the UK grew rapidly across the 1980s and 1990s with its roots being
traceable to the 1970s or possibly a little earlier (Mollan and Michie, 2012). In the
context of firms it has been asserted that when globalisation started to take hold and
foreign competitors entered the marketplace in the 1970s, UK manufacturing firms
experienced a decline in profitability (see e.g. Tweedale, 1996; Froud et al., 2000). The
threat posed by this change was especially noticeable in respect of car and consumer
electronics manufacturers. Froud et al. (2000) propose that the productionist period of
the 1980s was then superseded in the 1990s and a second period of financialization
commenced with firms in a contest to produce value for shareholders.
Erturk et al. (2008) (see also Froud et al., 2002) argue that a defining characteristic of
financialization in the UK was the “massification” (i.e. the increasing amounts) of savings
from individual households which were then channelled through a coupon pool[2].
This resulted in innovative financial products being developed; hence, this widened the
assortment of coupons being traded. As well as impacting on firms by driving the
demand for improved shareholder value, this change also impacted on family units.
The key impact on families was that they were forced to take greater personal
responsibility for their financial futures and the associated management of risk. Langley
(2008) has furthered these discussions of the impact of financialization on individuals in
the UK by considering the likes of mortgages and consumer credit. These discussions
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emphasise the underlying narratives of individual responsibility, while illustrating the
linkages between changes in individual behaviours with innovation in the financial
markets in the form of, for example, asset backed securities and credit default
swaps. Aalbers (2008) has also discussed financialization in the context of UK and US
mortgages and securitisation, with a focus upon explaining why the “financialization of
mortgage markets demand(ed) that not just homes but also homeowners become
viewed as financially exploitable” (p. 148). In the UK context Aalbers’ comments are
particularly important because of the, by European standards, relatively high levels
of home ownership.
The “massification” of savings underpinning these financialization waves also had
the outcome of significantly increasing the numbers of financial intermediaries. Retail
banks were reshaped as they began offering a plethora of products for savings and
borrowings, and finance fed on itself (Erturk et al., 2008). In turn this ensured that the
financial services industry in the UK continually grew in importance and brought into
being what Hall (2009) describes as “financialized elites” in the City of London.
Alongside this rapid increase in financialization in the UK, it has been observed that
inequalities have also grown apace (Erturk et al., 2008).
The literature examining the experience of financialization in Germany is less
well-known and depicts a very different state of affairs to the UK experience. Jürgens
et al. (2000) provide an early account of financialization from the German perspective in
which they maintain that by the end of the 1990s there had been only a limited move
towards a shareholder value orientation in Germany, and that this move only began to
occur in the mid-1990s. That there has been some movement towards financialization
since the mid-1990s is indicated by a modest rise in institutional share ownership,
concentrated on a very narrow group of German companies including Daimler-Benz,
Hoechst, MAN, and Preussag[3]. Consequently, they conclude that, even in comparison
to other Continental European countries, Germany moved only marginally towards a
shareholder value orientation. They argue that because the German stock market is
small in comparison to the size of the economy and only a small proportion of adults
own shares, there has not been the same impetus for a shareholder value orientation
compared to the UK where “value-oriented investors are major players” ( Jürgens et al.,
2000, p. 56). Additionally, they suggest that because of bank domination of the German
corporate governance system[4] and codetermination, shareholder value is not the
principal concern of the majority of companies[5].
Deeg (2009) has sought to determine whether non-financial European companies
have financialized by considering a different set of factors to Jürgens et al. (2000). Deeg
asserts that a financialized company is one which has a focus on shareholder value, a
preference for market finance and is listed on a stock exchange. His expectation is that
financialization will be observable if: there is a move away from using domestic debt
towards using international debt; there is a decrease in the percentage of loans in total
liabilities; and a culture of listing can be observed in respect of domestic firms. Deeg’s
analysis of German data for these three factors leads to a similar conclusion to that of
Jürgens et al. (2000); namely, that there are only muted signs of financialization in
Germany and starting in the mid-1990s[6].
Duenhaupt (2012) provides a comparative study of rentier income[7] in Germany
and the USA for the period 1980-2005. The trend of the results for the period
1980-1994 support the claim that financialization had not taken place in Germany in
this period as both the wage share and rentier income remain stable. Subsequently,
the wage share fell and rentier income rose for the period 1995-2005, which
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Duenhaupt interprets as indicative of a partial move towards shareholder value
orientation in the late-1990s in Germany. Duenhaupt’s study extends Epstein and
Jayadev’s (2005) examination of rentier income in fifteen OECD countries for the
period 1978-1999, and Epstein and Jayadev’s rentier income trends for Germany are
consistent with Duenhaupt’s conclusions.
Engelen et al. (2010) and Lapavitsas (2009) provide more recent perspectives on
financialization in the German context, with both examining data from the 2000s. All of
the measures of financialization employed by Engelen et al. (2010) depict Germany as
lagging significantly behind the other four countries in the study. A similar state of
affairs holds in respect of Lapavitsas’ (2009) study, with the German data significantly
below the two other sample countries (USA and Japan) in respect of both household
financial assets as a proportion of GDP and household liabilities as a proportion of
GDP. Engelen et al. comment that their results demonstrate “the limited extent to which
financialization has worked itself into the capillaries of German daily life” (2010, p. 65).
The outcomes of these two studies provide further confirmation of Jürgen et al.’s (2000)
earlier suggestion that financialization has been limited in the German context and,
overall, implies that there is consensus in the literature that signs of financialization in
Germany only became noticeable from the mid-1990s and that the impacts of
financialization were much less marked in Germany than in the UK.
Tracing cultural dialogues in the UK
Malsch et al. (2012) have observed the dominance of the hierarchical and individualistic
cultures in Western societies, and it will be argued in this section of the paper that this
can be interpreted in the economic and political history of the UK in the post-Second
World War years. Here we offer a knowingly stylised historical account which shows
the transition from the dominance of a hierarchical solidarity in the approximate period
1945-1970 as the socio-economic settlement gradually failed to meet expectations
sufficiently (Gamble, 1985). We interpret that some of this shift from the hierarchical
was down-grid, with progressive social movements indicating a shift to an enclaved
solidarity for some individuals, but ultimately with the individualist solidarity coming
to dominate.
The key domestic actions of the Labour government elected in 1945 were expanding
welfare provision, actively engaging in organising the economy and nationalising
approximately twenty per cent of the UK’s industrial base (McCormick, 2003). These
measures were a response to the severe economic difficulties the UK faced following the
war and were implemented with the aim of ending unemployment (Schenk, 1994).
The war had had some impact upon the patterns of social relations in the UK, but the
pre-war dominance of hierarchically based social structures had largely been sustained
(Marwick, 2003). The government actions listed above were hierarchically oriented
with their focus upon regulating and planning (in respect of both the economy and
firms) and in providing support for those who may fall upon difficult times (whether
because of unemployment, old age or sickness). A Conservative government was voted
into power in 1951, and again in 1955, but the fundamental basis for distributional
politics remained unchanged as successive governments remained committed to the
welfare system, government economic planning, and a commitment to full employment
all within, broadly, a Keynsian economic framework (Lloyd, 2002). Although there were
political and economic crises during this period, as Childs (2006) notes the 1950s “came
to be regarded as idyllic, the era of the affluent society […] unprecedented prosperity
and full employment […] (when) earnings had risen faster than prices” (p. 79).
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Hence, one of the fundamental pledges implicit in a hierarchical way of life was met;
that society would provide for individuals in return for institutional consent. In the
1950s this political-economic compact was broadly settled. From a neo-Durkheimian
institutional theory perspective, though cultural dialogues by definition cannot have
been absent in this period, they were nevertheless relatively subdued. While there were
those who espoused an individualistic way of life and argued that governments should
not intervene in the economy and called for nationalised firms to be returned to private
ownership they were not (yet) culturally dominant (Muller, 1996). Similarly, enclaved
voices could be heard such as in the late-1950s in, for example, the arts where writers
including John Osborne, Alan Sillitoe, Kingsley Amis and other “Angry Young Men”
were variously attacking or satirising the “establishment” and the injustices
perpetuated against those at the bottom of the hierarchy (Lloyd, 2002; Kalliney,
2001; Kroll, 1961) – but at best they can be said to have merely foregrounded the later
destabilisation of the Post-War consensus and accompanying changes to social mores
that were a hallmark of the 1960s and the 1970s.
Criticism of the dominant hierarchical way of life became more pronounced in the
UK during the 1960s and the early 1970s. Economic crises caused by balance of
payments problems in the mid-1960s (and Sterling devaluation in 1967) led to a squeeze
on pay, resulting in heightened tension between labour and management (Childs, 2006).
From a neo-Durkheimian institutional theory perspective, this can be seen as unsettling
individuals who may have been supporters of a hierarchical way of life as it constituted
a threat to the espoused values of the solidarity and this made them more susceptible to
the arguments of the other solidarities. This was not solely a susceptibility to the
arguments of the individualistic culture; there was also the potential for disenchanted
hierarchists to be persuaded to shift down-grid by enclaved groups. It has been argued
that in the USA in this period a similar process occurred connected to a collapse in trust
in the establishment, emblematically seen by widespread protests against the Vietnam
War and increased cynicism of government provoked by the Watergate scandal
(Linsley and Shrives, 2009). In the UK support for anti-establishment movements was
not as great as in the USA, but enclaved organisations and movements did exist and
included groups committed to protecting the environment, to ending gender
discrimination and opposing nuclear weapons (Marwick, 2003; Urwin, 1997).
Social changes in the 1960s reflected in the enactment of the Abortion Act, Divorce
Reform Act and Sexual Offences Act legalising consensual homosexual sex (Lloyd,
2002; Marwick, 2003) can be interpreted as the weakening of the hierarchical solidarity
and increased vibrancy in the enclaved and individualist solidarities.
By the 1970s the previously settled political-economic arrangements of the post-war
consensus were breaking down in the face of a “general sense of a worsening economy
and declining living standards […] and the break-up of the optimistic consensus”
(Marwick, 2003, p. 151). Policy frameworks which had been the basis for that earlier
period such as the Prices and Incomes Policy were abandoned (Porter, 1996). The oil
crisis of 1973 aggravated a struggling economy where the principal features were high
inflation, high unemployment and a high balance of payments deficit (Schulze and
Woodward, 1996; Lloyd, 2002). By the time of the coalminers strike and the three-day
week in 1974 the stability of the post-war years had broken down. The Labour
government of 1974-1979 was beleaguered by a stagnant economy, high inflation, and
having to request a loan from the IMF in 1976. By the time of the “Winter of
Discontent” in 1978-1979 when public sector workers including nurses, ambulance
drivers, refuse collectors and gravediggers went on strike, the legitimacy of the
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previous policy-framework had broken down (McCormick, 2003). In turn, this historical
context opened the way for what we interpret to be a fundamental shift in the outcomes
of cultural dialogues.
In the run up to the election of April 1979 the Conservative party espoused an
individualistic cosmology talking of “reducing the role of government (and) […]
enabling everyone to become better off by individual effort” (Childs, 2006, p. 417).
During the election campaign the Conservatives implicitly argued that the hierarchical
(post-war consensus) solidarity had not delivered on its promises and this was summed
up in the now-famous “Labour isn’t working” poster depicting a very long and
meandering line of unemployed people. Margaret Thatcher was voted into power in
1979 and enacted changes commensurate with an individualistic culture including:
curbing social welfare, deregulating markets, reducing taxation and government
spending. Many policies of Thatcher’s government were aggressively free-market and
pro-business and, eventually, 42 state enterprises were privatised employing c. 900,000
people (Foreman-Peck, 2004). The power of trade unions was ruptured, which included
the government refusing to concede during the bitter year-long miners’ strike in
1984-1985. Unemployment benefits decreased (Hall, 2007); the aim being to end a
“culture of dependency” that was judged to be smothering enterprise and initiative
(Heywood, 2003). The competing cultural dialogues did not stop at the voting in
of Margaret Thatcher; if anything we would argue they intensified and this can be
seen in the bitter contests for competing visions of British society. Nevertheless,
the success of the Conservative party electorally indicates the appeal of a political
credo that can be clearly interpreted as being individualistic. In turn it follows that
there was a commensurate decline in commitment to, and attractiveness of, the “old”
hierarchical solidarity (Dahrendorf, 1988). The advent of persistently high
unemployment caused by sudden de-industrialisation was a kind of social
hysteresis; an undoing of the ways of life that had sustained the post-war consensus
and its commitment to full employment.
We argue that these shifts in the political, cultural and economic landscape of the
UK can be interpreted as indicating the individualistic solidarity had become dominant
by the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, and that in broad terms this
tallies with the acceleration of financialization in the UK. According to Douglas (2004)
the individualistic solidarity “explicitly sanctions individual competition” (p. 291). It is
an entrepreneurial form of society, where the stimulus motivating individual
transactions is to gain resources and “people are expected to go forth entrepreneurially,
get new ideas, work hard, and compete for esteem and income” (Douglas, 2003, p. 1358).
The “prominent virtues are individual courage, intelligence, perseverance, and success
(whilst) (p)ower and wealth are the rewards” (Douglas, 2005, p. 28).
These individualistic endeavours can be seen as congruent with neo-liberalism, and
with self-regulation being deemed the most appropriate mechanism for managing
markets and the economy. The way the individualistic way of life underpins the
financialization process can be conceptualised through the consideration of the three
major features of the financialization literature: the rise of shareholder value, the
construction of financialized elites and the production of inequality, and the growth of
financial services.
In the context of companies, if the hierarchical solidarity is dominant then
managers should direct and control employees to ensure internal boundaries are
maintained. In turn, employees should accept these strictures as the company has a
reciprocal commitment to looking after the employees (Hendry, 1999). Managers in
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this context primarily act as stewards conserving the company’s resources and being
prudent in their management, to ensure sufficient resources are retained for the
future. The aim is for the firm to survive in the long term as this accords with the time
orientation of hierarchists. By contrast, if the individualistic solidarity dominates, the
focus of managers should be on wealth creation for the owners and, hence, priority is
given to shareholder value. For employees, this individualistic way of life is
competitive and retaining employment with the company is dependent upon
individual performance. The company’s goals are then financially based and linked
through to the overall strategy of maximisation of shareholder wealth. As
importantly, the goals are demanding and clearly defined as this enables blame to be
traced to specific individuals if targets are not met. The individualistic focus is on the
short-term in line with the observation by Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) that, in
“response to competitive pressure […] he (the individualist) has to be ready to cut his
losses, so he does not live by history and tradition. His environment does not
encourage him to plan far ahead” (p. 96).
Financialized elites and inequality also fit into the landscape of the individualistic
solidarity. The acquisition of wealth, or symbols of wealth, denotes what it is to
be a winner in that solidarity and, as there is no expectation of a safety net, wealth
affords some measure of protection should an individual fall on hard times.
Thompson (1992) explains it is inevitable that there will be those who prosper and
those who sink in this context, as there is no in-built self-balancing mechanism that
will even out the inequalities. The people who prosper will be the ones who have
sufficient talent, resilience, and possibly some good fortune or chutzpah, to
successfully navigate the networks that help in being successful. Then there will be
those who either do not possess these qualities and are pushed to the fringes because
of their lack of success, or who choose not to deploy these attributes as they are not
adherents of the individualistic way of life. Inequality is not a sign that the
individualistically based system is malfunctioning; rather, the opposite is the case as
it denotes that it is working.
In the individualistic setting it is to be anticipated that financial firms should come
to the fore and become pivotal. Individuals need financial firms to provide them with
mortgages and loans as the individualistic setting creates a particular set of preferences
in respect of styles of consumption. The goods acquired through borrowing
symbolically indicate that someone is a winner. They might financially stretch
themselves when borrowing but judge it worth the risk of over-borrowing because the
extra goods acquired may acquire additional social status and enhanced access to
useful networks; hence, there is a return for taking on the risk.
A solidarity becomes dominant as an outcome of individuals’ verdicts on what form
of life they would prefer (Heap and Ross, 1992). The individualistic way of life has
attractions and one of these is that it “implies (emphasis added) an equality of
opportunity exists for anyone” (Linsley and Shrives, 2009, p. 499). For example, in the
UK during the 1980s the Conservative government could sell the dream of home
ownership (a dream that was subsequently perpetuated by the banks and building
societies) because an individualistic society implies that anyone, regardless of
background, can own a home. Once acquired the home becomes more than just
somewhere to live. It becomes a financial asset and a symbol of individual success.
For those who were already home owners a more volatile and liquid property market
enabled them to seek to trade up to a more expensive home. Of course it is only an
appearance of equality of opportunity. For example, the mortgage advisers
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encouraging home buyers were not trying to democratise the housing market; they
were looking to gain financially from a transaction (Linsley and Linsley, 2010). The
proposition that underpins the individualistic way of life is that by dint of individual
effort an individual can achieve whatever they want.
Tracing cultural dialogues in West Germany/Germany
In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War and its attendant horrors of
Nazism the experience of German citizens was very different compared to UK citizens,
with physical survival and material reconstruction a critical priority (Eichengreen,
2007). The German population also faced the difficult task of creating a country and a
polity anew (Conradt, 2009). This difficult task was compounded by the splitting of
East and West Germany, and in the context of the Cold War.
In May 1949 the Federal Republic of Germany was formed. Post-1949 the Social
Democratic Party and ruling Christian Democratic Union party, led by Chancellor
Adenauer, worked together and converted the business community to the view that
industrial relations based on confrontation – frequent in some industries in the pre-war
Weimar Republic – should be replaced by social partnership and consensus (Conradt,
2009). The result was that the Federal Republic instituted a series of welfare measures
to create what became known as a social market economy. This resulted in a relatively
generous welfare system and German governments, both state and national,
demonstrated a willingness to intervene in the economy through regulation, the
provision of subsidies, and state investment.
Although these measures were frequently clad in the reformist language of
ordoliberalism, we can interpret this as being indicative of a hierarchical culture[8].
Therefore, we might be tempted to follow Lane and Quack’s (1999) suggestion that
hierarchy grew to become the dominant cultural dialogue in Germany. However, this
ignores that the ideas introduced in post-war Germany went further than the creation
of a supportive welfare system and government willingness to intervene in the
economy. The Basic Law (Grundgesetz) ratified in 1949 was intended to ensure that
past errors would not recur and that the new republic would be governed as a human
rights-based democracy (Green et al., 2008). This set another tone for cultural debates
by creating an initial constitutional impetus for the protection of civil liberties
(however, narrowly defined) and the promotion of the rights of minority groups[9].
Further, the social market model, developed post-war by Erhard and Müller-Armack,
stressed that the market should operate in the interests of society as a whole (Bruff,
2008) and this provided scope for enclaved groups to develop and to be heard. Given
the political dominance of industrial groups in the first two decades of the new republic,
this did not create an enclaved culture but it nevertheless facilitated support for
enclaved ideas.
The gradual influence of enclaved aspects on the socio-political structure of
the Federal Republic can be observed in respect of the social capital that
eventually developed (Urwin, 1997). Large numbers of citizen groups became
affiliated to the mainstream political parties, as did smaller, local action groups
seeking to resolve a wide range of issues. Surveys suggest that by the mid-1960s
Germans had developed a far greater propensity to engage in social protest and
interest than in many other democratic countries (Barnes and Kaase, 1979). The
extent of interest groups in Germany after the 1960s has been viewed by sociologists
as being indicative of enclaves having gained a significant foothold (see e.g. Helm,
1981). One aspect of the rise in activist-type groups was that the political activism of
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the New Left in the 1960s encouraged citizens to view protest against government as
a means of obtaining reform (Conradt, 2009)[10]. A further aspect was that there was
a generational adjustment whereby the so-called “68ers” (people too young to have
had experience of the war) were more willing to confront the country’s Nazi past,
partly because of fears of a revival of authoritarian tendencies (Green et al., 2008).
Consensus was central to the German social market model and this aided in
accommodating the voices of the enclaved-type interest groups alongside the
hierarchical solidarity.
The economic result was the German model of social-democratic capitalism and the
economic miracle of the 1950s and 1960s. The basis of the German model (which is
heavily covered in the “varieties of capitalism” debates) was a combination of strong
worker protection, labour representation on the supervisory boards (Aufsichtsrat) of
publically limited companies (Aktienggesellshaften), collective wage bargaining, and a
dynamic and substantial sector of middle-sized companies (Mittelstand) with
significant community rootedness (Hutton, 2003; Green et al., 2008; Busch, 2005). As
Busch (2005, p. 126) argues:
The characteristics of this model were a comparatively prudent fiscal policy, which (partly
due to federal structures) did not experiment with Keynesian demand management; a
stringent policy of price stability, carried out by a famously independent central bank, the
Bundesbank (which did not shrink even from major conflicts with the government of the day);
and a very low degree of labour market unrest, leading to low strike rates and thus supporting
the low inflation environment.
As can be seen in the quote above there are elements of both enclaved and
hierarchical solidarities present in the German model – capitalist businesses with
high levels of social welfare and stakeholder involvement in corporate governance.
The effect was to insulate West German workers from the more damaging effects of
the global economic problems of the 1970s. Although unemployment in West
Germany rose during the global recession of the 1970s, overall the economy remained
relatively strong (Conradt, 2009). Consequently, we can interpret that Germany was
simply not subject to the same intense cultural dialogues that addressed a collapsing
economic model as experienced by Britain in the 1970s. The pre-existing Post-War
hybrid hierarchical-enclaved solidarity held despite the emergence of influential
neoliberal critics (see e.g. Giersch, 1976)[11]. West Germany’s economy continued to
maintain, by European standards, relatively low official unemployment rates through
to the end of the 1980s despite millions in the conscript army and in apprenticeships.
In this context, one critical voice, the sociologist Dahrendorf (1988), was still able to
conclude that in Germany “the corporatist culture [has] remained largely intact;
whereas in Britain, Mrs Thatcher has, in her nine years as Prime Minister, probably
affected a deeper change in social values than any other politician in the post-war
period” (p. 194).
In the 1990s, however, this settled situation was to change. The unification of
West and East Germany caused significant economic hardship, as the moribund
economy of the East had to be integrated into the much more dynamic Western
economy. This led to a waning of economic success which began to erode the
dominance of the German model and impacted on cultural dialogues. For example, the
enactment of the second and third laws on the promotion of financial markets (Zweites
Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz and Drittes Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz) in 1995 and
1998, brought about some liberalisation of German financial markets albeit only in
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limited form (Vitols, 2003). More significantly, in 2003 Chancellor Schröder began
enacting a number of laws (Agenda, 2010) to stimulate the economy. Agenda 2010
included some individualistic responses to Germany’s problems as these laws cut
taxation, and reduced spending on social welfare, including on pensions and
unemployment benefit (Conradt, 2009).
From a neo-Durkheimian institutional theory perspective we can interpret that by
the 1990s Germany had developed a hybrid hierarchical-enclaved-individualist
solidarity. There are two reasons why the previous hierarchical-enclaved hybrid
appears to have been modified rather than being usurped. First, the enclaved element
of this hybrid moderated the cultural dialogues. Second, there remained a continued
desire to maintain a political-economy that insured against authoritarianism taking
hold (Freedland, 2012). This fear of authoritarianism has been stated in a commitment
to a form of latent political consensualism, which Schmidt (1987) described as a
“middle way”. The “middle way” hypothesis originally stipulated that Germany’s
multi-veto point polity prevented extreme policy changes leading the country to
maintain a position between “extremes of Scandinavian welfare capitalism and
Anglo-American market capitalism” (Schmidt, 2001, p. 1). According to
Schmidt (2001) this preference for consensual politics was largely maintained
post-reunification even though the underlying policy approach had become more
costly in budget terms. Consequently, it appears that some of the commitment to the
prior hierarchical-enclaved solidarity switched to the individualist solidarity with
both some diagonal movement from hierarchy to individualism and horizontal
movement from enclave to individualism occurring; the outcome being a hybrid
hierarchical-enclaved-individualist solidarity.
Overall, it can be argued that the cultural dialogues in the UK match with the
timing and experience of the UK in respect of financialization, and this is also the case
in the German context. Namely, the implanting of the individualistic culture into the
hybrid hierarchical-enclaved way of life in Germany in the mid- to late-1990s
corresponds with the introduction of financialization in Germany. Further,
financialization in Germany was only partial and this also fits with the presence of
the German hybrid hierarchical-enclaved-individualist culture. The fusion of the
three cultures in Germany implies the hierarchists, enclaves and individualists would
all have the opportunity to give voice to their beliefs and opinions, and it is apparent
this is the case if we return to the study of Jürgens et al. (2000). Jürgens et al. (2000)
state that in the media debates concerning shareholder value in Germany during the
1990s a limited number of positions can be identified: those who consider a
shareholder value orientation as potentially harmful because of an implied short-
termism; those who are critical of a shareholder value orientation because of its
associations with unemployment and being to the detriment of social relationships
within firms; those who perceive a shareholder orientation as having a potentially
beneficial effect upon how companies are managed; and those who are resigned to it
becoming increasingly the norm for German companies to adopt a shareholder value
orientation. The first response corresponds to the voice of the hierarchists whose time
orientation is towards the long term. The second is the enclaved voice criticising
shareholder value orientation for the production of inequities both in creating
unemployment and in producing relationship conflicts. The third voice is that of
the pro-shareholder value individualist and, finally, there is the (often silent) voice of
the isolate who feels powerless in the face of any change. Given the hybrid
hierarchical-enclaved-individualist nature of the German culture it is understandable
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that Jürgens et al. (2000, p. 55) contend that shareholder value is an “ambiguous
development” in the German context.
In recent times, however, there is evidence that financialization in Germany is
advancing, albeit in specific ways that reflect the unique cultural dialogues and
indicate that cultural dialogues are always ongoing. The impact of unification led to
questioning the appropriateness of the German model for the present era and it has
been increasingly possible for large corporations to argue that the labour-settlement
at the core of the model is out-dated in a globalised economy (Busch, 2005; Green et al.,
2008). Haves et al. (2014) argue that since the 1990s German banks have withdrawn
from their traditional role as providers of long-term finance, and have adopted
more American investment bank style practices; that there has been a rise in
institutional and foreign shareholding in large companies; and that there has been an
increase in the role of Hedge Funds and Private Equity. All of these three things are
seen to have weakened the pre-existing corporate governance arrangements,
including labour protection, and are associated with increased financialization.
Similarly, Trampusch (2015) discusses the financialization of German public debt
management, concluding that:
(T)he far reaching consequences of the financialization of public debt management [is vital] to
one of the core domains of modern capitalist democracies, namely public budget and finance
policy. Among these consequences the most important are the disempowering of old
organisations involved in issuing government bonds and debt management, the probable
implications for parliamentary control over budget policies due to obscure deals on interest-
rate and currency-rate swaps, the empowering of the financial market, governments’ double
role as regulators of banks and being one of their main clients (Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?)
and probable conflicts of interest between monetary policy, fiscal governance and debt
management (Trampusch, 2015, p. 132).
Germany’s role in the unfolding Eurozone debt crisis (Hall, 2012), in particular with
regard to Greece, is further evidence that the cultural dialogue emerging in Germany is
increasingly centred around perceptions of the need to protect German financial
interests, even at the expense of notions of European solidarity.
Conclusion
We have proposed in this paper that neo-Durkheimian institutional theory might be a
valuable theoretical framework to adopt in cross-cultural accounting research. It
overcomes problems associated with Hofstede’s approach as it does not connect
nations and cultures, and does not make “heroic assumptions of ethnic homogeneity in
historical or political arrangements of societies” (Baskerville, 2005, p. 391). In its initial
inception the theory presented a static model; however, subsequent developments and
the integration of the idea of cultural dialogues have ensured that the theory is capable
of explaining cultural change. The emphasis upon groups or communities comprising
all four solidarities provides insights into group dynamics that are not evident in
Hofstede’s work. Cultural dialogues reveal the dependencies between the four
solidarities as well as the differences. Each solidarity only remains viable because of
the existence of the other solidarities and the constant debates they are engaged in
present an opportunity for the members of each solidarity to affirm their worldview
and to look to win new recruits.
As it is such an expansive (or “grand”) theory then there are parts of it that
inevitably remain under debate and need to be developed. The isolate solidarity has
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often been ignored and it is only recently that its significance is being investigated.
A more detailed understanding of the functioning of hybrids is required as there is
less discussion of these in the literature than there might be. Additionally, the
mechanisms of change are being explored from a range of different perspectives to
more fully understand how they operate. Extant empirical research has provided
strong support for the theory (as discussed by 6, 2011), whilst there remains a need
for more empirical work to be undertaken to augment the extant literature (6, 2014b).
Researchers using neo-Durkheimian institutional theory have found it to be useful in
a wide range of settings (see e.g. the research assembled in 6 and Mars, 2008). In her
own writings Douglas displays this inter-disciplinarity in applying her ideas, for
example, to aspects of economics, sociology, and philosophy. As a consequence her
work ranges from examining the language of emotions (Douglas, 1995) to deviance
and danger (Lianos and Douglas, 2000) to condemnations of poverty (Douglas, 2004).
A strength of neo-Durkheimian institutional theory is its universality, in that its use
does not have to be restricted to studies of accounting practices in ethnic groups or
Indigenous communities. It can be applied to all types of groups and communities,
and can lend understanding to within-country and cross-country analyses. A caveat
is, however, that the grid-group framework needs to be used with reference to the
underlying theory.
The comparative study of experiences of financialization in Germany and the
UK has been presented to demonstrate the utility of the theory in a relatively
demanding context; namely, showing how the framework is able to integrate
the differing modalities, while retaining an appreciation for the unique variations,
of financialization that are seen at different moments in history and in different
societies. Within the confines of the space of this paper we have not been able to
undertake as detailed a historical analysis of Germany and the UK as we might
wish. Sociologically inclined historians (producing “sociological history” as
opposed to “historical sociology” to paraphrase Fischer, 1995) might look to
examine in greater detail the cultural, intellectual, political and economic history of
the two countries in order to achieve a more complete and historically acute
account of the comparative histories. This caveat made, our stylised historical
interpretation does support the contention that in the UK individualistic
attitudes towards the organisation of economy and society can be seen to be
dominant from the 1980s onwards, and this is the critical period when the
intensification of the financialization process can be certainly, clearly and
consistently seen. In the Douglasian formulation, the cultural dialogues resulted
in the gradual erosion of hierarchical mode of social structure, and a contest
thereafter between individualistic and enclaved modes of social and economic
organisation. This contest was primarily “won” by a coalition of individualistic
social groups and, in turn, this affected the form of financialization that is seen in the
UK. In the case of Germany, financialization only began to gain traction from the
mid-1990s and in a much more muted form, and the interpretation provided
indicates this corresponds to a period when an individualistic outlook began to win
some of the policy arguments and so was more prominent in the dialogue. However,
in Germany the influence of the individualistic oriented social groups was restrained
by being embedded within a long-standing hybrid hierarchical-enclaved culture.
Clearly, this interpretation is open to re-interpretation and counter-interpretation,
but it nevertheless serves to illustrate how a Douglasian-based analysis can be
undertaken in the field of accounting and finance.
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Notes
1. Much of the development of the theory as a dynamic theory is attributable to Michael
Thompson. For a more extensive discussion of the dynamics of change (see e.g. Thompson
et al., 1990).
2. For a full discussion of coupon pool capitalism see: Froud et al. (2001). In this paper it is
explained that the coupon pool is “not ( just) the secondary market in issued ordinary shares
[…] it includes all coupon investment opportunities, including bonds, venture capital and
securitised paper” (p. 276). Further, coupon pool capitalism is “where the pool of new and
issued coupons becomes a regulator of firm and household behaviour” (p. 275).
3. Kädtler and Sperling (2008) also identify Daimler-Benz as moving to a shareholder value
orientation. They note that for other German owned car assemblers there are significant
barriers to shareholder value orientation.
4. That is, banks are an important aspect of corporate governance in respect of the provision
of company finance and, in turn, the banks control voting rights via networks of
cross-shareholdings and have strong representation on supervisory boards. Jürgens et al.
(2000) note some loosening of these networks of cross-shareholdings occurring after the
mid-1990s, albeit in a restrained manner.
5. In line with Jürgens et al. (2000), Emmons and Schmid (1998) suggest that German universal
banks and codetermination regulations have historically acted as quasi-state institutional
means of coordinating individual activities and of achieving social consensus. They argue
that this, together with shareholder concentration, reduces the role of the stock market as a
coordination and control mechanism.
6. An earlier paper by Deeg (2005, p. 175) similarly suggests that “the German system
embodies an overall logic of voice with long-term cooperation founded on expectations of
reciprocity” which reform efforts during the 1990s sought to maintain, rather than replace.
Deeg suggests that given the adherence to this logic, a shareholder-orientated subregime
has emerged where the logic of voice has been partially replaced by the logic of exit; without
the workings of the main regime being fundamentally altered.
7. Rentier income can be defined in different ways. Broadly, it is income that derives from
owning capital or investments. An example of a more clearly specified definition is Epstein
and Jayadev’s (2005, p. 50) classification of rentier income as: “profits earned by firms
engaged primarily in financial activities plus interest income realised by all non-financial
non-government resident units”.
8. Ordoliberalism is associated with the Freiburg School of German economists who argued
that state intervention was necessary to ensure that free markets achieved their full
potential (see Ptak, 2004). Ordoliberalism became associated with the idea of a social market
economy in later years of Adenauer’s chancellorship (1949-1963).
9. These traits became more pronounced under the chancellorship of the Social Democrat Willi
Brandt (1969-1974) who de-emphasised Cold War agendas in favour of a democratisation of
German society (see e.g. Kommers and Miller, 2012).
10. For example, in 1983 citizen groups successfully protested against a planned
government census on the grounds it was invading private lives and, hence, infringed
civil liberties.
11. This is not to say that a pronounced neoliberal faction was absent from German politics.
However, the principal neoliberal party, the Free or Liberal Democrats (Freie Demokratische
Partei or FDP) historically only received between 5.8 and 14.6 per cent of the popular vote in
Federal elections from 1949 to 2009 (available at: www.wahlrecht.de/ergebnisse/bundestag.
htm accessed March 2013).
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CONSULTATION IN THE POLICY PROCESS:
DOUGLASIAN CULTURAL THEORY AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ACCOUNTING REGULATION
IN THE FACE OF CRISIS
PHILIP LINSLEY, ROBERT MCMURRAY AND PHILIP SHRIVES
This article employs Douglasian cultural theory to explain how policy consultations intended
to secure meaningful reform can, in fact, work to reinforce the status quo. The context for this
is an examination of responses to three consultations established by the Financial Reporting
Council (FRC), the body responsible for regulating accounting and auditing in the UK. The results
reveal a lack of diversity of voices in the responses to three consultations, with the enclave and
isolate voices being signicantly under-represented despite the policy issues under debate being
related to the nancial crisis. Further, the initial pre-consultation proposals are largely unchanged
post-consultation. We suggest that the regulator has not been captured; but instead is subject to
what may be described as self-capture. Self-capture describes the instinctive reaction of a solidarity
to act to uphold its pattern of social relations which results in the regulator’s worldview inevitably
(and unwittingly) being perpetuated.
INTRODUCTION
As the British regulatory state has grown over the last three decades, so too has con-
cern that the promise of independent oversight is giving way to politicization and vested
interest (Lodge 2014). Moreover, consultations intended to secure meaningful reform in
regulatory functions across policy areas as diverse as welfare provision, infrastructure
development, and nancial services (James 2000; Oliver 2010; Lodge 2014) have failed to
bring about dramatic changes in oversight policy or practice. Employing Douglasian cul-
tural theory (DCT), we consider how the very consultation processes designed to facilitate
change have in fact worked to reinforce existing modes of thought and practice so as to
buttress the status quo.
The context for this exploration is the greatest regulatory failure of recent times; the
2007–08 nancial crisis which resulted in the UK government taking emergency measures
to ensure that the banking system did not fail and, ultimately, acquiring shareholdings in
major UK banks such as Lloyds Banking Group. The crisis shone a light on weaknesses in
regulation (FRC PN 243 2008), and a fundamental review of the regulation of the nancial
services sector ensued. However, the body charged with securing change in respect of
the regulation of accounting, auditing and governance – the Financial Reporting Council
(FRC) – concluded in the aftermath of the crisis that ‘(we) currently believe that the recent
difculties in the nancial sector do not require a generalised tightening of governance
standards across the UK corporate sector’ (FRC PN 243 2008).
The FRC fulls its primary role of regulating accounting and auditing in the UK through
two committees. The Conduct Committee is focused on disciplinary and supervisorymat-
ters in respect of the accounting and auditing professions, while the remit of the Codes and
Standards Committee is to set accounting, auditing and governance codes and standards.
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The FRC undertakes a public consultation process when a code or standard needs amend-
ing or originating and all consultation responses are made available on the FRC website.
Following consultation, proposals are rened and the nal version of a standard or code
published.
This article explains how the FRC consultation processes worked against the very possi-
bility of substantial policy reform and regulatory change. With the aid of DCT we explore
how different solidarities function as ‘a consistent pattern of constraints upon reasoning
towards decision-making’ (6 2014a, p. 90) so as to circumscribe the room for change such
that, ultimately, people are led to make decisions that reinforce the dominant institutions
of which they are part. Such reinforcement has the secondary effect of making it difcult
for people to attend to the arguments of other solidarities. Specically, we demonstrate
how a dominant individualistic worldview was maintained (at the expense of more hier-
archist, enclave or isolate worldviews) such that the consultation processes emerge as a
mechanism for the maintenance of prevailing policies rather than the starting point for
their substantive re-negotiation.
The article is structured as follows. The rst section justies the selection of three key
post-crisis consultative activities of the FRC. The second discusses important aspects of
DCT and the third explains the method employed in analysing the three consultations.
The results are then reported in terms of the competing cultural dialogues identiable
in the differing policy proposals submitted by the consultation contributors in respect
of individualist, hierarchist and enclave solidarities. We argue that the responses of the
individualistic solidarity identied within the FRC, albeit moderated by a subordinate
hierarchical worldview, took precedence over the views of the other solidarities. In con-
cluding, we note that while DCT cannot prevent regulatory or policy failure, in attending
to the underlying logics of shifting worldviews it can provide useful pointers to policy
blind spots arising out of particular cultural biases.
FRC CONSULTATION SELECTION
The government department responsible for economic growth in the UK is the Depart-
ment for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). ‘Corporate accountability’ is a key BIS
policy established to address a perceived loss of public condence in how companies are
run. The FRC chairman is appointed by the Secretary of State for BIS and in 2013–14 the
FRC had an operating budget of c. £26m (FRC Annual Report 2013–14). Therefore, the
FRC was selected for this study as it is a signicant regulator in an important government
department and is concerned with matters with a high public prole post-the nancial
crisis.
A proportion of FRC consultations concern technical amendments to accounting stan-
dards or audit practice notes. Consequently, in selecting the consultations to examine for
this study it was considered that less-specialized consultationswere likely to bemore char-
acteristic of public consultation processes, being of broader public concern. Three different
consultations were selected from each of the years 2009, 2010, and 2011. The cases are all
post-nancial crisis when calls were being made for regulatory reform in the accounting,
auditing and governance eld.
The rst case, theCuttingClutter (CC) project, concerned the FRC’s complexity of corpo-
rate reporting project. In June 2009 the FRC issued a discussion paper, ‘Louder thanWords’
(FRC discussion paper 2009) suggesting that it was time to reconsider the fundamen-
tal purpose of accounting. The project had a primary concern with reducing complexity
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in corporate reports and it was argued that ‘key messages (were) lost in the clutter of
lengthy disclosures’ (FRC discussion paper 2009, p. 2). The second case, the FRC Audi-
tor Scepticism (AS) project (‘Auditor Scepticism: Raising the Bar’, FRC discussion paper
2010a), concerns audit effectiveness. In the aftermath of the banking crisis, questions were
raised as to whether, ex post, audit rms demonstrated a sufcient degree of scepticism
in questioning management’s assumptions in constructing the nancial statements (Sikka
2009). The third case examined company stewardship and the 2011a FRC discussion paper
‘Effective Company Stewardship: Enhancing Corporate Reporting and Auditing’ (ECS).
This paper made recommendations regarding the role and responsibilities of ‘directors as
stewards of investors’ interests’ and particularly having regard to deciencies revealed by
the nancial crisis. Thus, for example, the paper discusses the importance of companies
reporting on their risk management activities.
DOUGLASIAN CULTURAL THEORY
Mary Douglas, and with other signicant contributors (for example, Professor Michael
Thompson), developed the ideas associatedwithDCTover a long period (see, for example,
Douglas 1970, 1982, 1994, 2003; Douglas et al. 1999). Central to DCT is the belief that we are
social beings and our idea of ‘self’ is fashioned by reference to others. Consequently, social
relations are of paramount importance and the foundation of the theory is that distinct
arrangements of social relations exist; specically, the diversity of arrangements is limited
to four basic (or elementary) forms (6 2014b).
The four basic forms of social relations can be understood by reference to the dimensions
of grid and group. The two dimensions relate to the degree to which members of a group
are bound to one another (the group dimension) and the extent to which interactions and
relationships are regulated (the grid dimension). In their ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ states these
two dimensions co-join to create the grid-group matrix of four solidarities. Each of the
four solidarities is associated with a particular pattern of social relations which, in turn,
determines the worldview of the solidarity.
In the individualistic solidarity (weak grid–weak group) individuals can elect to coop-
erate with whomever they choose and will place their own interests above those of the
group. The resulting type of society is competitive and there is an expectation that indi-
viduals will ‘go forth entrepreneurially, get new ideas, (and) work hard’ (Douglas 2003,
p. 1358).
The hierarchical solidarity (strong grid–strong group) has two types of boundary. There
is a strong commitment to the group, the external boundary, and this distinguishes who
does and does not belong to the group. Internal boundaries are a feature of a high degree of
social regulation. Thus, roles and statuses are plainly marked out. There is an expectation
that authority will be acceded to and rules abided by, and systems will operate to manage
group members who threaten to breach boundaries.
The enclaved solidarity (weak grid–strong group) has minimal internal boundaries
and social regulation is low. However, there is a strong external group boundary and
as this is the only boundary it has great signicance. If this boundary is endangered by,
for example, a member displaying disloyalty to the group this person will be dealt with
harshly. Enclaved groups are inclined to reinforce the external boundary by dening
themselves against the ‘outside world’ and believing that they ‘hold the moral high
ground’ (Douglas 2013a, p. 31). For this reason ideas related to fairness, integrity and the
like are of importance.
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The isolate solidarity (strong grid–weak group) has a strong set of internal boundaries
and this denotes little margin for self-selecting social roles, which is conning. The weak
group feature implies a limited sense of being integrated into any group. This results in a
feeling that life is intrinsically inequitable and events difcult to control.
By assigning ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ forms to the two dimensions, Douglas recognizes this
is ‘reducing social variation to a few grand types’ (Douglas 1982, pp. 1–2). However, these
four basic forms are the ‘recurrent regularities that the grid-group typology captures’ (Ellis
and Thompson 1997, p. 4). Therefore, this classication provides a structure for the mean-
ingful analysis of actions and behaviours associated with the four solidarities.
Importantly, DCT is a dynamic theory. It is expected that all four solidarities will coex-
ist in any community albeit to varying degrees. Cultural dialogues will occur as the four
solidarities voice their thoughts about the most appropriate way to live life and the ‘com-
munity … engage(s) in a continuous internal dialogue’ (Douglas 2013b, p. 290). For the
most part, each solidarity will be looking to win over new converts and to rebut the argu-
ments of the other solidarities. These interactions between the four solidarities serve to
bolster the worldviews of the members of each by reminding them of what is important
for that solidarity based on its pattern of social relations. Further, any given solidarity may
decide to collaborate with another for a period if this helps it achieve its objectives.
Douglas does not regard patterns of social relations as an imposition on individuals.
We are active agents with freedom to choose within the prevailing conditions of social
regulation and integration. Hence, individuals are at liberty to commit to a differentway of
life and if a particular solidarity does not full an individual’s expectations, this disruption
of expectations ‘may dislodg(e) people from their ways of organising’ (Thompson 2008,
p. 81). Hence, change is always possible as people move between or through solidarities.
This dynamism implies that the solidarity that has dominance at a point in time in any
given community will have achieved that position by virtue of the product of the cultural
dialogues occurring at that time. Further, it implies that the dominant solidarity in any
community may be replaced over time as supporters move across the four solidarities.
DCT-based propositions
A set of hypotheses, or propositions, need to be developed to examine consultation as a
part of the policy process. The rst proposition is based on the premise that DCT expects
that all four solidarities will coexist in any community and will want to voice their respec-
tive views on the most appropriate way to live. Placing this in the context of our exami-
nation of the FRC policy consultation process we would, therefore, expect that there will
be responses to all three consultations exhibiting worldviews corresponding with the four
solidarities.
This same hypothesis has been examined by Lodge et al. (2010) and Lodge andWegrich
(2011) in DCT-based articles exploring food safety regulation and nancial regulation
post-the nancial crisis, respectively. These two articles identify the different arguments of
the solidarities by examining discourses in newspaper articles. We extend this prior work
by looking directly at consultation responses. Consulting stakeholders when making
policy or regulation is judged to be important because, in principle, it enables all voices to
participate. Therefore, examining consultation responses enables us to establish whether
all four solidarities are voicing their views in the FRC consultation process.
While the expectation is that the worldviews of all solidarities will be present in the
responses to the three consultations, they may not be present to the same extent. In their
examination of nancial regulation post-the global nancial crisis, Lodge and Wegrich
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(2011) nd the hierarchical worldview more prevalent. Pre-crisis individualistically ori-
ented free market ideas were dominant and their nding suggests that hierarchists, who
have a preference for greater regulation, are arguing for increased supervision. It can be
argued that this should also hold true in this study, as FRC regulation is in the domain
of corporate accountability and this has a commonality with nancial regulation, and the
FRC consultations are all post-crisis.
Further, it can be argued that the isolate solidarity, while not always passive, is less
likely to contribute to consultations as there will always be a proportion of isolate actors
who consider it fruitless trying to have their voice heard. Therefore, the rst proposition
(P1) comprises three parts as follows:
P1: (a) The worldviews of all four solidarities should be expected to be present in the responses to the three
consultations.
(b) The worldview of the hierarchical solidarity will be present to a greater extent than the worldviews of the
other solidarities.
(c) The worldview of the isolate solidarity will be present to a lesser extent than the worldviews of the other
solidarities.
All FRC policy consultations are within the domain of corporate accountability and this
implies that, while each FRC consultationwill relate to a specic topic in this domain, there
will be some broad commonalities across all the consultations. Because, in DCT, each sol-
idarity has a distinct worldview associated with its particular pattern of social relations
(see, for example, Douglas 2003), an argument can be made that we should, therefore,
expect that common themes will be identiable in respect of the arguments presented by
each solidarity in their responses across all three consultations. This proposition also per-
mits us to build on the prior work of Lodge et al. (2010) where, in their examination of
food safety regulation, patterns of argumentation commensurate with worldviews were
observable that ‘could not have been predicted by interest group-based analysis (that
would predict “capture” by the regulated industry)’ (p. 263). That is, if themes of argu-
ments in the responses to the three FRC consultations are commensurate with worldviews
of the solidarities, this provides some support that DCT can contribute to our understand-
ing of regulatory change and provide a different perspective to the regulatory capture by
interest group view of regulation. Therefore, the second proposition (P2) is:
P2: The themes of the arguments presented by each of the four solidarities within their responses will have
features in common across the three consultations.
In respect of nancial regulation, recent research has argued that the ‘traditional’ narra-
tive of regulatory capture by interest groupmay not adequately explain the policy-making
process in this domain (Kwak 2014). For example, Young’s (2012) research documents how
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was not ‘systematically vulnerable to inu-
ence by transnationally organized special interests’ (p. 681) and he concludes by calling
for new ways of understanding the policy-making process.
DCT can provide a less orthodox understanding that is different from this traditional
narrative of regulatory capture, as it would suggest that the regulator will listen only
to voices allied to their own solidarity. This may be unintentional, but arises as each
solidarity is looking to perpetuate its own worldview and defend its pattern of social
relations. Hence, each solidarity lacks awareness that it is deaf to the voices of other
solidarities (Douglas 1994). Therefore, DCT would predict that the regulator will enact
their own preferred solution(s) in accord with their worldview, and this forms the third
proposition.
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To examine this requires identifyingwhether the FRCholds aworldview commensurate
with a particular solidarity, and then comparing this to the worldview associated with the
eventual regulatory solutions enacted by the FRC. If the proposition is conrmed, this
would suggest that there has not been regulatory capture of the FRC; rather, there is a
form of ‘self-capture’. This would be a potentially important nding as it would challenge
both the regulatory capture narrative and the view that policy consultation is goodpractice
as it inevitably results in regulators hearing the voices of others and incorporating their
different ideas into re-drafted policy or regulation.
Therefore, the third proposition (P3) is:
P3: The worldview of the regulator will inuence the outcome of the three consultations.
Hybridity has been observed in respect of the solidarities in DCT where two or more
solidarities unite. This requires an actor to be willing to compromise their worldview by
offering some concessions to another solidarity.However, as Lodge et al. (2010) have noted,
this tactic can assist actors in having at least some part of their preferred solution enacted.
These collaborations with actors who support an alternative worldview are not perma-
nent, and typically they are two-way as there are difculties in creating hybrids that go
beyond this. Strategic hybrid collaborations may be perceived as useful devices for actors
in respect of consultation responses as theymay thenhave at least someof their preferences
incorporated into the subsequent regulation. Therefore, the fourth proposition (P4) is:
P4: There will be respondents who exhibit hybridity in their worldviews as a means for having at least some
part of their preferred solution enacted.
METHOD
Data coding
Across all three projects there were a total of 136 responses submitted. Each paragraph
of the responses was coded to Douglas’s typology consistent with the four solidarities.
Coding paragraphs was deemed more appropriate than coding sentences, as sentences
often constitute only part of an argument. Content analysis is unavoidably subjective, and
to improve coding reliability the paragraphs in an initial sample of 10 letters were coded
to solidarities independently by two of the authors and compared. Minor disagreements
are inevitable in coding and these necessitated detailed discussions in respect of the allo-
cated codes followed by re-coding. Coding decision rules were created. A paragraph that
had more than one possible solidarity classication was classied into the solidarity most
emphasized within the paragraph. A further 40 response letters were coded by the same
two researchers and compared. The remaining response letters were then coded by one
of the authors based on the decision rules. Inter-coder reliability, as measured by Cron-
bach’s alpha, was sufciently high at 81 per cent. For each response letter the number of
paragraphs per solidarity was totalled to identify the dominant solidarity and subordinate
solidarity, where applicable. The identication of the subordinate solidarity indicates that
there is some hybridity.
In DCT each solidarity holds a distinct set of beliefs and valueswhich they adhere to as a
means of ensuring that their particular pattern of social relations is preserved; for example,
hierarchists value rules as this protects the strong boundaries. To code each paragraph
a broad, indicative set of characteristics associated with each of the four solidarities was
determined, based on the key beliefs and values of each solidarity (table 1). After coding
of the paragraphs, key themes the supporters of the different solidarities had proposed in
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TABLE 1 Indicative characteristics of the solidarities
Individualist Indicated by concepts related to: individual freedom, entrepreneurial activity, personal gain or
success, group activity relevant if there exists opportunity for trade or exchange, negotiation,
failure treated as personal responsibility.
Hierarchist Indicated by concepts related to: tradition, authority, policing access, respect for rules, concerns
over boundaries, loyalty.
Enclave Indicated by concepts related to: idealism, justice, fairness, acting ethically, consideration of
wider constituencies.
Isolate Indicated by concepts related to: isolation, getting by, world is arbitrary and capricious,
resignation to fate.
Source: Adapted from Linsley and Shrives (2014).
TABLE 2 Summary of dominant and subordinate solidarities
Dominant and subordinate solidarity FRC consultation (number and
percentage of responses)
Overall
CC AS ECS
Hierarchy dominant and no subordinate solidaritya 4 (12.9%) 6 (23.1%) 22 (27.8%) 32 (23.5%)
Hierarchy dominant and individualist subordinate (hybrid)a 6 (19.4%) 4 (15.4%) 8 (10.1%) 18 (13.2%)
Hierarchy dominant and enclave subordinate (hybrid)a 2 (6.5%) 1 (3.8%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (2.2%)
Individualist dominant and no subordinate solidarityb 7 (22.6%) 7 (26.9%) 30 (38.0%) 44 (32.4%)
Individualist dominant and hierarchy subordinate (hybrid)b 10 (32.3%) 6 (23.1%) 16 (20.3%) 32 (23.5%)
Enclave dominant and no subordinate solidarity 2 (6.5%) 1 (3.8%) 3 (3.8%) 6 (4.4%)
Isolate dominant and no subordinate solidarity 0 (0.0%) 1 (3.8%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.7%)
Total responsesc 31 26 79 136
aTotal responses hierarchy solidarity dominant – 53 responses (39.0% of total).
bTotal responses individualist solidarity dominant – 76 responses (55.9% of total).
cColumns may not add to exactly 100% due to rounding.
each consultation were then identied. As the indicative characteristics were very broadly
dened, this ensured that we did not pre-empt what themes might subsequently be
identied for the responses.
CONSULTATION RESPONSES AND THE THREE FRC PROJECTS
Dominant and subordinate solidarities identied in the responses
The outcome of the coding of the responses is summarized in table 2. The coding iden-
tied 53 responses having a dominant hierarchical worldview, 76 responses a dominant
individualistic worldview, six responses a dominant enclave worldview and one response
a dominant isolate worldview.
The lack of responses from the enclaved and isolate solidarities implies that the consulta-
tion dialogue is partial andhas a strong bias towards the policy solutions of the hierarchical
and individualistic solidarities. While we would not necessarily expect an equal weight-
ing of responses across the four solidarities, we might have expected the proportion of
enclave and isolate responses to have been higher as the consultations concern governance
and accountability reforms following the nancial crisis; potentially a topic of wide inter-
est. However, policy consultations are (ostensibly) undertaken to encourage a plurality of
voices to be heard and as these two solidarities appear under-represented we reject part
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TABLE 3 Summary of hierarchically oriented themes
Theme FRC consultation
CC AS ECS
Defending the expertise of, and placing trust in, professionals Yes Yes Yes
Defending regulation Yes No Yes
Preference for knowledge to be ‘complete and organized’ Yes No Yes
Common goals important Yes No No
(a) of proposition P1. Nor do the results conrm part (b) of proposition P1. The results do
conrm part (c) of proposition P1.
The notion of hegemonic discourses may explain why there were only six enclaved
respondents. Jones and Song (2014, p. 466) suggest that for some issues there may be a
‘dominating discourse’ which will attract the attention of some solidarities and discour-
age other solidarities from entering into the debate (see also Song et al. 2014). In respect
of regulating business, the ‘dominant discourse’ in recent years has centred on arguments
for reducing the quantity of regulation, rather than on the content of the regulation; for
example, this is evident in respect of the Red Tape Challenge initiated by the UK govern-
ment in 2011 and in a similar Action Programme for Reducing Administrative Burdens
instigated by the European Commission in 2007.
Framing business regulation consultations in this way is likely to draw hierarchists
and individualists into the debate as they are, respectively, strongly for and strongly
against greater regulation. However, enclaved respondents may judge that this is not the
debate they want to have, being more concerned about the intent of the regulation and,
particularly, whether it improves matters. That is, enclaved groups will be looking to
engage in business regulation-related debates that are framed in terms of discourses of
(in)equity, (in)justice and the like. For example, on issues relating to the global nancial
crisis, enclaved groups might be more keen to debate issues such as curbing excessive
bonuses for bankers or the impact of austerity measures on individual households.
That there was only one response identied as tting with the isolate solidarity might
be because isolates are inclined to believe that responding is likely to be fruitless as no one
will listen to their comments. The sentiment that their voicewill not be heard is apparent in
the single isolate reply, with the respondent asking that the FRC reconsider the proposals
while at the same time anticipating that their suggested ideas will be rebuffed. A further
possibility is that there may be barriers deterring some from responding, such as a lack of
technical knowledge in respect of this domain.
The themes of arguments presented by each of the four solidarities
Common themes have been identiable for each of the hierarchical, individualistic and
enclaved responses in respect of the three projects, and tables 3, 4, and 5 indicate that
there is a sufcient degree of commonality to support the second proposition.
The four principal hierarchically oriented themes relate to the signicance of profes-
sional expertise and trust, defending regulation, a preference for knowledge to be ‘com-
plete’, and the importance of common goals (see table 3).
The theme present in responses to all three projects relates to professional expertise
and, connectedly, to trust in professionals. Hierarchical institutions advocate differenti-
ated statuses, and respect for expertise upholds a hierarchical pattern of social relations.
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TABLE 4 Summary of individualistically oriented themes
Theme FRC consultation
CC AS ECS
Regulation a burden and a cost Yes Yes Yes
The need for investor-relevant information Yes Yes Yes
Principles preferred to rules Yes Yes Yes
Practice preferred to theory Yes Yes Yes
TABLE 5 Summary of enclave-oriented themes
Theme FRC consultation
CC AS ECS
Recognizing that actions have wider societal impacts Yes Yes Yes
Transparency prime Yes Yes Yes
Resilience important Yes Yes Yes
The unreliability of IFRS No No Yes
In the context of this paper, with the FRC as the regulator responsible for oversight of
professional accountancy bodies, such discussions specically seek to defend the exper-
tise of accountants. The issue of trust, and particularly in respect of trusting professional
judgement, is linked to this defence of professional expertise. It is expected that profes-
sionals will have the trust of the public, but also have in place appropriate mechanisms to
ensure that this trust is warranted (Hughes 1984). In the case of professional accountants,
mechanisms associated with their acting with integrity are ‘maintained through mem-
bership criteria of the professional institutes, professional exams, continuous professional
development and where necessary disciplinary measures’ (Grant Thornton, AS response,
p. 2). The notion that disciplinary measures will operate to maintain trust in professional
accountants is important in a hierarchical context where it is expected that there will be
procedures to deal with those who transgress boundaries. Hence, the ICAEW explain that
accountants can be trusted as there are ‘various pieces of legislation … [which] provide
for regulatory action and even disciplinary action’ (ICAEW, ECS response, p. 5).
The theme concerning defence of regulation relates to the hierarchical worldview of
rules being ameans for both setting out how things should be done and for re-establishing
order when a boundary is violated. However, hierarchically biased responses to the CC
and ECS projects go further and also argue that complex regulation can be a force for good
as it helps ensure that disagreements between different subgroups can be resolved satisfac-
torily. Thus, regulation is also judged to be helpful as a means of reducing the possibility
of group frictions.
The third theme concerns knowledge, and the hierarchical worldview is that knowl-
edge should be ‘almost complete and organised’ (Thompson 1992, p. 199). For example,
in response to the CC project, the ICAEW suggest that before reaching conclusions as to
what has caused the increase in volume of annual reports, there is a need to organize
our knowledge to assemble a complete picture to identify the causes of the increase. This
worldview of both the scope of knowledge and of expertise is alsowhy theory is perceived
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to be as valuable as practice in a hierarchical context. Expertise is, in part, underpinned
by theoretical understanding of that area of expertise and theory aids in making knowl-
edge comprehensive. The pro-theory position of the ICAEW is evident in their contention
that the CC discussion paper is wrong to promote the view that ‘accounting is becoming
too theoretical’, arguing that this aids in ensuring that there are ‘acceptable boundaries’
(ICAEW, CC response, p. 4) in respect of accounting standards.
The nal theme in this solidarity concerns the establishment of common goals. This is
important for hierarchical solidarities as shared objectives assist in achieving group unity.
For example, this theme is addressed in the CC project in a discussion on how the project
will only be satisfactorily concluded if there is a ‘combined effort to work towards a com-
mon goal’ (ICAS, CC response, p. 2).
Individualistically oriented themes relate to a propensity for less regulation, the impor-
tance of providing investor-relevant information, a preference for principles as opposed
to rules and a preference for practice rather than theory (see table 4).
One facet of the individualistic worldview is a preference for self-regulation and there
are repeated calls from particular respondents for the FRC to avoid regulation as it is
both a burden and a cost. The objections to greater regulation are contextualized within
each project. Thus, the arguments surrounding costs of regulation are that these would
arise from greater disclosure requirements in respect of the CC project, over-auditing in
respect of the AS project and an unnecessarily expanded audit report in respect of the
ECS project. The argument for reducing regulation is often supported by contending that
there is need to ‘avoid … measures which could limit … economic growth’ (Deloitte, AS
response, p. 6).
The second theme concerns the provision of decision-useful information to investors.
The individualistic solidarity has faith in efcient markets. For markets to be efcient,
investors need relevant information. Hence, it is argued that at its core ‘nancial reporting
should be able to give a clear … statement of the core activities of the business’ (Ernst and
Young, CC response, p. 3). Further, there is a need for accounting regulation to provide
‘information … comparability across companies’ (Deloitte, CC response, p. 4) to ensure
that stock prices reect all available, relevant information.However, government interven-
tion in stockmarkets is largely seen as unhelpful, andmarkets should be left to self-correct.
The individualistic solidarity’s worldview, with regard to the scope of knowledge, is
that it should be ‘sufcient and timely’ (Thompson 1992, p. 199). This is also a reason why
theory is of minor interest in the context of this solidarity. Knowledge needs to be timely
as individualistic societies perceive markets to be in constant ux, and for markets to be
efcient there is a need for timely, price-sensitive information. Hence, there are discussions
over whether the annual report is t for purpose or needs ‘to be updated on a real-time
basis’ (PWC, ECS response, p. 3).
The individualistic bias towards wanting to have freedom to negotiate underlies the
theme of preferring principles to rules. Pragmatic (rather than theory-based) solutions are
preferred as they offer a ‘practical and useful framework’ (BT, ECS response, p. 2). Hence,
ACCAargue the FRC should ‘avoid over-prescription … [andpermit companies to] incor-
porate an appropriate element of exibility … [how] to frame their reports’ (ACCA, ECS
response, p. 3).
The individualistic and hierarchical respondents are professional bodies, audit rms,
trade associations, and individuals, and within each of these four categories there is a
mix of individualistic and hierarchical responses. This suggests that, for example, audit
rms are not working together to capture regulation as an interest group. Ten respondents
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replied to all three consultations and another eight replied to two of the consultations. For
these 18 respondents, their dominant solidarity remained the same across the different
consultations except for two occurrences where the dominant and sub-dominant solidar-
ity reversed. That their worldviews remained substantially consistent over time tends to
support DCT in its contention that groups will want to ensure that their particular pattern
of social relations is preserved.
Six responses were identied as consistent with the enclaved solidarity, three of which
were submitted by the same organizationwho replied to all three consultations. This orga-
nization is the Local Authority Pension Fund Forum (LAPFF). Enclaved organizations are
prone to classifying the world outside their group as a threat, and are predisposed to take
on the role of questioning whether the ‘outside world’ has lost its moral compass. Such
moral zeal is evident within all six responses.
Table 5 provides a summary of the principal themes identied in enclaved responses.
Enclaved groups are inclined to argue that we need to understand the wider impacts that
actions have on society and this is a key theme identied. For example, the LAPFF makes
this claim by stating that the FRC needs to understand that nancial reporting affects
real-life economics and ‘impacts on … job creation, working conditions … tax receipts
… the environment and other issues across society’ (LAPFF, CC response, p. 1).
A second theme concerns the necessity of transparency. The LAPFF argues that trans-
parency is vital as it opens up boards of directors to increased scrutiny and requires
directors to be ‘responsive … [regardless] whether they are required to do so by regu-
lation or not’ (LAPFF, CC response, p. 2). The LAPFF also believes that there is a need
for a ‘change in mind-set from those boards that have treated shareholders’ views as an
inconvenience’ (LAPFF, CC response, p. 3). The LAPFF is anti-simplifying regulation if it
permits a ‘box-ticking compliance approach rather than seeking to achieve best practice’
(LAPFF, CC response, p. 6). To emphasize the importance of transparency, the LAPFF
cite opacity as an important facet of the nancial crisis. Blair (another of the enclaved
respondents), in replying to the CC project, also provides examples of opacity in annual
reports.
The LAPFF response to the AS consultation is as vigorous as its response to the CC
project, being especially critical that auditors did not raise any alarm in the run-up to the
banking crisis. Fundamental to their argument is another recurring theme of resilience.
Enclaved groups perceive the world as fragile and, hence, incorporating resilience into the
world is judged to be vital. Thus, the LAPFF argues that to protect the capital base of the
business, companies need to have a ‘forward viewof the resilience of the business’ (LAPFF,
AS response, pp. 1–2). The LAPFF make reference to the nancial crisis and contend that
it has shown that ‘certain banks which received clean audit opinions … were not in a
resilient condition beneath that appearance’ (LAPFF, AS response, p. 2).
The LAPFF response to the third ECS project is arguably even more critical of the FRC
than in the rst two projects. It claims that the FRC has ‘skirt[ed] around the account-
ing issue to the extent of denying a problem with accounting and audit and the key role
that played in the banking crisis’ and is ‘using the consultation to deect attention from
its effectiveness as a regulator’ (LAPFF, ECS response, summary page). The two themes
of resilience and transparency are central to the LAPFF response to this project. These
themes arise out of the LAPFF’s conviction that the FRC’s adoption of International Finan-
cial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for preparing nancial statements has been harmful and
has resulted in ‘capital, pay and dividends . . . . be[ing] based on unreliable and dysfunc-
tional numbers’ (LAPFF, ECS response, summary page). The LAPFF judges that accounts
Public Administration Vol. 94, No. 4, 2016 (988–1004)
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
CONSULTATION IN THE POLICY PROCESS 999
are ‘misleading’ and ‘legitimis[e] imprudent value destructive behaviour’ (LAPFF, ECS
response, summary page).
In relation to transparency, the LAPFF comment again on the behaviour of directors,
stating that they cannot always be trusted and ‘may make losses, or even make off with
the capital’ (LAPFF, ECS response, p. 3). Similarly, another of the enclaved respondents
argues that ‘management incompetence can be masked’ and that the auditor ‘(c)osying
up to management in the hospitality box etc. is simply not good enough’ (Yaxley, ECS
response, p. 3). For the LAPFF, this is an important reason why reliably audited nancial
statements are necessary; namely, they are vital for the effective functioning of the AGM
as this is the principal forum for shareholders to hold directors to account.
The worldview of the FRC
The worldview of the FRC, identied through examining the three project discussion
papers prepared by the FRC, the FRC feedback and FRC’s next steps in respect of the
three projects, displays hybridity with the dominant solidarity individualistic and the
subordinate solidarity hierarchical. The key themes in the FRC discussions are the same
four individualistically oriented themes previously identied in table 4. However, these
discussions are moderated, and this is perhaps due to the inuence of the subordinate
hierarchical worldview.
At the outset, the CC discussion paper suggests that there is a need tomodify the annual
report so that it presents investors with decision-useful information that will aid investors
in allocating capital efciently and taking into account the risk of a company. The FRC
advocates a common sense approach towards the issue of the complexity of annual reports
and contends that the regulation should be simplied. It suggests that principles are better
than rules as a basis for regulation and it is implied that regulation should be practically
rooted.
In the AS discussion paper, while the individualistic solidarity is still dominant and
the subordinate solidarity still hierarchical, the distinction is less marked than in the CC
paper. It is proposed that any ‘further move away from “principles” towards “rules”’
(AS, FRC discussion paper 2010, p. 14) will be detrimental, but the discussion of regu-
lation is moderated. For example, the paper suggests that Auditing Standards are already
sufciently rigorous, but grants that more guidance on audit scepticism may be help-
ful for audit rms. Thus, it is acknowledged that some regulation is necessary and the
balance the FRC is seeking is for sufcient scepticism to ensure that the audit is effec-
tive; but not too much scepticism that the auditor carries out additional and unnecessary
audit tests. The latter is to be avoided as it has a post-audit cost implication for either
the client if they consent to paying an additional fee or the audit rm if the fee cannot be
re-negotiated.
The FRC discussions suggest that the hybridity may be a result of the FRC acknowledg-
ing that interdependence exists between the individualistic and hierarchical solidarities.
That is, the individualistic solidarity recognizes that for markets to function efciently
hierarchically based mechanisms need to be in place to protect against companies misin-
forming investors with regard to their performance. This relates to ‘threats to the func-
tioning of the market’ (Thompson 1992, p. 200) being a prime concern of the individualist
solidarity.
This acknowledgement of a co-dependence is also evident in the ECS discussion paper.
At the outset, the ECS paper states that the proposals are built ‘on existing foundations
and are not … over-prescriptive’ (ECS, FRC discussion paper 2011, p. 5). This is not to
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say that there is to be no prescription. For example, it is explained that investors need
more risk- and strategy-related information in the annual report. The paper recommends
that to achieve this, extra information should not be required through regulation, but
rather through a less onerous reporting standard. This standard would then not be too
burdensome. This need for investor-focused, decision-useful information is embedded in
discussions relating to the information needs of an efcient capital market. This accords
with theworldview of the (dominant) individualistic solidarity, as does the FRC statement
that it is not seeking to eliminate the ‘risk of failure’ through its prescriptions. Thus, this is
the individualistic stance that risk can bring the opportunity for prot, but success is not
guaranteed in a competitive marketplace and failure is possible.
In 2010 the FRC published a feedback statement summarizing responses to the CC
consultation. The FRC analysis of CC responses notes that there was some variation in
views received, but the overall FRC message conveyed in the feedback statement is that
‘(t)he principles for less complex regulation were well supported by most respondents’
(CC, feedback statement 2010b, p. 2). The FRC performed further CC follow-on work
and published the outcomes of this follow-on work in 2011 (CC, FRC discussion paper
2011b). In this 2011 paper the FRC position is essentially unchanged from the original
pre-consultation proposals paper. For example, the FRC continues tomaintain that there is
a need to simplify the corporate reporting requirements so as to ‘reduc[e] the time, energy
and cost of preparing unnecessary disclosures and increasing clarity for investors’ (CC,
FRC discussion paper 2011b, p. 3).
The FRC outlined its proposed post-consultation actions to the AS project in a 2011 feed-
back paper (AS, FRC feedback paper 2011c) and, again, the fundamentals of the initial posi-
tion are maintained; namely there must be balance so that there is sufcient scepticism but
without causing unnecessary costs to arise. The FRC feedback regarding the responses to
the initial consultation is that there was a ‘high degree of consistency in the responses from
the accountancy rms and their professional bodies’ (AS, FRC feedback paper 2011c, p. 2).
The FRC acknowledge that there was a range of opinions in the responses from stakehold-
ers, but there is only a very short discussion of these in the feedback paperwhich is justied
on the grounds that ‘it is difcult to prepare a succinct summary of their responses’ (AS,
FRC feedback paper 2011c, p. 5). The key proposed post-consultation action by the FRC is
that they will provide further guidance on what scepticism means, but maintain a stance
of keeping regulation in check, emphasizing that any requirement would ‘not be overly
time consuming’ (AS, FRC feedback paper 2011c, p. 10).
The FRC ‘Next Steps’ paper feeding back on responses to the third project was pub-
lished later in 2011 (ECS, FRC feedback paper 2011d). The FRC states that ‘respondents
were substantially supportive of the FRC’s proposals and the FRC continues to believe
that the approach outlined in its Discussion Paper is correct’ (ECS, FRC feedback paper
2011d, p. 2). In the feedback paper it is acknowledged that the response to one aspect
of one proposal was ‘controversial’ in that while there was some support from auditors
and investors, it was wholly opposed by listed rms. This aspect concerned increasing
investor participation in the appointment of a rm’s auditor and the FRC decision was to
not proceed with this particular aspect.
DCT suggests that any solidarity is likely to only listen to voices that espouse ideas
aligned with their own worldview. This is because each solidarity has a primary focus on
winning over others to their worldview as they believe that their pattern of social relations
is the most appropriate. That the FRC summary of responses seems to indicate that they
have judged most responses as supportive despite the evidence suggests there may be
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a lack of awareness that other voices had spoken. Prima facie, the analysis indicates that
proposition P3 appears to hold as the regulator has enacted solutions that correspondwith
their worldview. This would suggest that the regulator has not been captured; instead, it
is subject to what may be described as self-capture.
It is important to clarify what we mean by ‘self-capture’ in the context of DCT. The
nancial regulation literature generally suggests that powerful groups in the nancial
sector have captured regulation and, therefore, the underlying motivating ‘force is …
material self-interest’ (Kwak 2014, p. 75; see also Young 2012). From a DCT perspective,
‘self-capture’ is, however, different from self-interest. ‘Self-capture’ describes the instinc-
tive reaction of a solidarity to act to uphold its pattern of social relations. For this reason
the regulator’s worldview is inevitably (and unwittingly) perpetuated.
Hybridity
A signicant number of respondents display hybridity, either of the same form as the FRC
or of a reverse form with the hierarchical solidarity dominant and the individualistic sol-
idarity subordinate (see table 2). It has been stated that hybridity observed in respect of
the FRC may be due to the FRC recognizing interdependence between the individualistic
and hierarchical solidarities. Those respondents displaying hybridity of the same form as
the FRC also appear to frame their responses such that they are acknowledging that the
individualist solidarity has a need for some of the solutions of the hierarchical solidarity.
For example, hybrid responses of this type in respect of the CC project discuss that while
their desire is for regulation to be reduced, they also accept that some limited measure of
regulation is required, and in responses to the AS project the view is not wholly anti-audit
regulation but rather that cost-effective audit regulation is as important.
An alternative explanation as to why there is hybridity observable in the FRC is that it
is less an acknowledgement of interdependence between solidarities and more a tactical
manoeuvre to ensure that respondent groups holding a dominant hierarchical world-
view are less likely to raise substantive objections. Thus, the subordinate hierarchical
worldview identiable in the FRC proposals may be that the FRC is deliberately prepared
to cede some ground to supporters of the hierarchical solidarity to lessen objections.
However, it is difcult to ascertain which of these is the primary reason underlying
the hybridity and, therefore, it is difcult to know whether the fourth proposition is
supported.
The arguments of hybrid respondents where the hierarchical solidarity is dominant
and the individualistic solidarity subordinate can be contrasted with the hybrid respon-
dents who are of the same form as the FRC. The line of reasoning evident in these hybrid
responses is apt not to be towards recognition that the hierarchical solidarity has some
need for the individualistic solidarity; rather, it errs towards being a justication ofwhy the
individualistic solidarity needs the hierarchical solidarity. For example, when defending
regulation, the ICAEW state: ‘But users surely would not want a complete free-for-all and
so some level of restriction is required’ (ICAEW, CC response, p. 4). Similarly, in respect
of the same project, KPMG note that regulation is required as it enables economic activ-
ity rather than being a burden on the economy. Therefore, the arguments are inclined to
be concerned with clarifying ‘why you need us’ as opposed to ‘why we need you’. It is
possible that this category of hybrid respondent construct their arguments in this form
as they wish to counter the proposals of the regulator which have been congured based
on an inverted worldview where the individualistic solidarity is dominant and not the
hierarchical solidarity.
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CONCLUSION
The above ndings have important implications for policy-making and the regulatory
state. In respect of proposition P1(a) the overwhelming majority of respondents display
either individualist or hierarchical worldviews, and the enclave and isolate voices are
signicantly under-represented. Ostensibly, policy consultations are undertaken to facili-
tate change through encouraging a diverse range of voices to engage in the consultation
process and to offer their insights and propose solutions. These results suggest that this
diversity of engagement is not occurring despite the policy issues being related to the
nancial crisis which has been the subject of extensive public debate.
It is feasible that the lack of diversity of voices may be a result of the policy con-
text – focusing as it does on accounting, auditing and governance regulation. In this
setting the dominant discourse may centre on debates over whether more or less regu-
lation is better, and this may not engage enclaved groups. In effect, an agenda is set that
precludes the widespread engagement of two of the solidarities. Moreover, the perception
that such voices may be registered but not heard might further reduce participation in
consultation processes. It could be argued that such agenda-setting (Lukes 2005) stands as
a well-rehearsed mechanism for avoiding unwanted challenges to prevailing regulations
or policies. Therefore, where different views are sought, policy makers would do well
to consider how the framing of consultations is likely to encourage or discourage the
participation of particular solidarities.
That we found support for propositions P2 and P3 underscores the need for a diversity
of voices to be heard in policy consultation processes. The analysis of responses has dis-
tinguished the preferred solutions of each of the hierarchical, individualistic and enclaved
solidarities and distinct themes have been identiable for each. This conrms proposition
P2 and substantiates that the different solidarities are constrained in their decision-making
with the solutions any solidarity offers to a problem being limited in scope. This implies
that policy blind spots will arise as each solidarity has a restricted view of the world. To
solve wicked problems there is a need to nd some means of combining the proposals of
the four solidarities to craft a clumsy solution. Not only will this be a broader solution; it
is also more likely to be acceptable to all four solidarities as no voices are being excluded.
The acceptance of proposition P3 suggests that the FRC has, for the most part, not heard
other voices as it makes policy and develops regulation. If the regulator does not deviate
from their own worldview following a consultation, DCT would predict that the outcome
of the regulation would be sub-optimal and, therefore, unlikely to be in the public interest.
This is because it has excluded the voices of the other solidarities.
The LAPFF view is that the FRCmust listen to the voices of others and it advocates that
the FRC partner with a more diverse range of bodies ‘to ensure that no one set of views
is dominant in the FRC’s thinking’ (LAPFF, ‘Louder than Words’ response, p. 1). That we
nd support for proposition P3 implies that the scope for reform becomes circumscribed
as the regulator is enacting its preferred solutions commensurate with its worldview and
this places constraints upon reasoning, decision-making and the framing of acceptable
options and action (6 2014b). As the victor in the policy debates, this results in better imple-
mentation of the status quo. We have described this as regulatory self-capture. Regulatory
self-capture runs counter to the common narrative in nancial regulation of capture by
interest group, and this result suggests that DCT can add to existing explanations of how
policy and regulation aremade. This suggests that attention should be focused on averting
self-capture rather than capture.
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Finally, in respect of proposition P4, signicant hybridity is observable. For example,
the FRC reects this hybridity with the dominant individualist worldview supported by
a hierarchical subordinate worldview. What is difcult to know is whether the hybridity
on the part of the FRC indicates that alliances are deliberately being enacted or if they are
an acknowledgement of a mutual interdependence between the solidarities. Despite not
being able to determine which of these reasons holds, it implies that, at best, only two
voices are being attended to and two solidarities are effectively excluded; whereas there
needs to be a proactive approach on the part of the regulator to both draw in and listen to
all voices.
Consequently, these results suggest that future research further examining policy and
regulatory consultation processes by drawing onDCT is of importance. Studies examining
consultations in other policy contexts might add to understanding of whether there are
ways of drawing in responses from all solidarities. Such studies would be valuable as they
could recommend ways of ensuring that consultations can be framed to encourage full
participation. Studies that look to provide examples of the enactment of clumsy solutions
would be particularly helpful. Such research would assist in knowing how it is possible to
ensure all four voices respond to consultations and how to ensure that all four voices are
then heard. These studieswould also reveal howwe can avoid the possibility of regulatory
self-capture.
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a b s t r a c t
This paper draws on neo-Durkheimian institutional theory to identify patterns of social
relations within the Burmah Oil Company Limited (BOC) in the period 1971e1976 and to
assess whether the risk perceptions and the approaches to risk management discussed
within the risk disclosures for the BOC annual reports are consistent with the patterns of
social relations. Using archival sources the dominant pattern of social relations in the
period 1971e1973 is identiﬁed as hierarchical and in the period 1974e1976 as isolate; the
change in the pattern of social relations resulting from the BOC tanker ﬂeet crisis in 1974.
Signiﬁcantly, the annual report risk disclosures are found to be consistent with the
dominant patterns of social relations. Much prior risk disclosure research has focused on
examining the principal characteristics of risk disclosures and testing for associations
between volumes of risk disclosures and ﬁrm characteristics. This study suggests neo-
Durkheimian institutional theory may offer a causally-based explanation for annual
report risk disclosures.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Risk management is now considered a fundamentally important activity for the achievement of a company's strategic
objectives. Consequently, directors are required to take responsibility for ensuring that a risk management system is
“incorporated within the company's normal management and governance processes” (Financial Reporting Council, 2014a, p.
2). Signiﬁcantly, the function of a risk management system is not limited to supporting directors in better managing the
company; the process of managing risk also generates risk information that can then be made publicly available. Dissemi-
nating this risk information is considered an equally important responsibility for director as it “ensures that shareholders and
other stakeholders are well-informed about the principal risks and prospects of the company” (Financial Reporting Council,
2014a, p. 1).
Investors and other stakeholders need risk information to be able to assess a company's risk proﬁle and to understand how
risks are being managed. This enables them to make risk-informed decisions and assists in holding directors to account in
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respect of the risk implications of strategic decisions. The importance attached to publishing risk information has resulted in
many countries requiring companies to provide risk disclosures in their annual reports. For example, in the UK x417 of the
Companies Act 2006 stipulates “(t)he business review must contain… a description of the principal risks and uncertainties
facing the company” and provision C.2.1 of the UK Corporate Governance Code states that in the annual report “directors
should describe those (principal) risks and explain how they are being managed or mitigated” (Financial Reporting Council,
2014b).
There has also been a growing academic interest in studying risk disclosure. The research to date has largely focused on
examining risk disclosures in corporate annual reports in different countries and has been dominated by content analysis-
based research methodologies (see, for example, Elshandidy & Neri, 2015). In this paper we explore risk disclosure in a
different manner to prior studies and a detailed literature review is provided in the next section of the paper.
As has been stated risk disclosures should stem from a company's risk management process. This process requires a
company to identify those risks they judge to be signiﬁcant, which will be dependent on the company's perceptions of risk,
and then to decide how they wish to manage these risks. This implies that discussions of principal risks and how those risks
are managed in a company's annual reports should represent the risk perceptions and attitudes to risk and risk management
of the company. One way of understanding risk perceptions and risk attitudes is through the insights of neo-Durkheimian
institutional theory as developed by the anthropologist Mary Douglas. In summary, the theory argues that the pattern of
social relations in a group or community restricts how decisions are analysed. Social relations place a frame around the
group's reading of a problem and affect the solutions the group creates to address a problem through shaping which strategic
choices will be seen as feasible. This shaping arises as the pattern of social relations inﬂuences aspects such as the time scales
over which a group will look ahead, the extent to which the group is willing to fully commit to a strategy, the strength of the
connection made between reasoning and objectives, and how risk is viewed (6, 2014a). Further discussion of neo-
Durkheimian institutional theory is provided in the third section of the paper.
This paper examines a case company over a period of time and has two principal objectives. The ﬁrst objective is to identify
the pattern(s) of social relations existing within the case company for the period under observation. The second objective is to
assess whether the risk perceptions and the approach to risk management identiﬁed in the risk disclosures for the annual
reports are consistent with the pattern(s) of social relations identiﬁed for the case company for the period under observation.
If it is possible to trace through from identifying the pattern of social relations to the impact this has on risk perceptions and
approaches to risk management contained within the risk disclosures, then neo-Durkheimian institutional theory may offer a
causally-based explanation for annual report risk disclosures.
We apply neo-Durkheimian institutional theory to the case of the Burmah Oil Company Limited (BOC) for the period
1971e1976. BOC has been selected for study as it faced an oil tanker ﬂeet crisis and was subject to a ﬁnancial bailout by the UK
government in 1974 which caused signiﬁcant disruption to the organisation. Therefore, this allows us to explore whether the
disruption in 1974 led to a change in the pattern of social relations and, if so, whether the risk disclosures reﬂected this change
in social relations as predicted by neo-Durkheimian institutional theory. This makes BOC an interesting and appropriate case
for study, permitting analysis of changes in social relations and the impact this has on risk disclosures in the annual reports.
Furthermore, the BOC archives are substantial and contain documents which facilitate the identiﬁcation of patterns of social
relations within the company.
The paper seeks to extend risk disclosure research in the following ways. First, we seek to understand risk disclosures by
applying a theory that derives from social anthropology and can potentially provide a causal explanation for annual report
risk disclosures. Both sociology and anthropology have examined the topic of risk extensively (examples being the works of
Ulrich Beck and Niklas Luhmann) and yet prior risk disclosure studies have not sought to ascertain if the risk ideas in these
two ﬁelds can be employed to understand aspects of risk disclosure. Second, by drawing on the BOC archive our study goes
beyond solely focusing on examining the risk disclosures in the annual report and draws on other sources to seek to un-
derstand why risk disclosures exist as they are. Third, we adopt an alternative methodology to content analysis which fa-
cilitates analysing the speciﬁc subject matter of the risk disclosures.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next sectionwe review prior risk disclosure studies. Neo-Durkheimian
institutional theory is then detailed and discussed. The methodology is outlined next, and followed a summary of the case
company. The analysis and discussion of BOC in the period 1971e1976 is then presented, followed by the conclusion.
2. Prior risk disclosure studies
Abraham and Shrives (2014) assert that risk disclosure as a research topic is “still very much in its infancy” (p. 91);
however, this statement requires clariﬁcation as academics have recognised that risk disclosure is of importance and there is a
growing body of literature examining risk disclosure in different settings.
Thus, previous studies have examined ﬁnancial ﬁrms (see, for example, Maffei, Aria, Fiondella, Spano, & Zagaria, 2014),
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms (see, for example, Oliveira, Rodrigues, & Craig, 2011), and government owned enterprises (see, for
example, Allini, Manes Rossi, &Macchioni, 2014). Risk disclosure practices across a range of countries have been investigated
including, for example, studies of companies in Italy, USA, UK, Finland, Netherlands, and Egypt (see respectively, for example,
Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, & Steele, 2014; Elshandidy, Fraser, & Hussainey, 2013 Miihkinen,
2013; Mokhtar & Mellett, 2013) and there have been comparative cross-country studies (see, for example, Barakat &
Hussainey, 2013; Dobler, Lajili and Zeghal., 2011; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015). Studies have examined risk disclosures in their
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entirety (see, for example, Linsley & Shrives, 2006) and other studies have focused on subsets of risk disclosures including
operational risk and market risk disclosures (see, for example, Al-Hadi, Hasan, & Habib, 2016; Deumes and Knechel, 2008;
Lajili, Dobler and Zeghal, 2012). Whilst the annual report has been the main focus for the majority of studies there have
been investigations of other publications that contain risk information such as interim reports (see, for example, Elzaher and
Hussainey, 2012) and prospectuses (see, for example, Deumes, 2008). A small number of papers have adopted a wholly
theoretical approach to researching risk disclosures (see, for example, Dobler, 2008; Jorgensen & Kirschenheiter, 2003) in
comparison to papers that have sought to examine howexternal events such as the implementation of a risk disclosure-based
accounting standard and the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2007e8 have impacted on risk disclosures provided by companies (see
respectively, Miihkinen, 2012; Ntim, Lindop, & Thomas, 2013).
The sense inwhich it is appropriate to argue that risk disclosure research is “still very much in its infancy” is that for much
of the prior empirical research content analysis has been the dominant research methodology and this content analysis has
been both manual (see, for example, Abraham & Cox, 2007; Bowman, 1984) and computer-based (see, for example,
Elshandidy, Fraser, & Hussainey, 2015; Kravet & Muslu, 2013). Further, the aims of much of this prior research has been to
gather insights into the principal characteristics of risk disclosures or, through regression analysis-based hypothesis testing,
to examine for associations between volumes of risk disclosures and corporate governance characteristics such as board
composition (see, for example, Elshandidy et al., 2013; Khlif & Hussainey, 2016; Maffei et al., 2014).
The main purpose of research examining the principal characteristics of risk disclosures has been to identify the potential
usefulness of annual report risk disclosures by identifying risk sentences and coding these to ascertain the relative pro-
portions of sentences that are, for example, quantiﬁed or unquantiﬁed, forward looking or backward looking, and if they
explain speciﬁc risk management actions or merely describe risk management policy. In summary, the research to date ﬁnds
it is atypical for risks to be quantiﬁed or for forward-looking risk disclosures to be provided (Abraham and Cox 2007; Beretta
& Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Linsley, Shrives, & Crumpton, 2006; Dobler, Lajili, & Zeghal, 2011). Linsley and
Shrives (2006) also ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant proportion of the risk disclosure sentences are explanations of risk management
policies rather than discussions of speciﬁc risks. The suggestion is that risk sentences are of greater use to the reader if they
are quantiﬁed, forward looking or explain speciﬁc actions taken to manage speciﬁc risks and, therefore, the common
conclusion drawn in this prior research is that companies need to improve the quality of their risk disclosures.
It is more difﬁcult to compare the results of those studies that are regression analysis-based hypothesis tests examining for
associations between volumes of risk disclosures and corporate governance characteristics. This is because they are set in
different contexts and test different characteristics. For example, Barakat and Hussainey (2013) examine for relationships
between operational risk disclosures and corporate governance characteristics and aspects of banking regulation for a sample
of EU banks, whilst Al-Hadi et al. (2016) examine for relationships between market risk disclosures and bank risk committee
characteristics for ﬁnancial ﬁrms from Gulf Cooperation Council countries.
What is evident is that there are a number of aspects of risk disclosure that could be usefully examined, but that these prior
studies have not considered. First, the content analysis approach adopted by many prior studies means that the speciﬁc and
detailed subject matter of the risk disclosures has not been analysed. Second, whilst these prior studies analyse the risk
disclosures in the annual report or other disclosure document under consideration, there is no scrutiny of other information
sources that might provide an understanding of the risk disclosures. Third, prior risk disclosure research has largely relied
upon theories that have originated in economics and management such as agency theory, stakeholder theory, legitimacy
theory and resource-dependence theory (see, for example, Allini, Manes Rossi,&Hussainey, 2016; Ntim et al., 2013) and there
has not been adoption of other theories that might be better able to assess why a particular set of risk disclosures has been
provided by the company.
As outlined in the introduction, this study seeks to address these gaps in the following ways. First, content analysis is not
adopted; rather, the speciﬁc subject matter of the risk disclosures in the BOC annual reports is examined in the manner
described in the methodology section. Second, in addition to examining the annual report risk disclosures the BOC archive is
drawn on to aid in understanding why the risk disclosures are as they are. The wide range of documents available in the BOC
archive and the use towhich they are put are also described in themethodology section. Third, neo-Durkheimian institutional
theory has been adopted as it provides an opportunity for ascertaining whether it is possible to track through from patterns of
social relations to risk perceptions and attitudes to risk management, and then through to risk disclosures. The theories
adopted to date are unable to offer a causal explanation of risk disclosures in this manner. Hence, it is in these ways that the
paper is distinct from prior studies and is looking to develop risk disclosure research in a new direction.
3. Neo-Durkheimian institutional theory
Mary Douglas developed the ideas that now form neo-Durkheimian institutional theory over an extensive period (see, for
example, Douglas, 1970, 1978, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1994, 1995, 2003, 2004; Douglas &Wildavsky, 1982). At the core of the
theory is the proposition that as social beings we comprehend the world by reference to our relations with others and, hence,
we need to be concerned with understanding social relations. To be more precise, social relations are of fundamental
importance because they shape howwe evaluate decisions, howwe interpret problems and what preferences we have when
selecting solutions. In neo-Durkheimian institutional theory such shaping is often described by referring to social relations as
impacting on thought styles.
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Douglas seeks to explain the signiﬁcance of institutions in this context and she clariﬁes that “(t)o institute is to establish
order… An institution is speciﬁcally an ordering of social relationships into regular patterns” (Douglas, 2008, p. 9). It is a key
concern of Douglas to establish that the ordering associated with institutions is far more systematic than might be presumed
(see, for example, Douglas, 1989). Hence, Douglas argues there are a limited number of basic patterns of social relations (see,
for example, Douglas, 2003) and asserts the diversity is limited to four basic (or elementary) forms. These are substantiated as
the viable forms of institution (see, for example, Thompson& Ellis, 1997) and there is a propensity for any institution to revert
to one of these four forms as they have a comparative permanence and are observed to consistently recur (Douglas, 1978).
The frameworkwhich sets out these four basic forms is based on the two dimensions of grid and group. The grid and group
dimensions derive from Durkheim's classiﬁcations of social regulation and social integration. Signiﬁcantly, Douglas does not
treat these two dimensions as separate but “cross-tabulated them and focused… on the forms found in the interstices” (6,
2011, p. 64). The result is that the two dimensions combine inweak and strong (or low and high) states to create the matrix of
four basic forms; isolate, enclave, hierarchy, and individualist (Fig. 1). The four basic forms are often referred to as solidarities
and the names attached to each of the four solidarities have altered over the years as Douglas attempted to ensure theywould
not mislead (see, for example, Douglas, 1999).
Social integration (the group dimension) concerns the extent to which an individual is committed to other members of an
organisation or group. If an individual has a high degree of loyalty or commitment to other members in their community this
signiﬁes ‘high group’; conversely, if individuals are more focused on achieving their own goals than the group's goals this
represents a ‘low group’ form of organisation (Douglas, 1978). Social regulation (the grid dimension) relates to the degree of
freedom individuals have in respect of being able to self-select social roles. If there is relative freedom to select social roles
then this constitutes a low grid society; conversely, if there are restrictions (or regulations) upon the social roles one can
choose and prescriptions regarding social interactions this represents a high grid society. Hence, the grid dimension is
concerned with issues of role “(a)utonomy, ambiguity, (and) negotiation” (Douglas, 1989, p. 173). Thus, in summary, social
integration and social regulation respectively concern the extent to which “practices, positions, and relations are speciﬁed by
strong or weak accountability to bonds and memberships, and by strong or weak accountability to constraint, imperative,
prescription, (and) roles” (6, 2014a, p. 89).
Hierarchical ordering (high group and high grid) denotes that individuals are strongly bound to one another and regu-
lation of roles is strong. This implies clear role demarcation occurs. Distinguishing roles from one another assists in deﬁning
statuses; in addition, deference is shown to those in authority (Douglas, 2004). Traditions are valued and respected, and rules
are deemed important as they maintain order. The actions and operations of a hierarchical group or organisation are co-
ordinated as there are shared aims and common goals. There is a strong sense of “common membership in a community,
albeit among unequals” (6, 2014a, p. 90) and a high degree of loyalty to the group. Outsiders are viewed with some distrust as
they are external to the group. In this form of ordering styles of thought are such that planning horizons are over the long-
term as hierarchical institutions perceive a permanence and continuity from the past through to the future. There is an
underlying assumption that the hierarchical form of social relations can be expected to persist into the future and because
they are comfortable looking ahead over the long-term they are willing to engage in long-term commitments.
For hierarchical institutions the approach to risk (that is, the thought style regarding risk) is not to be risk-averse; rather, a
careful balance is sought between risk and reward. When making decisions under uncertainty the approach is to carefully
consider the risk implications of the venture. Expertise is drawn on to assess if the potential rewards areworth pursuing and if
G
R
ID
Isolate ordering
High grid - low group
Hierarchical ordering
High grid - high group
Individualistic ordering
Low grid - low group
Enclaved ordering
Low grid - high group
GROUP
Fig. 1. Grid-group framework.
Source: Adapted from Douglas (1986, 2004).
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they assist in diversifying overall risk. There is a thorough approach to the appraisal of the potential risks and careful de-
liberations on the venture under consideration. Further, plans or procedures will be put in place to manage potential risks
associated with any commitments taken on. Hence, under this form of social organisation there is strong belief in expert
knowledge and if risk assessments are undertaken with care then faith is placed in them.
The extensive prescriptions just described for hierarchical ordering do not apply to an individualistic institution as there is
weak social integration (low grid) and weak social regulation (low group). This permits individuals to collaborate with
whoever they wish and the preference is for self-regulation. Douglas perceives this as a demanding form of social organi-
sation in the sense that it “sanctions individual competition” (Douglas, 2004, p. 291) and individuals “are expected to go forth
entrepreneurially” (Douglas, 2003, p. 1358). There is little help available if an individual fails as they cannot appeal to others
for assistance. Consequently, controlling resources is potentially important as it determines power (6, 2011). Styles of thought
in the context of this pattern of social ordering are such that the planning horizon is over the short to medium term. There is a
tendency not to look forward to the long term as individualists are motivated to “take proﬁts and exit before the worst
happens” (6, 2011, p. 91). Further, the past is not seen as a suitable guide to the future. The attitude to risk if the ordering is
individualist is a willingness to accept risk if the proﬁt potential is sufﬁciently attractive. That is, there is an erring toward
placing proﬁt considerations before risk considerations. There would not need to be the same justiﬁcations regarding risk
diversiﬁcation compared to the hierarchical ordering and nor would such careful deliberations be needed. This is not to
suggest there is a naivety under individualist ordering. There is not a presumption the envisaged proﬁts will always be ac-
quired and there is acknowledgement losses might occur. However, the view is that losses on one venture will subsequently
be outweighed by gains on other ventures.
In respect of enclaved institutions (high group and low grid) there is strong social integration and weak social regulation.
Individuals are strongly bound to one another as commitment to the group is of the utmost importance. This can result in
enclaved institutions deﬁning themselves in opposition to other institutions as this strengthens group cohesion (Douglas,
1978). By comparison, roles are regulated only to a limited extent. Enclaves may need “elaborate rules for keeping them-
selves equal… (and) ambitious leaders are dragged down, and often expelled” (Douglas, 1999, p. 412). Styles of thought are
such that planning horizons are over the short-term. The reason they “foreshorten futures (is) to anticipate apocalyptic
discontinuities” (6, 2011, p. 91) as this is a means for strengthening group unity. Likewise, the group is united by having a long
memory for past events and especially where either there have been perﬁdious acts of disloyalty or great acts of commitment
to a group cause. The approach to risk in enclaved ordering is based on the precautionary principle with the world perceived
as fragile. Hence, risk is largely to be avoided and this is because new ventures are thought to have the potential to destabilise
the current modus operandi. If a potential new venture is available the enclave will be more likely to worry about possible
losses arising than proﬁts, and the enclave tends to distrust experts believing they do not have the capability to identify
potential risks in advance of any new venture.
The isolate ordering differs greatly from the enclaved ordering as it is low group and high grid. Social regulation is strongly
controlled with restrictions on selection of social roles. Ties between individuals are weak and especially in the sense that
there is a lack of shared aims.
This leads isolate institutions to be largely pre-occupied with constraints. Because it is harder in isolate settings to make
use of social bonds or to appeal to common values then managing individuals in such a context is difﬁcult (6, 2014c) and
anyone attempting tomanage is heavily constrained because of this. In this form of social organisation amanager can attempt
to force constraints on others; but when this does not succeed then they have to get by and cope. This represents a shift from
what 6 (2014c) describes as the structural despot to the structural serf. Therefore, a relative passivity arises and the institution
looks to survive, if needs be soaking up losses. Relatedly, the thought style of the isolate is to look only to the shorter term and
planning too far ahead is not done. The form that risk management takes is that the isolate looks to cope as best they can and
hope that at some point there will be an upturn in fortunes. This has the implication that when isolate institutions develop
strategies they are “especially vulnerable to perverse outcomes… (for) once an imposition strategy is broken, isolate ordering
cultivates neither rich sets of reserve preferences nor fallback negotiating positions to accommodate opponents” (6, 2014c, p.
687).
It can be seen from the descriptions of the four basic forms that the pattern of social relations in each form is highly
signiﬁcant as it “inﬂuences the way that people think” (6, 2014b, p. 290). Hence, there is causality between institutions and
thought styles (see, for example, Douglas, 1986). What is also important to note is that these four basic types of social
organisation, and the resultant thought styles, are in constant opposition. This is inevitable as the thought styles generated by
the different forms of social organisation are at variancewith one another. Douglas stresses in later versions of the theory that
any organisation or society will comprise all four forms of institution and describes the interactions between the four types as
‘cultural dialogues’ (Douglas, 2004). Through these cultural dialogues the four afﬁrm and sustain their particular pattern of
social ordering by debating with one another which form of social organisation is to be preferred. Thus, the four forms are in
constant tensionwith one another, although therewill be timeswhen temporary accommodations aremade (6, 2014b). These
temporary accommodations are, in effect, strategic alliances that facilitate an institution in achieving some part of its aims.
In its initial formation Douglas's theory was static. However, as the theory evolved dynamismwas fully incorporated and
particularly through the work of Michael Thompson (see, for example, Thompson & Ellis, 1997). An important implication of
the theory being dynamic is that for any organisation or society the dominant form of institution may be replaced by another
form of institution becoming dominant over time. This potential for change is recognition that for any institution the existing
dominant form of social organisationmay become unsustainable. Consequently, the theory can explainwhy the thought style
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in a communitymay alter by reference to a change in the form of social organisation. Change occurs if individuals ﬁnd that the
current dominant form of social organisation does not fulﬁl its inherent ‘promises’. For example, if the dominant form of social
ordering is hierarchical then this may encompass an expectation that there will be some form of safety net for individuals
who are not prospering. If such amechanism is not available, perhaps because it is withdrawn because of a lack of resources to
fund the safety net, then discontent arises and individuals may look to come together under one of the other forms of
institution.
This dynamism also underscores that individuals have agency. Thought style shapes how decisions are analysed as it
places a frame around their reading of the problem and, further, it shapes what strategic choices will be seen as feasible.
However, this shaping of strategic choices that stems out of thought styles still fully allows for individuals making “intelligible,
explicable, intelligent and reasonable choices” (6, 2011, p. 35).
4. Methodology and Burmah Oil Company Limited context
In this study we undertake a historical analysis of risk disclosures for the Burmah Oil Company Limited (BOC). We review a
range of sources from the BP archives where BOC records are held with the purpose of identifying the pattern(s) of social
relations of the company and to ascertainwhether the risk disclosures observed in the BOC annual reports are consistent with
the pattern(s) of social relations identiﬁed.
BOC was selected due to its having been the subject of a ﬁnancial bailout by the government in 1974. The ﬁnancial bailout
was an event of such signiﬁcance that there was the possibility that the existing dominant form of social organisation might
have ceased to be sustainable and, consequently, replaced by an alternative dominant form of social organisation. Therefore,
this provided the possibility for studying whether a change in the form of social organisation shapes risk perceptions and
attitudes to risk as predicted by neo-Durkheimian institutional theory.
A range of archival sources were collected for the period under investigation, 1971e1976, by two of the authors inde-
pendently. The documents collected included minutes of annual general meetings, minutes of internal meetings, internal
memorandums prepared by senior managers, staff development policies and practices, letters to stockholders, organisational
charts, human resource policy documents and discussion documents relating to retention and recruitment of staff. The
documents collected were those that related to staff interactions and human resource matters as these were appropriate for
identifying the nature of social relations present in the company.
Two of the authors independently reviewed all documents to identify those parts that provided evidence of the nature
of the dominant pattern of social relations. The areas of particular interest related to indications of the time horizon for
planning, the risk appetite and risk attitude within the company and the extent to which the company was pro-active or
reactive in its decision making; three areas which have been discussed in neo-Durkheimian institutional theory as in-
dicators of patterns of social relations. Subsequently, the two authors compared their assessments of the pattern(s) of
social relations and then discussed their ﬁndings with the third co-author. It was important a wide range of different types
of documents were reviewed to improve the reliability of the ﬁndings and for triangulation purposes. Examples sup-
porting our judgements made in undertaking the process outlined above are provided as part of the analysis later in the
paper.
The risk disclosures in the annual reports were also identiﬁed by two of the researchers independently. This entailed a
two-step process. First, two of the authors reviewed the entire annual reports for the period 1971 to 1976 and individually
identiﬁed any discussions that might pertain to risk; risk being broadly deﬁned following Linsley and Shrives (2006) risk
disclosure study. The two researchers then discussed their ﬁndings and agreed on the risk-related disclosures for each of the
annual reports. These two authors then independently undertook a thematic analysis of the risk disclosures identifying any
indicators of social relations within the annual reports. Focus was again given to the time horizon for planning, the risk
appetite and risk attitude within the company and the extent to which the company was pro-active or reactive in its decision
making as indicators of the social relations of the company. The ﬁndings were then discussed with the third co-author.
Examples of risk disclosures supporting our analysis, and obtained using the process outlined above, are presented as part
of our analysis later in the paper. A brief history of BOC and the key events relating to the ﬁnancial crisis and bailout is
presented in the next section.
4.1. Burmah Oil Company Limited context
The Burmah Oil Company Limited (BOC) was founded in 1886 when Burmah became a province of the Indian empire. The
British government granted a number of oil concessions to BOC and this led to the drilling of oil in Burmah in 1888 (Corley,
1988). During the 1920s and 1930s, BOC handled about 75 per cent of Burmese oil production and 85 per cent of oil reﬁning. In
addition to being a major producer in the Burmese oil industry, BOC was a key producer in India. A time line of the key events
in the history of BOC s provided in Table 1.
After the Second World War, BOC's operations in both India and Burmah (which became independent states in 1947 and
1948 respectively) decreased signiﬁcantly. The Burmese government nationalised oil operations in Burmah and in India BOC
encountered an increasingly difﬁcult market with increased government involvement in the activities of the company. The
company therefore looked to expand activities in other parts of the world (Corley, 1988).
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Part of this related to expanding its oil tanker ﬂeet in the 1970's. BOC engaged in a large international contract to provide
oil tanker services in relation to the liqueﬁed natural gas market involving Malaysia, Japan and the United States and
committed to purchasing new tankers. This deal was ﬁnanced through loans provided by US banks. By 1973 BOC's tanker ﬂeet
had doubled to 38 vessels, most of which operated in the spot market in which high lease rentals could be achieved in good
economic times. In 1974, BOC acquired an American company, the Signal Oil and Gas Company which gave them interests in
the Thistle oil ﬁelds of the North Sea. The borrowings of BOC now totalled approximately $650m in respect of its American
investment activities.
BOC disclosed signiﬁcant proﬁts in 1973 but an unexpected downturn in the world economy resulted in a slowing of the
world tanker trade. In December 1974 BOC discovered large losses were expected in its oil tanker subsidiary which
threatened its survival. BOC contacted the Bank of England and the British government for assistance on Christmas Eve 1974
and a bail out was agreed. In early 1975 the Bank of England announced it would guarantee the borrowings for a period of
12 months (Burmah Oil Company Limited press announcement, 31 December 1974; Note of Treasury meeting, 27 December
1974; Note of meeting at Department of Energy, 6 January 1975). This initial agreement had to be renegotiated shortly
afterwards and the ﬁnal agreement included: unconditional guarantees for BOC's $650m borrowings to be repaid by 31
December 1975, the bank to provide a standby facility of £75m charges on subsidiary companies in favour of the bank to be
procured, and BOC to realise assets and restructure its business particularly the tanker ﬂeet business (Agreement between
Burmah Oil Company Limited, Bank of England and HMG, 24 January 1975; Note of meeting between Department of Energy
and Treasury, 16 January 1975; Note to Bank of England from HMG on 6 January 1975; Burmah Oil Company Limited
stockholders report, March 1975). After the bailout agreement the company faced retrenchment and government oversight,
and in the next section we analyse the social relations and risk disclosures pre- and post-bailout within the time period
1971e1976.
5. Analysis and discussion of BOC in the period 1971e1976
In this section of the paper we identify the pattern of social relations within BOC as evidenced by archival research. This is
followed by an analysis of whether the risk perceptions and approach to risk management in the annual report risk dis-
closures of BOC reﬂect the pattern of social relations identiﬁed. Our analysis suggests the form of social organisation changed
over the period 1971e1976. Initially, the dominant form of social organisation is hierarchical, and this is then replaced by the
isolate form of social organisation which rises to dominance after the tanker ﬂeet crisis in 1974. We ﬁrst provide a discussion
of the pattern of social relations and the risk disclosures for the pre-crisis period 1971e1973, andwe then turn our attention to
the post-crisis period 1974e1976.
Table 1
Timeline of key events for BOC, 1886e1980.
Date Event Commentary and related events
1886 Foundation of Burmah Oil Company
Limited (BOC)
The company was founded as the Rangoon Oil Company in Glasgow in 1886 by David
Sime Cargill to develop oil ﬁelds in the Indian subcontinent. Burmah became a province
of the Indian empire the British government granted a number of oil concessions.
1908 Anglo Persian Oil Company (APOC)
formed
BOC establishes APOC as a 97 per cent-owned subsidiary (APOC).
1914e1918 British government acquires 51% of
APOC
British government acquires controlling interested in APOC with BOC remaining as
signiﬁcant minority shareholder.
1935 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC)
formed
APOC renamed as AIOC.
1948 BOC enters into a joint venture with the
Burmese government
After independence in Burmah, BOC enters into a joint venture with a 51e49 per cent
partnership between the Burmese government and British private interests
1954 British Petroleum (BP) formed and
withdrawal from Burmah
AIOC renamed as BP and Burmese government takeover BOC's Burmese interests.
1971 BOC expansion outside core Asian
market
BOC look to expand activities in other parts of the world including the UK, North and
South America, Canada and Australia.
1973 Negotiation of tanker ﬂeet deal BOC hopeful that international investments, particularly tanker ﬂeet deal, will lead to
BOC remaining successful and proﬁtable.
Early 1974 Tanker ﬂeet crisis World economy takes a sudden downturn and world tanker trade slows down. BOC in
ﬁnancial trouble and may not be able to meet its creditor obligations to the American
banks. BOC bank covenants renegotiated.
Late 1974 BOC approaches Bank of England Approach to Bank of England for ﬁnancial support and bailout.
Early 1975 Rescue of BOC Initial and ﬁnal rescue agreement between BOC, Bank of England and the British
government.
1976e80 Period of upheaval Continuing support from British government, selling of non-core assets and focus on
survival of the company.
Sources: Compiled from BOC Limited Financial reports, 1970e80; Burmah Oil Company Limited press announcement, 31 December 1974; Note of meeting
at Treasury, 27 December 1974; Note of meeting at Department of Energy, 6 January 1975; T.A.B,Corley,A history of the Burmah oil company,vol.II:
1924e1966 (London:Heinemann, 1988).
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5.1. The pattern of social relations in the pre-crisis period 1971e1973
The evidence indicates the hierarchical form of social organisation is dominant in this period with both a high group and a
high grid dimension apparent within the company. One aspect of BOC that evidences a high group dimension relates to staff
policies as documented in internal memorandums relating to human resource issues. These indicate a clear preference for
identifying staff loyal to the interests of the company and for promoting from within the company. For example, a memo-
randum that provides notes of a meeting on management succession and development records:… that good men would be transferable between different companies of the group in order to serve the group's in-
terests best. (17 May 1973, arc 180,878)
This linking of ‘good men’ with those who serve the ‘group's interests best’ denotes a strong group dimension where it is
deemed virtuous to place group interests above one's own interests. The promise of eventual promotion is a common means
of rewarding those who display commitment to the group; however, other forms of compensation can also be provided and
within the same memorandum it is noted that:
There was discussion on the absolute need to ensure that menwho accept senior positions abroad are accommodated
adequately when they return to this country.
(17 May 1973, arc 180,878)
It is also apparent that internal promotion is preferred over external recruitment and this is also indicative of a high
group dimension. Namely, ‘insiders’ are preferred to ‘outsiders’ who are external to the group as this preserves the strong
group boundary. For example, in a memorandum from the Group Personnel department to chief executives, chief rep-
resentatives, directors, divisional directors, regional and functional co-ordinators it appears external recruitment is seen as
a last resort:
As it is clear from the policy directive, in order to make the best use of the human resources we have internally, all
vacancies in job group II and which cannot be ﬁlled fromwithin the resources of a particular unit must be channelled
via the group personnel department before any external recruitment is done (10 January 1974, arc 180,925).
This preference for recruiting fromwithin applies at all levels including the Board of Directors, where it is also noticeable
there is a cohesion amongst board members and a reluctance to have ‘outsiders’ become board members. An example of a
display of this board unity and an aversion to bringing in ‘outsiders’ occurred in 1972 when an attempt was made by two
stockholders to be appointed to the Board as they wished to reorganise the company. The incumbent directors fought
intensely against this attempt by two outsiders to usurp their roles.
There is also evidence that a high grid dimension existed at BOC in the period concerned. Departments and divisions
are distinct from one another, and a clear organisational structure exists. The status of each member of a department is
well-deﬁned ensuring levels of authority are demarcated and the role of each member of staff is well understood. In
addition, considerable time and effort is expended at BOC on detailed planning and on controlling the promotion process
in a manner that reinforces regulation of roles at the company. This includes having clear procedures for identifying staff
eligibility for promotion, and closely linking eligibility to company policies and practices. For example, the group
responsible for management succession planning at BOC (known as MPS) identiﬁes future senior managers through a very
detailed process:
The role of theMPS is to collate information… on… performance, potential, career and educational background and to
advise… on staff availability andmovements within the group. The information collected is then combined into a draft
management succession plan for the group. This represents the present and future manning of some three hundred
posts from job group II to divisional directors. (10 January 1974, arc 180,925)
Further, deference is shown towards the authority of senior managers and this also suggests a high grid dimension. For
example, the authority of the chairman as the principal decision maker is indicated in the language he uses, such as when he
clearly states that he is the person who sets “out the policy which the board has been consistently following during recent
years” (7 December 1972, arc ref 139 806).
The reference in this quotation to ‘consistency in policy’ is indicative of a long-term planning horizons which is associated
with a hierarchical form of organisation. This long-term planning horizon, and the associated feeling of a shared history, are
present in the proceedings of the 71st Annual General Meeting when directors with long service are thanked and their
histories highlighted by reference to their longstanding and loyal associations with the company. For example, one director is
recalled as having had a:… long and distinguished career with the company over a period of 45 years… He had a very special knowledge and
understanding of our interests in India, Burma and Pakistan. (9 June 1973, arc 131,425)
The importance of developing staff and of retaining them is also indicative of a long-term perspective. The emphasis on a
long and shared history of managers and directors also suggests strong communal ties are fostered between staff which
reinforces the group dimension.
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Therefore, the evidence indicates the dominant form of social organisation at BOC in the years immediately preceding the
ﬁnancial bailout is hierarchical. Whether this hierarchical pattern of social relationships is reﬂected in the risk disclosures
identiﬁed in the annual reports of BOC in the pre-crisis period 1971e1973 is discussed next.
5.1.1. Risk disclosures in the pre-crisis period 1971e1973
The tanker ﬂeet-related risk disclosures in the 1971,1972 and 1973 annual reports all make signiﬁcant reference to Burmah
Oil Tankers' (BOT), which dealt with the BOC tanker ﬂeet and its operations. The decision to own and charter tankers is
contextualised in risk discussions which appear to be aligned with a hierarchical thought style.
BOC's 1971 annual report sets out how BOT was initially created to hedge against risk of crude oil transportation costs in
respect of the reﬁnery at Ellesmere Port. Thus, the decision to own and charter tankers is not an outcome of the company
seeking a new risky venture, but stems from a desire tomitigate risks. Hence, the risk discussions imply a hierarchical thought
style where risk and reward are carefully balanced. This is further corroborated in the 1971 annual report where it is stated
that uncertainties attached to the future prospects of the company because of a market depression for fuel oils and middle
distillates should not be cause for concern because of “its diversiﬁcation into non-oil activities” (Burmah Oil Company
Limited, Annual Report 1971, p. 5). The presentation of the activities of BOT as a risk diversiﬁcation strategy again implies a
concern with balancing risks.
Further evidence of a hierarchical thought style is present in respect of the thoroughness of the appraisal of risk. Risk
assessments for the tanker ﬂeet venture have been undertakenwith reference to an appraisal of the changing energy patterns
affecting the oil industry. In particular, it is observed that there will be an increasing need for tankers to transport liquid
natural gas (LNG) and crude oil (Burmah Oil Company Limited, Annual Report 1971):
Great changes are taking place in the energy patterns throughout the world… Two of the most signiﬁcant of these are
the growing importance of liquid natural gas (LNG) as an internationally transportable energy source and the rapidly
increasing extent to which the vast economies of the USA and Japan will have to rely on imported LNG, in addition
to imported crude oil, in order to meet their energy requirements (Burmah Oil Company Limited, Annual Report 1971,
p. 4).
That a thorough assessment of risk has been made is highlighted in the description of the negotiations BOC has been
having with the Bahamas Development Corporation (BDC) to build a trans-shipment facility which will be leased by BOT. This
will enable BOT to offer transportation for crude oil from the Middle East through to ports on the east coast of the USA.
Transportation will be at attractive rates through using large tankers from the Middle East to the Bahamas and then trans-
ferring the crude oil to smaller vessels at the trans-shipment facility which are able to enter the USA ports. The implication is
that the risk is well managed and this is also evident in similar tanker ﬂeet risk disclosures identiﬁed in the BOC 1972 and
1973 annual reports.
In respect of BOC's 1972 annual report, the operations of BOT continue to be conveyed as counterbalancing the risks
discussed in the annual report in respect of BOC's ‘traditional’ oil operations. The focus on howaltering trends inworld energy
are impacting on the USA and Japan are reiterated. The comparative lack of risk in respect of BOToperations is also highlighted
by statements explaining there is “keen interest” being shown in crude oil transportation contracts by “many US and foreign
companies” (Burmah Oil Company Limited Annual Report 1972, p. 26). LNG transportation contracts are also under negoti-
ation with one major contract mentioned as signed in BOC's 1972 annual report.… stockholderswill have noted in the press that a ﬁrst contract has been concludedwith Shell Oil for the transportation
of substantial quantities of crude oil from the Persian Gulf to US east coast ports. Other similar contracts are in course of
negotiation. (Burmah Oil Company Limited Annual Report 1972, p. 8).
These developments are all judged to have proﬁt potential as they take BOT into a business area “which is still in the early
stages of the growth cycle” (Burmah Oil Company Limited Annual Report 1972, p. 27). To support this view, details of orders
that have been placed are provided in the BOC's 1972 annual report. There is the recognition that there is a potential risk
associatedwith the long-term ﬁnancial commitments that BOT has taken on in respect of both chartering agreements for new
oil tankers and with the acquisition of LNG tankers. However, the company again perceives the risks associated with these as
being well managed, stating that a “substantial part of these commitments is already matched by tanker out-charters and
other long-term arrangements” (Burmah Oil Company Limited Annual Report 1972, p.45).
BOC's 1973 annual report notes that BOT contributed one-third of total proﬁts and this was possible because of the
“high rates for spot charters” (Burmah Oil Company Limited Annual Report 1973, p. 7). There is acknowledgement in the
1973 annual report that some uncertainties are starting to arise, with speciﬁc mention that spot rates in early 1974 have
been lower than during 1973 and that there are political and economic uncertainties in the oil industry. However, ex-
pressions of uncertainty about the future are muted. Management state they are still actively managing future risks
through “secur(ing) an increasing number of long term affreightment contracts” (Burmah Oil Company Limited Annual
Report 1973, p. 9). Further agreements for the future transportation of LNG are noted in BOC's 1973 annual report,
including a major order from Pertamina (the Indonesian state oil company). The risk attached to the ﬁnancial commit-
ments of chartering tankers is, as in the 1972 annual report risk disclosures, seen as being managed by being matched to a
very substantial degree by income that will be derived from long-term transportation contracts BOT has entered into.
Thus, the report implies that risk is being managed right through to the year 2000; twenty seven years in the future. The
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long-term conﬁdence of the management team is evident in its discussion of future prospects and long-term objectives
being based on:… planning to take advantage of the changing world energy pattern (and) (w)e are now seeing some of the fruits of the
company's policies and I look forward with conﬁdence to further progress in the years ahead. (Burmah Oil Company
Limited Annual Report 1973, p. 9)
The long term planning horizon, thorough risk assessments, judicious balancing of different risks and the risk-reward
balance discussions in the risk disclosures are indicative of the hierarchical form of social relations. Thus, we argue that
the risk disclosures do indeed reﬂect the type of social relations identiﬁed as dominant in BOC during the period 1971e1973.
The hierarchical form of social organisation that dominates in the company before the ﬁnancial crisis and that is reﬂected in
the risk disclosures in the annual reports of 1971e1973 is, however, disrupted by the tanker crisis in 1974. The discussion of
the pattern of social relations and analysis of the risk disclosures for the period 1974e1976 are presented next.
5.1.2. The pattern of social relations in the post-crisis period 1974e1976
Hierarchically conﬁgured organisations are prone to assume the current order of things will continue for the long-term
and when this does not happen this causes alarm. This is unlike, for example, individualist institutions that are usually
less surprised when plans do not come to fruition and setbacks arise. The dramatic events associated with the tanker ﬂeet
crisis quickly resulted in BOC managers becoming concerned whether the prior loyalty they had shown toward the
company was now merited, on the grounds the company was now unable to offer them security for the foreseeable
future. That is, the hierarchical form of social organisation in BOC no longer appeared viable to managers as it was unable
to deliver on a promise of job security because of the company's losses. In addition, previous entitlements were
withdrawn:… every element of cost should be critically re-examined with a view to curtailment or a drastic reduction in 1975…
Business entertaining should be restricted to the bare minimum. The private dining rooms at Burmah House will be
closed for the time being …. Travel in the UK and abroad is to be strictly conﬁned to obvious operational necessity.
Revised entitlement rules will shortly be published … Company cars e orders for new cars have been cancelled. (13
January 1975, arc 232,532)
For those employed within BOC this lead to social integration, which was previously strong, dissipating due to new
personnel entering the company. To deal with the BOT problems a new Chairman and Managing Director joined BOC on
23 January 1975. In turn the new Chairman instigated a major reconﬁguration of the Board of Directors of BOC and
appointed a new chief executive for the tanker company on 10 February 1975. This resulted in a number of existing
directors resigning. Thus, the senior management team became very different after the bailout with many ‘outsiders’ being
brought into the company and there was no longer a prevailing view that internal recruitment was applicable. The
appointment of external staff to the senior management team weakened community bonds and relationships acquired a
distance not previously evident; however, the degree of social regulation remained largely unaffected with, for example,
roles retaining clarity. Hence, the isolate form of organisation appears to have become dominant with its low group e high
grid conﬁguration.
Evidence from the archives indicating the isolate thought style is prevalent is noticeable in respect of attempts at man-
aging being heavily constrained and managing for the short-term dominating. For example, in a draft letter from BOC to the
deputy governor of the Bank of England (13 October 1975, arc 139,791), the Board have to request approval of their proposed
actions from Bank of England and Her Majesty's Government. The letter also highlights the pressure being placed on the
company by the shareholders' action group. This letter reveals the many constraints senior managers are operating under and
how they are, for the most part, not able to operate pro-actively but are reacting to the views and actions of external
stakeholders. A short-term planning horizon is also apparent with the focus of the letter being wholly on the short-term
future of the company.
There is also evidence of coping and getting by on the part of management. For example, in a Chairman's brief to senior
staff (4 December 1975, arc 138,765) he notes that “(t)he fact is that what we have got to do is to try and not lose credibility”
and in this brief there is a strong indication the company feels it is dealing with factors which are hard to predict and, again,
that they have little choice but to respond to situations as they arise:
The situation here is that that is a loan andwe have as part of the package negotiation to decide exactly how that loan is
going to be dealt with and it is amatter of what the Government will accept andwhatwe are prepared to accept. So that
the terms onwhich the loan is going to be continued and the price of Ninian are to an extent interlocked. And until we
can have some feel for the amount we are going to get for Ninian and some concept of what wewould like for the loan,
quite clearly our ﬁnancial planning is a little difﬁcult to predict just at the moment but what has happened as a result of
this agreement or agreement to negotiate is that now we will have to amend if you like, our plans to an extent. (4
December 1975, arc 138,765)
That the company is simply coping with events as they arise is also indicated, for example, in the proceedings of the 73rd
Annual General Meeting of the company:
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Ladies and Gentlemen. Among the many difﬁculties with which I have had to cope since taking ofﬁce at the end of
January… As I have already indicated, the organisation must to some extent follow events rather than precede them.
The ﬁnal shape of the company will depend upon the outcome of discussions and negotiations now in progress on
several fronts. (6 June 1975, arc 131,412)
Thus, we can see that the pattern of social relations at BOC changes to isolate form due to the tanker ﬂeet crisis. The year
1974 marks a transition associated with the shock caused by the change of fortunes and the subsequent reorganisation of the
company, and the changes in the risk disclosures in the annual reports post-crisis are discussed next.
5.1.3. Risk disclosures in the post-crisis period 1974e1976
The analysis of the BOC risk disclosures in the period 1974e1976 suggests they are no longer in accord with a hier-
archical thought style and instead accord with an isolate thought style. In 1974 there was a loss before extraordinary items
of £8 m and no ﬁnal dividend was recommended by the Board of Directors. The audit report explains the accounts as
prepared:… do not reﬂect any future adverse effects, which could be material if computed on the basis of prevailing freight rates,
that may be produced on the group's affairs by certain contracts in existence at 31st December 1974, relating to
shipping operations… (Burmah Oil Company Limited Annual Report 1974, p. 26)
The waning of the hierarchical ordering is apparent in the 1974 annual report risk disclosures that show incredulity that
the careful risk planning as described in the 1971, 1972 and 1973 annual reports should come to grief through “circumstances
that so unexpectedly overtook the company” (Burmah Oil Company Limited Annual Report 1974, p. 9). The 1974 loss is
discussed in detail and there is signiﬁcant disbelief that so many signiﬁcant events could all come together at the same time
and result in such severe consequences. The crux of the issue is the signiﬁcant reduction in demand for crude oil resulting in
excess tanker capacity and a consequent fall in freight rates.
This leads BOT to adopt a loss absorption strategy by laying up some of its tankers and allowing others to run at a loss
because of the severely depressed freight rates. The discussion of how BOT has been adversely affected by a dramatic fall in
freight rates ranges widely and is concerned with the constraints these events have imposed on BOC. Thus, there are dis-
cussions regarding “unilateral actions of the OPEC countries after the war of 1973” and the “many other factors” that have
resulted in oil prices rising by a factor of ﬁve. For example, these other factors include inﬂationary effects on working capital
requirements, the need for further ﬁnance to maintain developments in respect of North Sea oil and construction delays in
respect of the Bahamas trans-shipment facility. These multiple events are all considered unprecedented. Graphics in the
annual report emphasise this disjuncture between past and present with a chart clearly depicting ‘before and after’ plum-
meting monthly freight rates.
In BOC's 1974 annual report risk disclosures the company highlights they are looking to understand what the worst case
scenario might be. They wish to estimate the “absolute maximum commitments that could arise in the worst of all possible
cases over a long period of time if no corrective action were taken” (Burmah Oil Company Limited Annual Report 1974, p. 8).
There is acknowledgement this is going to be very difﬁcult. Note 36 to the accounts states that a:… material number of vessels on charter … cannot in present circumstances be proﬁtably employed and it remains
impossible to predict the amount of income likely to be received over the period of the commitments (Burmah Oil
Company Limited Annual Report 1974, p. 39).
There is an acceptance that the outlook for the tanker market is “bleak” and that a signiﬁcant proportion of the tankers are
simply a burden on the company's resources. The notion that the Bahamas trans-shipment facility would be a great asset is
fully revised and this idea is judged “invalidated by events” (Burmah Oil Company Limited Annual Report 1974, p. 8). The
company is bearing the costs of constructing ﬁve tankers which it is committed to purchasing although has yet to ﬁnd suitable
ﬁnance to do this. In effect this is the isolate being resigned to accepting that the worst can, and does, happen in life. It is also
an acceptance that all that can be done is to acknowledge the losses and look to subsist by coping as best you can. Hence, it
becomes a case of keeping one's head down and getting by if possible.
The tanker ﬂeet risk disclosures in the BOC's 1975 annual report begin in similar vein to the 1974 risk disclosures and,
hence, continue to display an isolate thought style. Initially, there is reference to the “bleakness” of the circumstances that the
company faced in the prior year and the world is described as being in “disarray”:… stockholders will know only too well of the bleak circumstances… difﬁcult task of reconstruction… the year 1975
was one of great difﬁculty … in a world in which considerable disarray has arisen.
(Burmah Oil Company Limited Annual Report 1975, p.5).
Hence, in the annual reports of 1974, 1975 and 1976 there is a sense that the strategy is to absorb losses and survive by
coping (6, 2013) as isolates are prone to do. Pre-crisis the company had been suggesting a strategy of risk diversiﬁcation and
now the objective is to “remain an oil-based enterprise … (whilst) … ﬁghting for survival” (Burmah Oil Company Limited
Annual Report 1975, p. 9). Assets are disposed of as a means of surviving and transportation contracts are re-negotiated to try
to reduce exposure to losses.
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6. Conclusion
This paper has examined social relations within BOC in the period 1971e1976 to assess whether the risk disclosures in the
company's annual reports are consistent with the patterns of social relations identiﬁed. The study explored an important
British company (BOC) during a period where a major event occurred in 1974. Drawing on archival sources and employing
neo-Durkheimian institutional theory, the analyses identify the dominant pattern of social relations in the period 1971e1973
as hierarchical and in the period 1974e1976 as isolate. The archival evidence for a hierarchical form of social organisation is
indicated by both high group and high grid dimensions. The high group dimension is perceptible in a preference for
rewarding staff who demonstrate a commitment to serving the best interests of the group and in a preference for promoting
from within the company rather than through recruiting managers external to the company. The high grid dimension is
apparent in the organisational structure with roles being distinct and deference to authority occurs. The change in the
dominant form of social organisation arises as a result of the hierarchical form of social organisation not being able to fulﬁl its
promise that demonstrating a commitment to the group will result in a reciprocation whereby the group will provide for the
individual. The previous expectation of job security dissipates as the tanker ﬂeet crisis progresses and impacts negatively on
the ﬁnancial position of the company. External directors are brought in and communal bonds weaken resulting in the group
dimensionweakening, whilst social regulation remains largely unchanged. Hence, an isolate form of social relations comes to
the fore with management efforts greatly constrained and planning directed towards the short-term.
The study ﬁnds the annual report risk disclosures consistent with the dominant pattern of social relations in each
respective period, 1971e1973 and 1974e1976. Therefore, the study supports the view that the pattern of social relations does
inﬂuence both the risk perceptions and risk attitudes of the company contained within the annual report risk disclosures. In
the pre-crisis annual reports, the risk disclosures discuss how BOC management are conﬁdent in planning for the long-term
and enacting a risk management strategy that balances risk and reward. By contrast, in the annual reports after the tanker
ﬂeet crisis the risk management strategy is rooted in the short-term and a relatively desperate form of coping occurs with
survival the aim. Overall, the results suggest a causal connection between the pattern of social relations and the risk
disclosures.
The research has implications for our understandings of risk disclosure. If risk disclosures are a function of a company's
form of social organisation this assists us in understanding what is motivating managers to provide particular sets of risk
disclosure narratives in the annual report. Namely, risk disclosures reﬂect the risk perceptions and risk attitudes associated
with the dominant pattern of social relations for the company. This leads to a further implication in respect of risk disclosure
policy. It is commonly suggested that risk disclosures should provide investors and other stakeholders with information
regarding the most important risks a company faces. However, if it is accepted that the pattern of social relations inﬂuences
risk perceptions this implies a company will be constrained from observing the full range of risks that might potentially
impact on its operations. Consequently, there will be an inevitable bias in respect of the risks that will be disclosed by a
company; the bias being dependent on the form of social organisation. A practical, and policy-related, implication that arises
for regulators is how to overcome this problem of companies having risk disclosure bias. A possible way forward is through
recognising that any company will comprise all four solidarities. If a suitable mechanism can be found within a company to
enable all four solidarities to contribute to discussions regarding potential risks then this might provide a broader set of risk
disclosures for inclusion in the annual report. However, this would require the dominant solidarity to recognise that value can
be derived from listening to the voices of other solidarities.
A further aspect is that the study counters the tendency to assume that risk management and risk disclosure are new
phenomena. Discussions surrounding risk management and risk disclosure may appear to have intensiﬁed since the end of
the 1990's; however, companies have always had to contend with risk and the examination of the BOC annual reports in-
dicates that risk information has been provided prior to the 1990s. As discussed in the literature review, risk disclosure
research is still developing and prior research has largely aimed to gather insights into the principal characteristics of risk
disclosures without analysing the speciﬁc and detailed subject matter that might provide an understanding of the risk dis-
closures. Additionally, prior risk disclosure research has largely relied upon theories that have originated in economics and
management and there has not been adoption of other theories that might be better able to assess why a particular set of risk
disclosures has been provided by the company. Therefore, in this study neo-Durkheimian institutional theory has been used
to offer a causally-based explanation for annual report risk disclosures.
A limitation of the research is that interpretation of the archival sources and risk disclosures is required for assessing the
dominant pattern of social relations. For instance, interpretations drawn regarding the managerial motivations for disclosing
risk information in the annual reports may be subjective. Additionally, management may deliberately not disclose infor-
mation on a speciﬁc adverse situation. Methodological limitations lie in the gaining of permission to use the archival col-
lections and physical access. Despite advances in digitisation, the authors had to visit the archives where the collections are
held and there is the possibility there are missing papers which the authors are unaware of. A ﬁnal limitation lies in
examining a single company in a UK context. Hence, there is a need for further case-based research that uses this theory to be
undertaken to corroborate the results. The theory should apply regardless of company location and, therefore, it may be
particularly helpful for further studies to examine non-UK companies. Archival research is not the only means for identifying
patterns of social relations and future studiesmight instead opt for an ethnographic approach to identify the patterns of social
relations at the case companies. Another route for future research projects is to consider a comparative study examining a
range of case companies where it is likely that the four different forms of solidarity can be observed or where there are
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examples of hybridity whereby two or more forms of social organisation combine to dominate in a company. These results
suggest that it could also be beneﬁcial for accounting academics researching risk disclosure to consider employing alternative
risk theories from the ﬁelds of sociology and anthropology.
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